Across the Sangro

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 24116, 27 November 1943, Page 4

Across the Sangro

Although it was reported a day or so ago that the Germans were still reinforcing and strengthening their “winter line,” the phrase had little meaning; and the Bth Army, by establishing itself across the Sangro and seizing Castel di Sangro and Alfadena, has robbed it of that little. It is a fortnight since the Bth Army began to push patrols across the Sangro and was already in occupation of heights above the two important road towns. During this fortnight the weather has hampered the offensive. During that time, also, the Bth Army has received large reinforcements, including the New Zealand Division. But it may be surmised that what has been done now might have been done sooner, if the progress of the ,sth Army had not been interrupted. News from the left flank has been scanty; but if the map references in it are checked, they suggest that the advance against Cassino, bypassing Mignano, was rebuffed and that the enemy’s grip on Mignano was strengthened by local counterattacks, while the pressure north of Venafro could not be sustained. The sth Army, in brief, has been held up in the coastal sector, instead of penetrating the valley of the Lin; and this, probably, is why a report this week emphasised the effect of the capture of Castel san Vincenzo and Rochetta, on the central sector, in creating a threat to outflank Cassino. A situation which compelled the sth and Bth Armies co-operat-ing in the centre to concentrate tactically on the problems of the left flank would tend to delay the right; and if such a situation developed, as seems likely, it was one in which the German “ winter “line” theory had a brief plausibility. But the major facts were totally against it, the prospects of an outflanking advance on the east coast being so clear and close. The Sangro is a more formidable stream, especially in winter, than the Trigno and the Biferno; but, though it was a “tough business,” in Sir Bernard Montgomery’s words, to establish the bridgehead, it appears that, once he had chosen the time and assembled the force, the business was done at the first attempt. Behind the Sangro there is no possible line on which the Germans can stand south of Pescara. Progress

on the plain between the Sangro and the Pescara-Rome highway will at once and cumulatively endanger the enemy’s positions in the centre and on the west coast; and as he withdraws, he will expose the converging approaches to Rome. The “defences in depth” said to exist beyond the Sangro remain to be tested as the bridgehead is exploited. It .'s not easy to believe that they are of an order which will prevent the pace of the offensive from being accelerated. Conditions will permit the use of armour on a greater scale. The Allied bombardment of the German road and rail supply system has been intensified in the last three weeks. The reinforcement of the Bth Army is obviously more than routine replacement of troops. News that the Sardinian and Corsican airfields are in use would complete the evidence indicating that the march on Rome is intended to enter its final, aggressive phase and sweep through it.