South-East Asia Command

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 24112, 23 November 1943, Page 4

South-East Asia Command

Too much should not be read into the first communique issued during the week-end by Lord Louis Mountbatten, who on Friday took over supreme command in South-east Asia. It would be immensely encouraging if it could be assumed that the “ vigorous air offensive ” against the Japanese in Burma spoken of in the communique is the beginning of the great assaults Lord Louis Mountbatten is expected to launch by land and sea. But it would be rash to interpret these air raids in this fashion. They should, it seems, be 'elated to the Japanese offensive, now some weeks old, against the Chinese positions in western Yunnan guarding the Salween crossings, and to the smaller actions on the Arakan and Chin fronts. If these air operations are no more than defensive, that is not disturbing. Indeed, no more should be expected at present. In terrain and supply, and in other respects, the South-east Asia theatre is certainly one of the most difficult of the war; and Lord Louis Mountbatten has had only a few weeks in which to advance his plans. But, obviously, if he is to go beyond limited offensives there must be close liaison with China. South-east Asia and China are, however, separate commands. In the latter the United Nations some time ago appointed Marshal Chiang

Kai-shek supreme commander; and recent Chinese official announcements have emphasised that, whatever areas may come under Lord Louis Mountbatten’s control, China does not. This was the situation when Lord Louis Mountbatten, soon after going to India, visited j Marshal Chiang in Chungking. He was followed within a few days by Brigadier-General P. J. Hurley, as a special envoy from President Roosevelt. General Hurley’s mission, according to the United Press of America, was “ to smooth out the “ problem of co-ordinating the “ Chinese, British, and American “ forces under Lord Louis Mount- “ batten’s command.” The problem is, however, one to which China has frequently drawn attention, without achieving much, and it is inseparable from China’s complaint that the Pacific War Council, the only organisation concerned with military strategy for Asia arid the Pacific on which she is an equal member, is no more than advisory. Close co-operation with China will be essential in any extensive operation in this area, whether it is designed to clear the Burma Road, to open the road and rail routes to China through French Indo-China by striking across the Kra Isthmus, or to free China’s southern coast and ports. But the dangers of incomplete co-ordination may be ever present if China continues to feel that she has not been given an equal voice in forming and directing the strategy to free her from Japan. If, as a correspondent of “The Times” said the other day, there is now a most encouraging prospect of full co-operation between the two commands, Lord Louis Mountbatten and General Hurley did excellent work when they visited Chungking.