THE MEN OF VICHY FOIL RESISTANCE IN AFRICA

Press, Volume LXXXV, Issue 25739, 26 February 1949, Page 6

THE MEN OF VICHY FOIL RESISTANCE IN AFRICA

CHURCHILL MEMOIRSt

BOOK II

[By the Rt. Hon. .WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, M.P.]

XIX

When the Petain Government was formed, the plan of going to Africa to set up a centre of power outside German control was still open. It was discussed at a meeting of the Petain Cabinet on June 18 (1940). The same evening President Lebrun, Petain, and the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber met together. There seems to have been general agreement at least to send a representative body to North Africa. Even the Marshal was not hostile. He himself intended to stay, but saw no reason why Chautemps. Vice-President of the Council, should not go and act in his name. When rumours of an impending exodus ran round agitated Bordeaux, Weygand was hostile. Such a move, he thought, would wreck the “honourable” armistice negotiations. Laval was deeply alarmed. He feared that the setting up of an effective resistance administration outside France would frustrate the policy on which he was resolved. Weygand and Laval set to work on the clusters of Deputies and Senators crowded into Bordeaux. TO NORTH AFRICA Darlan, as Minister of Marine, took a different view. To pack off all the principal critics of his conduct in a ship seemed at the moment to him a most convenient solution of many difficulties. Once aboard all those wjio went would be in his power, and there would be plenty of time for the Government to settle what to do. With the approval of the new Cabinet, ne offered passages on the armed auxiliary cruiser Massilia to all political figures of influence who wished to go

to Africa. The ship was to sail from the mouth of the Gironde on the 20th. Many, however, who had planned to go to Africa, including Jeanneney and Herriot, suspected a trap, and preferred to travel overland through Spain. The final party, apart from refugees, consisted of 241 Deputies and one Senator, and included Mandel, Campinchi, and Daladier, who had all been actively pressing for the move to Africa. On the afternoon of the 21st the Massilia sailed. On the 23rd the ship’s radio announced that the Petain Government had accepted and signed the armistice with Germany. Campinchi immediately tried to persuade the captain to set his course for England. but this officer no doubt had his instructions and met his former political chief of two days before with a bleak refusal. The unlucky band of patriots passed anxious hours t’ll on the evening of June 24 the Massilia anchored at Casablanca. Mandel now acted with his usual decision. He had with Daladier drafted a proclamation setting up a resistance administration in North Africa with himself as Premier. He went on shore and, after calling on the British Consul. established himself at the Hotel Excelsior. He then attempted to send his proclamation out through the Havas Agency. When General Nogues read its text he was disturbed. He intercepted the message, and it was telegraphed not to the world but to Darlan and Petain. They had now made up their minds to have no alternative and potentially rival Government outside German' power. Mandel was arrested at his hotel and brought before the local court, but the magistrate, afterwards dismissed by Vichy, declared there was no case against him and set him free. He was. however, by the orders of Gov-ernor-General Nogues. re-arrested and put back on the Massilia, which henceforth was detained in the harbour under strict control without its passengers having any communication with the shore.

MANDEL’S FATE Without of course knowing any of the facts here set forth, I was already concerned about the fate of Frenchmen who wished to fight on. PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL ISMAY. J 24.vi.40. It seems more important to establish now before the trap closes an organisation for enabling French officers and soldiers, as well as important technicians, who wish to fight, to make their way to various ports. A sort of “underground railway" as in the olden days of slavery should be- established and a Scarlet Pimpernel organisation set up. At our meeting of the War Cabinet late at night on. June 25 we heard among other things that a ship with a large number of prominent French politicians on board had passed Rabat. We decided to establish contact with them at once. Mr Duff Cooper, the Minister of Information, accompanied by Lord Gort. started for Rabat at jte wn a Sunderland flying-boat. They found the town in mourning Flags were flying at half-mast, church bells were tolling, and a solemn service was taking place in the cathedral to bewail the defeat of France. All their attempts to get in touch with Mandel were prevented. The Deputy-

