ARBITRATION COURT

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23945, 12 May 1943, Page 4

ARBITRATION COURT

CLASSIFICATION OF JINKERMAN TIMBER INDUSTRY SEEKS INTERPRETATION The classification of a Jlnkerman was debated in the Arbitration Court yesterday morning. Workers’ representatives explained that for practical purposes snigging was the general operation of drawing logs from the stump to the "bank” from which they would be delivered. The log was "broken out" from the spot where it fell, was snigged on to the jinker, or log trolley, and was then hauled to the "bank.” All those minor sections came under the broad classification of snigging and hence the jinkerman would come under the definition of snigger in the award. The employers maintained that it was just to classify the inexperienced worker in question under the alternative grouping of a horse-ariver, or unspecified worker. Mr Justice Tyndall presided and associated with him were Messrs Cecil Prime (employers) and A. L. Monteith (workers). The ruling was sought because a jinkerman employed by E. E. Scott, Ruakapuka, near Geraldine, was held not to come within this classification. “This appears to be nothing more than an attempt to have another clause put in the schedule, which is already too large.” said Mr F. Turley, representing the New Zealand Timber Workers’ Union. He held that the objection was merely ■ a trivial effort to avoid a slightly higher wage. Clause 30 of the award provided that a breaker-out, snigger, ropeman or shoeman (hauling rope), to apply to only one man in each hauling team, should receive 2s 8d an hour. The work entailed the delivery of logs out of the forest to the roadhead or mill. Mr A. R. Greatbatch, secretary of the Canterbury branch of the Timber Workers’ Union, said that from 20 years’ experience in the industry he would definitely say that the jinkerman in question came within the scope of clause 30. He snigged the logs to a clearing, loaded them on to the jinker, and was the only one on the job doing this part of the work. Mr Arthur Seed, representing the employers, said the interpretation was an important issue because a jinkerman was little more than a horse-driver and did not require the skilled logging experience of those provided for in the award. A jinkerman was not mentioned in the award. The employer, Sectt, said his jinkerman's work was simple. The horses became so accustomed to the work that it amounted to little more than coupling the traces on to the jinker. Comment was made from the Bench that, on the evidence, there appeared to he a variety of names for the same tasks in different parts of the country. Decision was reserved. Doctrine of Substantiality Legal argument on the doctrine of substantiality was heard yesterday afternoon when the Inspector of Awards (represented by Mr K. G, Archer) claimed £lO as a penalty from the Christchurch Club (Mr A. C. Perry) for a breach of the New Zealand (except Westland) Chartered Clubs’ Employees’ Award by failing to pay Francis Holden Matthews the prescribed weekly wage. Matthews was an old age pensioner, said Mr Archer. He was employed for two hours daily by the Christchurch Club. When he arrived at 7 a.m. he raked out a central-heating furnace, set, and lit the fire, brought in the day’s supply of coke, cleared up the yard, cleaned boots, and did other odd jobs. He was classed as a rouseabout, and received his breakfast during the two hours he was on duty. The allowance given him was £1 a week. “Matthews was directly connected with the domestic management of the club and is therefore considered to come within the scope of the award,” said Mr Archer. The award in clause 7E required that "other male employees" should receive a minimum wage of £4 5s a week. Clause 11A said that employment should be weekly whether part time or not. While it might be said that provision should have been made for such casual help as Matthews, the award did allow under-rate workers in special circumstances. said Mr Archer. "I rely entirely on the doctrine cf substantiality which is well-known and recognised by the Courts,” said Mr Perry. He quoted various law reports of cases in which the doctrine had been invoked, with the Court's comment, "If all the employee’s working time, no matter how short, is spent in the one job, the doctrine of substantiality does not apply,” said Mr Archer in reply. The doctrine applied where there was dispute about several classes of work performed by the one worker. It was then that a decision was required as to which was the substantial employment. Decision was reserved.