ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE THE WESTERN POWERS

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25274, 28 August 1947, Page 6

ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE THE WESTERN POWERS

COMMUNIST STRATEGY

[By

VOLNEY HURD

in the "Christian Science Monitor."!

(Published by arrangement.)

Paris, August 9.—That Molotov> strategy against the Marshall _Plan is succeeding is the consensus in Communist circles here, as the difficulties of the situation open up, giving the Rea propaganda machine plenty of material for its offensive against the American project. . . This viewpoint may come as a snocK to the United States, since the organisation of the Conference for European Economic Co-operation has been going so smoothly. But this latter is merely a technical step and the easiest. . , The following points are those giving greatest confidence to Communists at the moment:— 1. Dissension among the big Western three on the Ruhr. . 2 France’s being .forced into taking the side of the West by sponsoring the Marshall Plan conferences with England and holding them in Pans. .3. France having to yield on Runr internationalisation, which means rejection of a foreign policy almost universally supported by the French people. , 4 Points two and three mean loss of the entire base cf major French foreign policy and this is chargeable to the present Government. Added to the softening up already achieved »y the recent series of strikes and tne speeding up of the current inflationary trend, this is seen as making the downfall of Ramadier much more 5. If Ramadier goes, the Communists will re-enter the Government. Once in, they will seek to cut . the ground from under the Western orientation which Bidault was able to give, duetto the Communists being out of the Government. Had they been in, it is conceded Bidault would have had a hard ume getting the French Government to accept the Marshall offer, let alone acting as sponsor and host. Further, he ?ould never have talked up to Molotov as he did, denouncing Russia for splitting Europe.

France's Withdrawal Suggested 6. Aims and hopes would be that France could be made to withdraw from the Marshall Plan, wrecking the whole present conference, or, failing that, to use the French as a channel for Russian-type obstructionism from within, which the Communists think they are skilful enough to effect. Chief Communist hope has been that The German problem would offer the key to making an impasse of the

Marshall project. The position of each of the Western Powers on the Ruhr is deep-rooted and hard to change: (a) France’s internationalisation plea L« based on the honest belief that It is ’he only way France can get national security from a new German aggression. (b) Britain favours socialisation or nationalisation of Ruhr industries, in keeping with the theory of the present British Government. It also feels that this is the best way to secure the i support of the most powerful party in Germany, the Socialists. (c) The United States favours private enterprise and private capital, coming from the International Bank. Besides the fact that this is the expression of a basic American viewpoint, there is the impetus of lagging German production running up costs to the Ameri. can taxpayer and the conviction that nothing less than this approach will pet the Germans to step up their production. Communist Tactics The Communists are using these differences in typical fashion. Taking up the Molotov theme that the Marshall Plan means American interference in the European scene, they are lumping the French and British points of view together as European solutions, possible of merging, but being prevented by the obstinate interference from distant America. French Communists have always supported the two basic legs of French policy mentioned earlier, and now deemed lost through the necessities lacing the present French Government. Actually, Communist support for the first leg, namely, France holding a middle position between Russia and the United States as a balance and war preventive, is due to a simple factor, ft is that France’s natural trend is toward the West By keeping in the middle it was, to that extent, kept away from the West. On the Ruhr point, the Communist support is also disingenuous. Internationalisation of the Ruhr would bring Russia from its present boundary in Germany right into the heart of the western German source of strength. But the Communists naturally do not admit these points. They merely beat the chauvinistic drum to which the French still respond when fear is employed. Communists freely use this quality and French fears are especially sensitive after the last seven years.