“THE HINGE OF FATE" AMERICAN VICTORY AT MIDWAY ISLAND

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26264, 8 November 1950, Page 6

“THE HINGE OF FATE" AMERICAN VICTORY AT MIDWAY ISLAND

[By the Rt. Hon. WINSTON CHURCHILL] XXII

The advance into the Coral Sea was only the opening phase in the new Japanese policy of expansion. Even while it was in progress Yamamoto, the Japanese Admiralissimo, was preparing to challenge American power in the Central Paciffc by seizing Midway Island, with its ai ‘ neld -,. 1 ™ I P h *“.*'2 Pearl Harbour itself, another thousand miles to the east, could be threatened and perhaps dominated. the same time a diversionary force was to seize uiselul points of vantage in. the Western Aleutians; By careful timing of his moments Yamamoto hoped first to draw the American fleet north to counter the threat to the Aleutians and leave him free to throw his main strength against Midway Island. By the time the Americans could intervene here in force he hoped to have possession of the island ana to be rea ~y to meet the counter-attack with oveiwhelming force. The importance to the United States of Midway, the Outpost of Pearl Harbour, was such that these movements must inevitably about a major clash. Yamamoto felt confident that he could force a aecisive battle on his own . terms ana that with his great superiority, particularly in fast battleships, he would stand an excellent chance of annihilating his enemy. That was the broad plan which he imparted to his inate. Admiral Nagumo. AU depended however on Admiral Nimitz falling into the trap, and equally on his having no counter-surprise of his own. The American commander was vigilant and active. His intelligence kept him well imformed, even as to the date when the expected blow was to During the last week of May the Japanese forces allotted to this great enterprise, comprising the mam strength of the Japanese Navy began to move from their bases. The first to go was the Aleutian diversionary force, which was to attack Dutch Harbour on June 3 and draw the American fleet in that direction. Thereafter, landing forces were to seize the islands of Attu, Kiska, and Adak, farther to the westward. Nagumo with his Sroup of . four carriers would strike at Midway the following day, and thereafter on June 5 the landing force would arrive and capture the island. All this was expected to be achieved without serious opposition. Yamamoto with his battle fleet would meanwhile lie well back to the westward, outside the range of air search, ready to strike wrien the expected American counterattack developed. Activity at Pearl Harbour Meanwhile at Pearl Harbour the greatest activity prevailed. The Enterprise and Hornet arrived from the south on May 26. The Yorktown appeared next day, with damage calculated to take three months to repair, but by a* decision worthy of the crisis within 48 hours she was made taut and fit for battle and was rearmed with a new air group. She sailed again on the 30th to join Admiral Spruance, who had left two days before with the other two carriers. Admiral Fletcher remained in tactical command of the combined force. At Midway the aitfleld was crammed with bombers, and the ground forces for the defence of the island were keyed -to the highest pitch of expectancy. Early information of the approach of the enemy was imperative, and continuous air search began on May 30. Meanwhile United States submarines watched the west and north of Midway. Four days passed in acute suspense. At 9 a.m. on June 3 a Catalina flying boat on patrol more than 700 miles west of Midway sighted a group of 11 enemy ships. The bombing and torpedo attacks which followed were unsuccessful, except for a torpedo hit on a tanker, but the battle hgd begun, and all uncertainty about the enemy’s intentions was dispelled. Admiral Fletcher through his intelligence sources had good reason to believe that the enemy carriers would approach Midway from the north-west, and he was not put off by the reports received of the first sighting. which he correctly judged to be only a group of transports. He turned his carriers to reach his chosen position about 200 miles north of Midway by dawn on the 4th, ready to pounce on Nagumo’s flank *if and when he appeared. First Action June 4 broke clear and bright, and at 5.34 a.m. a patrol from Midway at last broadcast the long-awaited signal reporting the approach of the Japanese aircraft carriers. Reports began to arrive thick and fast. Many planes were seen heading for Midway, and battleships were sighted, supporting the carriers. At 6.30 a.m. the attack came in hard and strong. It received a resolute reception, and probably one-third of the attackers never returned. Much damage was done and many casualties suffered, but the airfield remained serviceable. There had been time to launch a counter-attack at Nagumo’s fleet. His crushing euperiority In fighters took heavy toll, and the results of this gallant stroke, on which great hopes were set, were disappointing The distraction caused by their onslaught seems, hotvever, to have clouded the judgment of the Japanew commander, who was also told by his airmen that a second strike at Midwav would be necessary. He had retained on board a sufficient number of aircraft to deal with any American carriers which might appear, but he was not expecting them, afid his search had been u al j he . a . rted and at flrst fruitless. Now he decided to break up the formations which had been held in readiness for this purpose and to rearm them for another strike nt Midway. In any case it was necessary to clear his flight decks to recover the aircraft returning from the first attack. This decision proved fatal, and although Nagumo late , r . heard of an American force, including one carrier, to the eastward, it was too late. He was condemned to receive the full weight of the American attack with his flight decks encumbered with useless bombers, refuelling and rearming. . . Fierce Strike at Enemy Admirals Fletcher and Spruanee by their earlier cool judgment were well men? 1 Th this crucial moment. They had intercepted the news aS ? 8 ln d ,'i rin £ the early morning, ? i? 1 7 a [”- , thp Entar P r ise and Horthev ,0 ] , aun fu h a strike with a ” they had, save for those aircraft needed

