SINKING OF THE GRAF SPEE

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25272, 26 August 1947, Page 5

SINKING OF THE GRAF SPEE

SUCCESSFUL BRITISH PROPAGANDA CAPTURED GERMAN NAVAL DOCUMENTS <N.Z. Press Association—Copyright) Secro, n LONDON, August 24. lured hi r i aval re «'>-ds capeefict and American intelliraXSl 5 d l rin " the war - a nd now show h th=t b> n ‘he British Admiralty. viniXri ‘ B ? tlsh Propaganda conSdS%«r C « Ptaln °£ the pocket ba “ le - BrHish G a f F Pee ’ that a Powerful awa, ted him near the vide? wJt a i e b ?St u ary U he left MontethU U ls dama sed ship, and that tn ledge caused him to decide aenii <.h le n the - Graf Spee instead of ag ?“ cl ? alle ngmg the British force. y ’J he cruiser force consist, °‘ the Ajax. the Achilles, ana the Exeter, under Admiral SL Harry Harwood, which had severely damaged the Graf Spee m,t a and forced her to Montevideo had been reinforced by one more cruiser, the Cumoerlana.

Captain Hans Langsdorff, who comthe Graf Spee, and the whole or tne German nava] intelligence service, however, were convinced that “J e carrier, Ark Royal, and a .battleship Renown had joined Admiral Harwood’s force. In fact they were many thousands of miles away.

ia Th^^ eco . rds show that on December 16, 1939 three days after the battle W1 j ..the Achilles. the Exeter, and the Ajax. Grand . Admiral Raeder. Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, consulted Hitler and told him that at least two weeks would be required to make the Graf Spee seaworthy, and that the Government of Uruguay was prepared to grant the ship only 72 hours’ sanctuary.

At this conference Hitler strongly opposed any suggestion that the pocket battleship should allow itself to be interned by Uruguay, and he aproved instructions that the ship should try to fight its way out and reach Buenos Aires, where, the German Foreign Office reported, it would have “greater freedom of action.” If this proved to be impossible Hitler ordered the ship to be scuttled.

When, in spite of the most strenuous efforts of the German Foreign Office, the Uruguayan Government refused to extend the time limit, Captain Langsdorff put to sea, and, before the waiting British cruisers could engage him, scuttled his ship in the mouth of the River Plate. Before sailing he . sent a letter to the German Ambassador at Buenos Aires for transmission to . Hitler, in which he expressed his intention of taking his own life after he had scuttled his ship. This he did three days later. In this letter Captain Langsdorff said he was convinced that any attempt to reach the open sea would fail. He therefore decided, as the depth of water in the estuary was insufficient to sink the ship completely, to refuse to fight and to destroy all the equipment before scuttling. “As this decision might be consciously or unwittingly misconstrued and attributed to personal considerations,” he said, “I have decided to bear the consequences involved. I can do no more for my ship’s company. Neither will I be able to take any further part in the struggle of my country. I can now only prove that the fighting forces of the Reich are ready to die for the honour of the flag.” Other records show that the loss of the Graf Spee seriously upset the calculations of the German Naval Command, which had been waiting for the pocket battleship to break through to home waters. At a later conference between Grand Admiral Raeder and Hitler, the German commander-in-chief noted that Hitler complained because the Graf Spee did not sink the damaged Exeter, but he added that the decision of Captain Langsdorff to destroy his ship was completely justified.