"THE HINGE OF FATS" CORAL SEA BATTLE: VARYING FORTUNES

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26263, 7 November 1950, Page 6

"THE HINGE OF FATS" CORAL SEA BATTLE: VARYING FORTUNES

tBV th« W* H<w ’ W,NSTON CHURCHILL] XXI

We must now turn aside to> note the impact of stirring eve 2^’D;'an S P were Ocean where the striving their utmost to stem the advancing tide of enemy conquest. By the end of March the Japanese had achieved almost complete success, suprising even to themselves, in th ohasc of their war plan. TW were masters of Malaya. Slam, Hong Kong. » int n o d ßu’rTa. ot Japanese arrogance was now af IU zenifii. The uniform success wj“« h *>•.“ attended their arms had inflamed thgir martial spirit, and- ei? engender a mood of unwarranted ex altation and a belief that Wesiern Powers hSd not the will to fight > to the death. This belief was soon to cost them dear. Except in Burma, where their advance continued., their forces stood on a perimeter which had been carefully chosen in ’heir pre-war p ans as the prudent limit of their initial thrusts. Within this immense area they could consolidate their Wins and develop their newly won resources. Given a breathing-space, they felt confident that they could withstand a renewed American onslaught when it came and at their own. chosen moment surge forward again in a new wave of conquest Offiis was the prewar plan, but now, flushed with victory, the Japanese leaders were tempted to enlarge their ideas. It seemed to them that they could safely seize the heaven-sent °PP <>r * unlt y further quick expansion and so gain treater depth for defence. .. After some deliberation in Tokyo it was decided to extend the defensive perimeter outwards to include tne Western Aleutians. Midway Island Samoa. Fiji, New Caledonia and Port Morseby. in Southern New Guinea. These movements would threaten tne American main base at Pearl Harbour and in the south would sever direct communication between the United States and Australasia and provide them with suitable bases from which to launch further’ attacks southward when the time was ripe. In reaching this decision the Japanese gravely un-der-estimated the recuperative powers of the United States and overlooked the inherent weaknesses in their own national economy. They had not the resources to maintain the defence oi such vast areas, and when in due course their outer perimeter was breached they were so weakened that i they no longer possessed the power to defend the inner vital zone. As we shall see, the strategic decisions taken at this time .were ultimately fatal to their chances of winning the war. Before long their advancing tide of conquest was arrested and then turned' back. By the early months of 1943 the ebb had begun. Japanese Expansion At the end of April 1942 the Japanese High Command resolved oh the first step in their new policy of expansion. This was to include the capture of R>rt Moresby and the seizure of 'Tulagi, in the Southern Solomons, opposite the large island of Guadalcanal. The occupation of Port Moresby would complete the first stage of their domination of New Guinea and give added security to their advanced naval base at Rabaul, in New Britain. From New Guinea and from the Solomons they could begin the envelopment of Australia. American intelligence quickly became aware of a Japanese edneentration in these waters. Forces were observed to be assembling at Rabaul from their main naval base at Turk, in the Caroline Islands, and a southward drive was clearly Imminent. It was even possible to forecast May 3 as the date when operations would begin. The American carrier forces had at this time been widely dispersed I on various missions, 'including that of launching General Doolittle's bold and spectacular air attack against Tokyo itself on April 18. This event, occurs ing at a crucial moment, had indeed been a factor in determining the new Japanese policy. Conscious of the threat in the south. Admiral Nimitz at once began to assemble the strongest possible force in the Coral Sea. Rear-Admiral Fletcher