i Governor, named Moricc, declared | only on the telephone but in a na° sonal interview which Duff Cooper’S’ manded. that he had no choice but t , obey the orders of his superior* I General Nogues tells me to shoot nf self I will gladly obey. Unfortunates the orders ne has given me are j cruel.” The former French Ministers and Deputies were in fact to be treated as escaped prisoners. Our mission faS no choice but to return the way the? came. A few days later (July n j ; gave instructions to the Admiralty to try to cut out the Massilia and rescui those bn board. No plan could, however, be made, and for nearly weeks she lay under the batteries of Casablanca, after which the whole , party were brought back to France and disposed of as the Vichy Government thought convenient 'to ‘henjj selves and agreeable to their German masters. Mandel began his long and i painful internment which ended in his murder by German orders at the end of 1944. Thus perished the hope* of setting up a strong representative French Government, either in Africa or in London. AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN Although vain, the process of trying to imagine what would have happened if some important event or decision had been different is often tempting and sometimes instructive. The manner of 'the fall of France was decided on June 16 by a dozen chances, each measured by a hair’s-breadth. If p aU ] Reynaud had survived the 16th I should have been with him at noon on the 17th, accompanied by the moat powerful delegation that has ever left our shores, armed with plenary powers in the name of the British nation. Certainly we should have confronted Petain. Weygand. Chautemps. and the rest with our blunt proposition: “No release from the obligation of March 28 unless the French Fleet is sailed to British ports. On the other hand, we offer an indissoluble Anglo-French Union. Go to Africa and let us fight it out together.” Surely we should have been aided by the President of the Republic, by the Presidents of the two French Chambers, and by all that resolute band who gathered behind Reynaud, Mandel, and de Gaulle. It seems to me probable that we should have uplifted and converted the defeatists round the table, or left them in a minority or even under arrest.

But let us pursue this ghostly speculation further. The French Government would have retired to North Africa. The Anglo-French Superstate or Working Committee, to which it would probably in practice have reduced itself, would have faced Hitler. The British and French Fleets from their harbours would have enjoyed complete mastery of the Mediterranean, and free passage through it for all troops and supplies. Whatever British «air force could be spared from the defence of Britain, and what was left of the French Air Force, nourished by American production and based on the French North African airfields, would soon have become an offensive factor of the first importance. Malta, instead of being for so long a care and peril would at once have taken its place as our most active naval base. Italy could have been attacked with heavy bombing from Africa far easier than from England. Her communications with the Italian armies in Libya and Tripolitania would have been effectively severed. HITLER’S CHOICE France would never have ceased to be one of the principal belligerent allies and would have been spared the fearful schism which rent and still rends her people. Her homeland no doubt would have lain prostrate under the German rule, but that was only what actually happened after the Anglo-American descent in November, 1942. Now that the whole story is before us no one can doubt that the armistice did not spare France a pang. It is still more shadowy to guess what Hitler would have done. Would he have forced his way through Spain, with or without Spanish agreement and. after assaulting and perhaps capturing Gibraltar, have invaded Tangier and Morocco? This was an area which deeply concerned the United States, and was ever prominent in President Roosevelt’s mind. How could Hitler have made this major attack through Spain on Africa and yet have fought the Battle of Britain? He would have had to choose. If he chose Africa we. with the command of the sea and the French bases, could have moved both troops air forces into Morocco and Algeria quicker than he, and ’in greater strength. We should certainly have welcomed in the autumn and winter of 1940 a vehement campaign in or from a friendly French North-west Africa. BRITAIN OR RUSSIA Surveying the whole scene in the afterlight it seems unlikely that Hitler’s main decision and the major events of the war. namely the Battle of Britain and the German surge to the East, would have been changed by the retirement of the French Government to North Africa. After the fall of Paris, when Hitler danced his jig of joy. he naturally dealt with very large propositions. Once France was prostrate he ntust if possible conquer or destroy Great Britain. His only other choice was Russia. A major operation through Spain into Northwest Africa would have prejudiced both these tremendous adventures, or at least have Dreven ted his attack on the Balkans. I have no doubt that it would have been better for all the Allies if the French Government had gone to North Africa. And that this would have remained true whether Hitler followed them and us thither or not. One day when 1 was convalescing at Marrakech in January. 1944, General Georges came to luncheon. In the. course of casual conversation I aired the fancy that oerhaos the French Government's failure to go to Africa in June. 1940. had all turned out for the best. At the Petain trial in Augusk 1945. the General thought it right tir state this in evidence. I make no complaint. but my hypothetical speculation on this occasion does not reoresent my considered opinion either during the wax* or now. (To be continued) Copyright 1949 in U.S.A, by The New York Times Companv and Time. Inc. (publisher of Time and Life); in the ?Fi t,sh Empire by th? Dailv Telegraoh Ltd.: elsewhere bv International Cooperation Press Service. Inc. World rights reserved. Reproduction in full pr in part in any language strictly prohibited.