for their own defence. The Yn»n whose aircraft had been cariyK?! the morning search, was delaveil ? .S 4 these were recovered, but her force, too. was in the air soon S'* 9 a.m.. by which time the first from the other two carriers wp^ ave * proaching their prey. The near the enemy was cloudv X? dive bombers failed at first their target. The Hornet’s gram “ ail aware that the enemy hadhirS P aver J°j lnd then ' and the battle. Owing to this misch.r the first attacks were made by tor!!? bombers alone from all three carri and, although pressed home with courage, were unsuccessful in the fS of the overwhelming opposition Of 41 torpedo bombers which ‘J? tacked only six returned. Their a votion brought its reward While li Japanese eyes and all available ftahS strength were turned on them th, dive bombers from the Enterpriw .l! Yorktown arrived on the scene. Aln,,„ unopposed, their bombs crashed Nagumo’s flagship the Akagi. and hL sister ship the Kaga, and about same time another wave of 17 bombw. from the Yorktown struck the Son? In a few minutes the decks ofbll thr» ships were a shambles, littered ww blazing and exploding aircraft Beln» tremendous fires broke out, and It soon clear that all three shim doomed. Admiral Nagumo could S shift his flag to a cruiser and waM three-quarters of his fine commlS burn.

Japanese Retaliate It was past noon by the time th. Americans had recovered their air craft. They had lost over 60 in afi. but the prize they had gained was erui Of the enemy carriers only the Hinn remained, and she at once resolved to strike a blow for the banner of ths Rising Sun. As the American nlloh were telling their tale on board th. Yorktown after their return neni came that an enemy attack was an. proaching. The enemy, reported to t» about 40 strong, pressed home the attack with vigour, and, besides btini heavfly mauled by tighten snj gunfire, the Yorktown suffered three omb hits. Severely damaged but with her fires under control, she car ried on until some two hours later the Hiryu struck again, this time with torpedoes. This attack ultimatelr proved fatal, although the shin remained afloat until sunk two days after by a Japanese submarine.

The loss of the Yorktown was avenged, even while she still floated The Hiryu was located at 2.45 n.nu and within the hour 24 dive bombers from the Enterprise were winging their way towards her. At 5 pjn. they struck, and in a few minutes she too was a flaming wreck, though she did not sink until the following mominz The last of Nagumo’s four fleet carrier had been smashed, and with then were lost all their highly trained aircrews. These could never be replaced So ended the battle of June d, rightly regarded as the turning point of the war in the Pacific. Importance of Victory It Is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this memorable American victory, not only to the United States, but to the whole Allied cause. The moral effect was tremendous and instantaneous. At one stroke the dominant position of Japan in the Pacific whs reversed. The glarins ascendancy of the enemy, which had frustrated our combined endeavoun throughout the Far East for six months, was gone for ever. From this moment all our thoughts turned with sober confidence to the offensive. No longer did we think in terms of where the Japanese might strike the next blow, but where we could best strib at him to win back the vast territorim that he had overrun in, his headions rush. The road would be long sm hard, and massive preparations were still needed to win victory in the East but the issue was not in doubt; nor need the demands from this theatre impinge too heavily on the great effort the United States was preparing to exert in Europe. Reflection on Japanese leadership at this time is instructive. Twice within s month their sea end air M been deployed in battle with aggressive skill and determination, time when their air component had been roughly handled they had withdrawn from their chosen objective, even though on each occasion, it wm within their grasp. The men ot Midway, Admirals Yamamoto. Nssum> and Kondo, were those who planhsd and carried out the bold and tremendous operations which in four months destroyed the Allied fleets in ths Far East and drove the British Essterr. Fleet out of the Indian Ocean. Yamamoto withdrew at Midway because, ai the entire course of the war had shown, a fleet without air cover and several thousand miles from its base could not risk remaining within range of a force accompanied by carries with • air groups largely intact He ordered the transport force to retire because it would have been tantamount to suicide to assault, without air support, an island defended by air forces and physically so small that surprise was impossible. In general, the rigidity of the Japanese. planning and the tendency to abandon the object when their plans did not go according to schedule is thought to have been largely due to the cumbersome and imprecise nature of their language, which rendered It extremely difficult to improvise by means of signalled communications. One other lesson of these events stands out in sharp relief. The American Intelligence system was successful in penetrating the enemy's most closely guarded secrets well in advance ot events. Thus Admiral Nimitx. albeit the weaker, was twice able to/concentrate all the forces he had in sufficient strength at the right time snd place. When the htgir struck this proved decisive. The importance of secrecy and the dire consequences of leakage of information in war sn here proclaimed. (To be continued) [Copyright 1950 in U.S.A, by the New York Times Company and Tima (publishers of Time and Life); the British Empire by the Daily Tele- ' graph. Ltd.: elsewhere by International Co-operation Press Service, Inc. World rights reserved. Reproduction m full or in any part in any language strictly prohibited.]