was already there, with the carrier Yorktown and three heavy cruisers. On May 1 he was joined by the ■ carrier Lexington and two more cruisers from Pearl Harbour under Rear-Admiral Fitch, and three days later by a squadron commanded by a British officer, Rear-Ad-miral Crace, including the Australian cruisers Australia an<T Hobart and the American cruiser Chicago. The only other carriers immediately available, the Enterpriae and Hornet, had been engaged in the Tokyo raid, and though they were sent south as rapidly as possible they could not join Admiral Fletcher until the middle of May. Be-, fore then the impending battle had been fought Enemy Landing at Tulagi On May 3, while refuelling* at sea some 400 miles south of Guadalcanal. Admiral Fletcher learned that the enemy had landed at ’Tulagi, appar's'l th the immediate object of establishing there a seaplane base from which to observe the eastern approaches to the Coral Sea. In view of the obvious threat to this outpost the small Australian garrison had been withdrawn two days previously. Fletcher at once set off to attack the island with only his own task group; Fitch’s group were still fuelling. Early on the following morning aircraft from the Yorktown struck at Tulagi in strength b 9t the enemy covering forces had withdrawn ana only a few destroyers and-small craft remained. The results were disappointing. . The next two days passed without important incident, but it was evident that a major clash could not be long delayed. Fletcher s three groups having refuelled, were now all in company, standing to, the north-westward towards New Guinea. He was aware that the Port Moresby invasion force had left Rabaul, and would probably pass through the Jomard Passage in fb! rchi pelago. on either ine 7tn or 8:h. He was also aware that three enemy carriers were in the neighbourhood, hut had no knowledge of their whereabouts. In fact, the Japanese striking force, comprising the carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku, with two heavy cruisers in support, had come south from Truk, keeping to the eastward of the Solomons, well out of entered Of lh2 r r reCO i n c aiS,a . nce ’ ®’ <l had the . Cor »l Sea from ths east on the evening of the Sth. On the 6th cl ?*’ n .E in ° n Flesher. a J. <me time in the evening were I® miles away, but neither aide ",® s ** are . of the presence of the Dur , ln < jhe night the forces and on the morning of the 7th Fletcher reached his chosen oosition south of the Louisiad.es, where intended to strike at the invasion force. He now detached Grace’s group exit'fr± ea tb *? d c 2X e £. ,he southern h» miob? the J omard Passage, where texpect to meet the enemy that day Grace was soon spotted, and in the afternoon was heavily attacked tornid^ CeS b Ve , waves "f shore-based torpedo bombers. comparable in PrisS h o ) V Wnl thoSe a o ich t l° d £Unk thc le J ßcpu’se. By_skil ful handling* and good fortune not a ship was hit, and he continued onwards fb»f ar fh‘ Port M °cscby; until, hearing that the enemy had turned back, he withdrew to the southward. ~ D »n«r of Enemy Carriers Meanwhile Admiral Fletcher's chief concern remained the enemy carriers. a * whwh he still had no precise news' At dawn he commenced a wide search, and at 8.15 a.m. he was rewarded bv a report of two carriers and four cruisers north of the Louisiades. In fact the enemy sighted was not the carrier striking force, but the weak" escort C b° I v £ rinK , t . he invasion transports, which included the light carrier Shoho. However, Fletcher struck with o, 1 ’ strength, and three hours later tti’e Shoho was overwhelmed and sunk. This event, which deprived the invasion force of its air cover, caused it to r ev .t r - se ‘‘s. course until the situation farther south had been clarified. Thus the transports intended for Port Mot-es-ov n ever entered the Jomard Passage. n^ri r « mained 2 0rth °f the Louisiades ur, tll finally ordered to withdraw. Fletcher’s whereabouts were now to ’ ene mv and he was in a serious predicament. An enemv attack must be expected at any time,

