ATOMIC POWER: ISSUE OF VETO IN CONTROL

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25089, 22 January 1947, Page 6

ATOMIC POWER: ISSUE OF VETO IN CONTROL

DISARMAMENT

Among recent United Nations developments which have appeared to indicate that Russian policy has turned towards more confident co-operation with the West was Mr Molotov’s demal that his Government wished to be able to use the veto to obstruct the work of inspection under any international authority that might be set up. In this article in the “Christian Science Monitor of January 7, JOSEPH C. HARSCH looks beyond this concession to the issues that remain unsettled. (Published by arrangement.)

Washington.—Probably like a number of other Americans, we have found ourselves confused by the complexities of the arguments over the veto and atomic energy. We know that nothing is more important to the peace of the world than getting atomic energy in harness. And we know that Mr Baruch feels, or seems to feel, that the key to the problem is getting rid of the veto. But we ourselves confess that we have never quite understood the relationship. So we took ourselves to a gentleman who has been close to the whole issue, and not far from the diplomatic top level. We asked him to please explain to us the relationship of the veto to the control of atomic energy. We herewith offer the gist of his explanation. “You Can’t Fuss Round”

“Frankly,” h& began, “what we all have in mind is some big country (he did not name any names) building a secret atomic arms plant. That would be discovered some day by the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Authority. Of course, the moment the secret plant is discovered it means war. You can’t fuss round with formalities at a time like that. It becomes a matter of survival. The very discovery of the illegal plant begins the war. If you don’t act then, you must assume that the country which built the plant will act the moment it knows it has been discovered.” "Yes,” we replied, “we understand that. But where does the veto come in?” "Well,” he said, “I’ve never been quite sure myself. Mr Baruch and his staff say that if there is no veto it will make it easier to mobilise the coalition against the aggressor. But it seefns to me that there will be very little time to mobilise any coalitions. If there is no veto, we take the case against the violator of the atomic energy treaties to the Security Council of the United Nations and they approve our action. “Of course, the action will have been taken, if it is to be taken, before the Council can vote. What the Council does Will put a stamp of approval on that action, and no one can veto it. So I suppose it’s a useful thing to get rid of the veto if we tan. It makes what we do to protect ourselves a formal action of the world organisation rather than the defensive action of a group of individual nations.

"That seems to make it useful,” h* said, and we agreed. “But,” We asked, “if the action has been taken before there is any discussion of the violation in the Security Council, is the delegate of the violating nation likely to be sitting at the Council table that day?” He agreed that the presence of this delegate would be extremely unlikely. Thus there could be no casting of a vocal veto. However, the technical form of the veto is agreement of all the Great Powers. The absence of the delegate of the violating member would deprive the decision of the technically required unanimity. So permitting a majority vote, instead of requiring a unanimous vote, would make it possible to give full technical approval to the actions of the nations undertaking the punitive action. “Now,” we said, “what about setting up the Atomic Energy Authority? Isn’t that the essential first step, after all?” Without an Authority .... “Of course,” he replied. “It woof do us much good to eliminate the vft unless we get agreement on an AtonC Energy Authority. There won’t hi anything to veto or not veto withcmt an authority.” “Well, are We getting anywhere with the authority?’ “That,” he said, "is a question I cannot answer. ’There has been so much talking about the veto that no one has found out for certain whether agreement is in sight on setting up the authority. We presume that most of the countries are ready for it, except possibly Russia. The record of the debates does not show whether Russia is ready for it. The Russians have agreed, in principle, to controls and inspections. Some people think they mean inspections and controls under an international authority and others think that they have a system in mind which would be set up directly under the Security Council. “Of course, if their idea is somethin under the Security Council, it won 7 ! do. It must be a real authority as sketched out in the Acheson-Lilien-thal report. Unless we get that, we are not putting any of our atomic eggs in the basket.” “If you can get that,” we asked, "will you worry very much about the veto?” “If we can get that,” he replied. "I will personally consider getting rid <tf the veto a good thing, but I won’t worry very much about it one way or the other.’ 1