SOVIET ACHIEVEMENT IN WINTER CAMPAIGN

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23915, 6 April 1943, Page 4

SOVIET ACHIEVEMENT IN WINTER CAMPAIGN

THE RUSSIAN FRONT

[By the Military Correspondent of the "Sydney Morning Herald.-j

The extent of the achievement can beat be measured by considering the position in which Germany would have been to launch a spring offensive if the Russians had not_ been able to effect material changes in the line as it stood on November 19 last. As a result of a 300-mile advance made in the summer campaign, strong German forces had occupied part of Stalingrad, large sections of the Volga lifeline were in ■ jeopardy, the northern Caucasian provinces were overrun, and the enemy even had footholds in the passes leading to Baku. From these vantage points he would have been in a position to make a grab for the oil of the Caucasus and perhaps to have launched a successful attack on the Middle East. He could also have attempted a drive across the Volga into the heart of the new industrial regions, which, if successful, would have metamorphosed the entire Soviet position. Moscow, already threatened from the west, would have been outflanked, and besieged Leningrad would have been isolated.

Winter Gains

Instead of facing,this grim picture the Russians can embark upon the spring campaign, not only with all the immediate threats of November 19 removed, but also in a considerably more favourable position than they stood at the beginning of the European spring last year. In the south, for instance, all of the summer losses have been regained, except for the Kuban bridgehead and a small local area round Stalin in the Donets basin. Moreover, the position is basically different from that of last June, because the Germans now lack the consolidated starting points that allowed their sweep across to Voronezh and Stalingrad. It was a great disappointment that the Russians were able to hold Kharkov only between February 16 and March' 15, but, as against this, the city is much more isolated than it was last year. The Russians retain the entire line of the Donets, and hold vital bridgeheads on the western bank; while, to the north of Kharkov, they now hold the keypoint of Kursk and the important Sumy salient, both of which were in enemy hands last spring. The Sumy buttress is particularly significant. because, as long as it is in Soviet hands, it minimises the importance of the Nazi penetration to the Byelgorod pocket and provides a potential outflanking threat to the Kharkov positions.

The Central Front

Further north, the Soviet forces have vastly improved their position on the central front. The greatest failure of the Russian winter offensive of 1941-42 was the inability to reduce the RzhevVyazma fortified line before Moscow. That, quadrilateral provided a permanent threat to the Russian capital, and the Germans had been in continuous occupation of the region since the fourth month of the war. The German system in front of Moscow has now been broken. The north-western corner of the quadrilateral fell when Velikye Luki was occupied on January 2. It collapsed entirely when Rzhev fell on March 3, to be followed by Gzhatsk three days later and Vyazma on March 12. Since then, the Russians have battered a way forward until they now threaten the immediate defences of Smolensk in the vicinity of the twin portals of Yartsevo and Yelnia To complete the list of winter gains, the Russians also improved their position in the north, Leningrad was relieved on January 18, after a siege lasting since August, 1941, and gams were made in the Lake Ilmen region although the Russians had to stop short before they reached Staraya Russa. ' ■.

Now that the thaw has brought about a temporary cessation of hart fighting on practically all sectors of the Russian front, a point bS reached at which it is possible to review the results of the*s ter campaigns and to assess the prospects for the spring. Above such survey must emphasise the magnitude of the Sov£ successes. 7"

In the north and the cer -e ever, it is safe to say that the’*, of consolidation has fallen short highest hopes that might legitim* have been entertained by ShapuS kov’s General Staff. No general w have been made in the north inS stance, since the relief of Le’njJ and the Germans / cjing to poSS which still leave/-the '.relief-MfS dangerously exposed atod liable j closure. The drive along the'jte coast and the penetration to theT vian and Estonian frontiers eventuate, and Germany’s norths! armies are still favourably placet Importance of Orel In the centre the gains, astonish as they were, did not permit the c® paign in this sector to be carried! its full strategical conclusion. Onel the main reasons for this was *3 doubtedly the successful German * sistance at Orel. Although the & sians moved round three sides of 1 fortress,, the Germans kept the tor not only as an advanced spearpofo but as an integrated part of thefc fence system based on Brysanst I, this way the Russians were msm to straighten the line at this 1 pivot, point between the central and southtn fronts, and were prevented from a ploiting the southern approaches t Smolensk. The failure to take On was probably as crucial a foctor i the inability to retain Kharkov one it was occupied. When the Germans attacked las summer they held not only Kharkoi and Orel, but Kursk, Rzhev, and Vyu ma as well. The only important poin at which they now hold an advaotaji that they did not possess last.June i in the retention of the Kuban bridge head across the Kerch Straits, WM the Kuban marshes do not lend them selves to large-scale movements'at antime of the year, and while the Rus sians are grimly endeavouring to elimi nate the German grip, so lone asth enemy holds his ground here he pos sesses a jumping-off position lot ai early drive towards the Caucasus, The Spring Campaign The vital question now is which sid will hold the initiative when the fptin fighting begins. The Russians hold sounder line and better bases than the did last year, but the Germans; hav shown their strength in their success ful February counter-attacks, and ther are many points at which they ma repeat their break-through of las July. No forecast can be made, be cause the position is so large! governed by the imponderable facto as to which side suffered the greats relative losses in the. great irate campaign. The communiques them selves throw no light on this, for, j Stalin recently said, if the Genoa claim to have secured 20,000,000 Sovie casualties is correct the U.S.S.R, hi no army left; and a similar unrealil characterises certain Soviet estimati of German losses. Apart from the balance of wink losses, the seizure of the initiative wi be largely determined by supply prol lems. The Germans, especially sine the recapture of the Donets basin, at in a much better position than th Russians in so far as the regrouping o forces and the rapid massing at chose pressure-points are concerned 1 . Ht garding supply in the wider sense, t* outcome depends upon the dema made on the German war-machim rival fronts -that may be ope'Mj: Europe and upon the western Democracies to supplemf output of Soviet armament wo fjr future of the Russian front u J largely and increasingly depki upon developments in tern of the war, ' -. -.4 ■■ |