and his own striking force* wnuM not be re-armed and ready for further action until the afternoon. Luckily for him the weather in his vicinity . was'thick and getting worse and the enemy had no radar. The Japatiem carrier force was in fact well within striking distance to the eastwards They launched an attack during ths afternoon, but in the squally, murky weather the planes missed their tar get. Returning empty-handed to their carriers, they passed close to Fletchert force, and were detected on the radar screen. Fighters were sent out V, i n tercept, and in a conlused njelee in the gathering darkness many Japane» planes were destroyed. Few of the » bombers which had set out rewainM their ships to take part in the' battE next day. Both sides, knowing how close that were together, contemplated makin*. « night attack with surface forces Both judged the olan too hazardous. During the night the two forces once more drew apart, and on the morning of th* Sth the luck of the weather was reversed. It was now the Japanese Who had the shelter afforded by low eloM whereas Fletcher's ship* were htthtei’ in the brilliant sunshine. The game df hide-and-seek began again. At 831 g search plane from the Lexington at last located the enemy, and about the same time an intercepted signal made it plain that the enemy, too, had sighted the American carriers. A fullscale battle between two equal and well-balanced forces was at hand Before 9 a.m. an American striking force comprising 82 aircraft was bo. ing launched and by 9.25 all were on their way. About the same time the enemy were launching a similar strike of 69. American Attack Develops The American attack developed about U a.m., the Jananese some jo minutes later. By 11.40 all was ov*t The American aircraft had trouble with low cloud round the target. When they found it one of the enemy carrien headed for the Dover of a rain-squall and the whole of the attack was thrown against the other, whleh proved .to be the Shokaku. Three bomb hits were rcored and file sMSa was set on fire, but the damage at to* time was over-estimated. Although put out of action for the time befog, the Shokaku was able to reach Mme for repairs The Zuikaka remained m. scatbed. Meanwhile in clear weather th* Japanese attack went in against the Yorktown and Lexington. By most skillful manoeuvring the Yorktowa evaded nearly all attacks, but suffered many near misses and one bomb hit which caused severe casualties and started a fire. This was soon brought under control and the ship’s fighting efficiency was little impaired. Ths less handy Lexington was not so fortunate, taking two toroedo hits and two or three borttbs. The end of the action found her heavily on fire and listing to port, with three boiler rooms floodk ed. By gallant exertions the fires were brought under control, the list WM corrected, and the ship soon was making 25 knots. The aircraft losses on both sides in the fierce encounter, the first in history between carriers, were assessed after the war, Americtn. < 33; Japanese, 43. Disaster For American* If events in the Coral Sea had ended here the balance would clearly kav* been in the Americans' favour. They had sunk the light carrier Shoho, severely damaged the Shokaku. and turned back the invasion force Intended for Port Moresby. Their own two carriers seemed tc be in fair shape, and their only loss up to this point was a fleet tanker, with her attendant destroyer, which had bawl sunk the previous day by the JapateM ■ carriers. Unfortunately a disaster now overtook them. An hour after file battle ended the Lexington was t heavily shaken by internal explosiffo. < Fires broke out below which spread and. became uncontrollable. Valiant efforts to save the ship proved of no avail, and that evening she was abandoned without further loss of life »nd sunk bv an American torpedo. Both sides now withdrew from the Coral Sea. and both claimed the victory. Th* Japanese propaganda, in’ strident , terms, declared that not only both Fletcher's carriers, but. also a battieship and a heavy cruiser, had been sunk. Their own actions after the battle were inconsistent with this belief. They postponed until July their advance towards Port Moresby, although the way was now open to them. By theh tne - whole scene had changed, and th* stroke was adandoned in favour of an advance overland from the bases thty had already gained in New Guine*. In fact, these days marked the limit ot the Japanese drive by sea towards Australia. On the American side the conservation of carrier forces was the prime necessity. Admiral Nimitz was well aware that greater events were looming farther north, which would need everything he had. He was content to have arrested for the time being the Japanese move into the Coral Sea, and instantly recalled to Pearl Harbour all his carriers, including the Enterpriae and • Hornet then hastening to join Fletcher. Wisely, too, the loss of the Lexington was concealed until after the Midway Island battle, asr the Japanese were obviously uncertain about the true state of affaire and wet* groping for imfermation. This battle had an effect out of progortion to its tactical importance trategically it was a welcome American victory, the first against Japan, and the first battle at sea in which surface ships never exchanged a shot The news blazed round the world with tonic effect, bringing immense relief and encouragement to Australia and New Zealand as well as to the United States. Tactically the lessons learned here at heavy cost were soon applied with outstanding success in the Battle of Midway. Island, the opening moves of which were now about to be begin. (To be Continued). ICooyright 1950 irt U.S.A, by th* New York Times Company and Time* Inc. (publishers of Time and Life): fn the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph. Ltd.; elsewhere by International Co-operation Press Service, foe. World rights reserved. Reproduction in full or in any part in any language strictly prohibited ]