CAMPAIGN IN ITALY

Press, Volume LXXXIV, Issue 25548, 16 July 1948, Page 7

CAMPAIGN IN ITALY

Field-Marshal Lord Wilson’s Reports PLAN TO ATTACK OVER ALPS OVERRULED (Special Correspondent N.Z.P.A.) LONDON, July 14. The belief that if his forces had not been weakened to reinfoice the Allied landing in southern t rance in August, itm, u.e Allied armies in Italy mignt nave driven the Germans beyond me Alps by the end of that year ana enner oroxen .inrough into western trance or through me Ljubljana Gap into Austria is expreseea by. FieidMarshal Lord Wiison in a series of reports to the Allied Combined Chiers of Staff, now released iof publication. Tne reports coyer the penodMay 10 to December 12, 1944, when Field-Mar-snai Wilson, tnen General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, was Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, with General Sir Harold Alexander, now t ield-Marsnal Viscount Alexander, as his army commander. Field-ivlarshai Wilson makes it plain that his opinion was strongly backed by Field-Marshal Alexander, who persistently urged the Chiefs of Stait to allow him to retain all his troops and develop his advance beyond Rome into a major breakthrough on the German southern flank. He was confident, he stated, that ii the enemy did not reinforce his southern flank that the Allied offensive would sweep into the Po valley by mid-July, and that by mid-August he would be in a position to launch an attack with 10 or 12 divisions across the Adige towards Austria. Field-Marshal Wilson, who pointed out to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that their decision must affect the possibility of ending the war in 1944 instead of early in 1945, said that he realised that the order to divert trobps from Italy to France must have a profound effect, not only upon the course of the operations in his own theatre, but upon the whole development of the war.

Overruled by General Eisenhower The representations of Field-Marshal Wilson and Field-Marshal Alexander were, however, overruled by General Eisenhower, who desired the seizure of a major port in southern France in order to provide another inlet for reinforcements then awaiting transhipment from the United States.

Although Field-Marshal Wilson sent his chief of staff to London to put his case, his arguments did not prevail, and the attack on Southern France was finally given overriding priority on June 22. At varying stages three American and four French divisions were then withdrawn from Italy, together with a substantial proportion of the Allied air support. At subsequent stages Field-Marshal Alexander renewed his pleas for reinforcements, and several times he suggested that enough arms should be supplied to equip three divisions of friendly Italians. The Chiefs of Staff, however, ruled that no arms could be diverted to the Italians other than those obtainable from captured stocks. This, says Field-Marshal Wilson, made the employment of Italians as reinforcements virtually impossible. As the Italian campaign progressed, Field-Marshal Alexander became so short of reinforcements that he was forced to reduce all the United Kingdom infantry battalions from four rifle companies to three, and to conserve manpower and shells to such an extent that offensive operations were seriously handicapped. “The fighting qualities of the troops accomplished much.” says Field-Marshal Wilson, “and the fact that the goals expected of them were not attained is not to their discredit. The dividends of this campaign were reaped on the Western and Eastern fronts and in Italy the following spring. “Operation Strangle”

“They were known during the Rome campaign as ‘operation strangle.’ and were designed to destroy bridges on all the enemy supply routes, leaving the Germans short of supplies and ammunition when the main ground offensives were launched. The severe losses inflicted upon the enemy in both campaigns are emphasised. When the Aliled forces began their attack on the Gustav Line there were 16 German divisions south of Rome and seven more in the north. As th? Allied pressure increased. Field-Marshal Kesselring moved three of his divisions in the north into the line, and later committed a total of 20 divisions. When the fighting ceased og the banks of the Amo outside Florence, it is estimated that thes° 20 divisions had been reduced to an effective strength of six.” Field-Marshal Alexander used these losses as a strong argument, in favou” of continuing the attack with the full strength of both his armies. In a

dispatch to Field-Marshal Wilson at this stage of the campaign. Field-Mar-shal Alexander said: “I now have two highly organised and skilful armies capable of carrying out large-scale attack and mobile operations in the closest co-operation. Neither the Appenines nor even the Alps should prove a serious obstacle to their enthusiasm* and skill.”