GERMAN NAVAL WARFARE

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25272, 26 August 1947, Page 5

GERMAN NAVAL WARFARE

SECRET ARCHIVES PUBLISHED

HITLER’S ORDERS FOR PREPARATION

(N-Z P-ess Association—Copyright) LONDON, August 24. According to secret German navalarchives captured by Allied intelligence officers in Germany in 1945, and nublished by the Admiralty, Hitler issued his first directive in preparation for the war early in April. 1939, five months before the invasion of Poland. The archives revealed that Hitler anticipated interference by Britain and France and made his preparations accordingly. On May 10 he ordered the German Navy and the Luftwaffe to make immediate preparations for opening “economic warfare” against Britain. and also against France. The documents show that on August 21 the day Hitler announced the Rus-cian-German non-aggression pact, Grand Admiral Raeder issued orders tn the commanders of the pocket battleships Graf Spee and Deutschland, w ith their attendant supply ships, Altmark and Westerwald, to go to waiting positions in the Atlantic. At the same time 21 German submarines were sent to waiting positions around the coasts of Britain. Hitler made it plain when he issued his final detailed orders for .the opening of hostilities on August 31 that the first task of the German land forces was to overrun Poland. The German armed forces in 'the west were instructed to respect neutral boundaries but, if Britain and France intervened. to maintain their positions with as few losses as possible until the invasion of Poland was completed. Navy was ordered to concentrate on destroying British merchant shipping and protecting the Baltic. Attacks on London

Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to prepare for massed attacks on British naval forces, armament industries and troop transports, but he stipulated that the decision »about attacks upon London must be left to him. The outbreak of war in the west found Germany much less prepared for war at sea than on land and in the air, and both Grand Admiral Raeder and Admiral Doenitz, who commanded the German submarine fleet, in notes included in the collection, were pessimistic. Raeder had apparently been assured by Hitler that war against Britain was not to be anticipated until 1944 or 1945, and German naval rebuilding, although it had been considerably expedited before the outbreak of hostilities, lagged a long way behind the air and land forces’ preparations. On September 1, Doenitz sent a long memorandum to Raeder in which : v he pointed out that at least 90 U-boats were required to carry out the operations envisaged in the Atlantic alone, whereas he had only 57. He expressed the opinion that the German underwater fleet, as then constituted, could not be more than ‘‘a petty annoyance” to British commerce. Doenitz then made a strong plea for the immediate extension of Germany’s submarine building programme. Raeder shared this pessimism, and, in the course of a long note, he pointed out that if the war had been delayed for another five years Germany would have been in a good position, with the aid of Italy and Japan, to beat the British Fleet and quickly put Britain out of the conflict. By 1945, he said, Germany planned to have three fast battleships, three converted pocket battleships, five heavy cruisers, and nearly 200 submarines. An instruction issued by Raeder, and reaffirmed by Hitler, shows that lhe German naval commanders were ordered strictly to observe The Hague Convention “at least in the beginning. The documents reveal that Hitler maintained this attitude until he became convinced that even if Poland were quickly overrun Britain and France would not accept a fait accoriplit Thereafter, the prohibition of attacks against passenger ships was gradually relaxed until final..y unrestricted naval warfare was ordered. Sinking of Athenia

Other German documents released by the Admiralty disclose that the sinking of the liner Athenia without warning 200 miles west of the Hebrides, a few hours after the declaration of war, was a mystery to Hitler and the German Naval Staff until the U-boat returned to harbour. It was then ascertained that U 30, under the command of Lieutenant Lemp. had sunk the Athenia. Lemp was aware that he disobeyed instructions, but he pleaded that he was over-excited by the sudden declaration of war. He was severely reprimanded, and he and the ship’s company were ordered to observe the strictest secrecy. Very few officers were informed of the truth and even the Naval Staff was kept in ignorance for some time. Lemp was killed when another submarine, to which he had been transferred, was sunk. The documents also disclose hcfw a U-boat, in the second month of the war. pierced the hitherto impenetrable Scapa Flow and. unscathed, stole out again after firing torpedoes which tore • through the hull of the 29,000-ton battleship Royal Oak. killing 810 officers and men.

U 47, commanded by Lieutenant Otto Prien, who had been selected for the task by Grand Admiral Raeder, lay submerged off the Orkneys waiting for a chance to sneak into Scapa Flow. A careful survey had shown the weakness of the defence. With skilful navigation. it was possible either to pass between the three blockships, or on either side of them, close to the shore. Prien wrote in the log: “The English have been kind enough to switch on all coastal lights so I can obtain the most exact fix.”

Describing the firing of five torpedoes, two of which hit their targets, he said: “There is a loud explosion, Then some columns of water, followed by columns of fire, and splinters fly through the air. The harbour springs to life, and on land, 200 metres away, cars roar along a road. A battleship has been sunk and a second damaged.”

The document shows that the success of this operation considerably enhanced Hitler’s opinion of the German Navy. Grand Admiral Raeder reported on the operation, and at the same time obtained virtual permission for unrestricted naval warfare against British and French merchant shipping.