The Press SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1943. Satelberg

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 24116, 27 November 1943, Page 4

The Press SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1943. Satelberg

The fall of Satelberg, last principal Japanese stronghold on the Huon Peninsula in New Guinea, is imminent, according to a cable message printed this morning. In the 10 days since this drive began, Australian troops, “ on the world’s most “ exhausting battleground,” have fought their way forward at an average rate of about 400 yards a day. The township they are about to take stands 3000 feet up on steep ranges radiating down to the sea, six miles away. Two miles to the east is the village of Javenenang, from which the Australians launched one prong of their attack, using heavy Matilda tanks for the first time in New Guinea. The other prong advanced from Kumawa, less than two miles south-east of Satelberg. The tanks from Javenenang pressed along the razorback ridge traversed by the main road to Satelberg; the Kumawa force drove the enemy, yard by yard, from two tracks leading to the Satelberg road. The difficulties of ground, weather, and supply they have had to overcome were outlined in a dispatch, printed yesterday, from the special Australian correspondent of the New Zealand Press Association. They underline the merit of the achievement; but they do not fully explain why the clearing of the peninsula has been prolonged. Satelberg lies about 10 miles north-north-west of Finschhafen, taken by Australian forces on October 2. Between that date and the launching of the present drive General MacArthur’s communiques seldom mentioned the ground fighting in the Finschhafen-Satelberg area. That issued on October 25 implied that the operations ahead would not be unduly difficult. “The enemy’s “efforts to break through to the “ coast north of Finschhafen, appar- “ ently to escape or to obtain supplies from the sea, have ended,” it said. “He has now fallen back “and is based on the hills, where “ his supply routes to the north are “ difficult and precarious. His forces “ are weak and of little signifi- “ cance." If the enemy’s supply lines were then precarious and his forces weak, they were not so when the present offensive began, on November 17; for General MacArthur’s communique of November 19 spoke’of “heavy” resistance. Moreover, an account written near Satelberg on November 20 by a war correspondent of the “ Sydney “ Morning Herald ” did not suggest that General Mac Arthur designed his offensive to overcome only a weak enemy. “Probably no more “ detailed organisation, assiduous “ preparation, and meticulous planning have preceded any campaign “ in New Guinea than were carried “ out before the present drive,” this correspondent wrote. Nor did the use of heavy tanks suggest it. Yet at no time between October 25 and November 19 was the public told that the enemy had improved his supply position.' That is at the root of the complaints by Australian newspapers that more information about the land fighting in New Guinea should be released. Complacency and the ill-informed often go hand in hand. They marched together too far in the early days of the war, Mr Curtin’s recent outbursts against “ thoughtless “ enemies ” in Australia suggests that they are marching again. But one remedy is obvious; and Mr Curtin, his censors, and the High Command should supply it.