INDIA FRONT CONSEQUENCES OF DRIVE IN AFRICA

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23848, 18 January 1943, Page 4

INDIA FRONT CONSEQUENCES OF DRIVE IN AFRICA

(By JOSEPH

[Published by arrangement with

BOSTON, November 29. The course of recent events on the world’s three great active fronts— Africa, Russia, and the Pacific islands —has suddenly elevated the IndiaBurma Front into the position of the world’s most important passive front. What has happened in the Solomons, around Stalingrad and in Tunisia has altered both the potential balance of power between the armies which face each other across the Bay of Bengal and the mountain barrier extending northward between Burma and India, and also the importance of future events in that area. This war has not previously offered a simpler or clearer example of how assumption of the initiative on any one front can improve the position - of allies on the other side of the world. To say that General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s landings in Africa have improved India’s security is an understatement. It has transformed India -from a plum ripe for easy plucking into a promising offensive base. Forced Change in Plans

India was probably saved temporarily by the United States Navy’s desperate undertaking in the Solomons Islands. That move absorbed large portions of the Japanese air and naval forces large enough to spoil any immediate plan the Japanese had for the kind of quick campaign against India which air and sea supremacy would have made possible. If they intended to try for India, which is extremely probable, they we're forced to change their plans from one based on quick movement by sea and air to one based on the slower movement of land forces. That provided General Sir Archibald P. Wavell with valuable time to build a real army in India, and also tided him over the harrowing‘period when he had to guard against the danger of a German attack sweeping down on his western front through Persia from the Caucasus while he faced the Japanese on his eastern front. * Now, for the first time since the Japanese conquered Burma, General WaVell is free to concentrate his attention on his Japanese front. He owes this new freedom to the striking recovery of Russian initiative on the Stalingrad. Front, which in turn is due to the German air power which General Eisenhower has drawn off to Africa.

The greatest danger which has existed in recent months to the global strategic position 6f the United Nations has been the danger of a German break ihto the Middle East,and Persia, either through Turkey or through the Caucasus. Japan has a gateway into the Indian Ocean. Had Germany found one, too, these Axis partners would have been able to join hands and in all probability been able to convert the Indian Ocean into a great supply line to their mutual advantage. , for Attack

Certainly any German break into the Middle East would have been, the signal for a Japanese advance against India.

But to-day Hitler has no immediate prospect of getting into the Middle East. His Caucasus offensive has been thrown back on its heels by the Russian counter-attack in front of Stal- 1 ingrad. If Hitler loses his trapped Stalingrad army then he will probably be forced to withdraw everything he now has south of Rostov. Even if he extricates the Stalingrad army he is still in no position to push his attack on the Caucasus. That road to the Indian Ocean seems rather powerfully blocked to-day. Nor does Hitler seem to enjoy any real prospect to-day of getting out of his trap by way of Turkey. So far as we can judge at this writing he has decided to fight for the Mediterranean in Tunis and Tripoli rather than try to come around the ends by Spain and Turkey. It is perhaps a trifle optimistic, yet it seems warranted to as-

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the -Christian Science Monitor sume that ,he no longer ti*. dent resources to do both** His apparent cnmJ?™ 1 Tunis-Tripoli move Kfe «o relahve strength Of Turkey would seem'bJVS? conclusion that mtle? n o any real prospect of row®* 9 Indian Ocean b Burma Road Factor This, if sound.,, changes , enormously for Japam? ft T* # faces a British has to be divided to ■' simultaneous attacks from General Wavell can fcJrM Burma with a sense his rear. The Japanese 1 K mg about the spoils oriVft . also think about wfaat the Burma Road American bombers have thS.!? 1! a Japanese ship in'the cfiS; bases in China, -its Wlw 0 ” 1 It is doubtful maintain its preserit^t^Sw* l } to the two-prbnged‘3tihw2to l i s i sl! Rabaul and of India. It would be them to drive with a view to severing e V »n\. suppiy line to United inside China. .•”*** ®

, The Japanese \ increasing their ground^ 1 Burma We can only - guessS intended use is. They woWZ have three possible courKlS They can simply remalnWthf fensive in Burma. Or theyicta.L against Kunming if theylffi have enough ground strengttto Burma against General Waveinn process. Or they fight for New Guinea, and Rabaul. go on the islands, turn their air and tea frtrtt forces against General iWkvell cept battle on the Indian Front . The y a r? not at the moment evidt mg any inclination to abandon! Guinea, the Solomons, sand;R»biui us. And it would' seem jnost imliv that they would choMe l ®s a ei°n.lt is certainly able that they will make tt fcajt more powerful attempt to •drive from the Solomons.' • ■ Yet they could better aflord to hj us in Rabaul than tohavetheßui Road reopened and a r#Uy- pow« American bombing fonievotierat from China bases againstefcoth « shipping lines in the, Chinai-Ser l against Japanese industiill'ceatia land. The-air forces we .have' I 'to-day China are pitifully proportions of their ’achlfam» n i,| due to many things, .‘inOludtoMei element of plain courage.'TJiitmtyi not due to numbers/ what could be .accomplishedfei bombing attacks ft'oih could be made withvaerdplahtaim ating in twenties or ones or threes. ■ ' To let us take Rabaul wblildjbd a i more serious blow to Japaneseptesli than to Japan’s strateginip&tioa would put a real i tween the opposing- ; hawapaiM: i forces and very probablyiproduce temporary stabilisation - of-thetol west Pacific Front. We woiild id ln position to start another forvfiitdttov ment from Rabaul at Therefore, while it ; stillVffiHM u likely, it is not beyond the-bbasdi possibility that Japan : and naval weight islands to the Bay of. cept battle with, : GeneralM|yidl'| India as the prife. (,• ./If impossible to brehk and New Guinea.battles.it‘ttda launch an attack northward i ta6£|i Meanwhile General WaveU;imt t be in- a position to assumeSraw tive himself despite: the-iflicfilfiii turbances of India. > These are the il Anglo-American have opened up on the other ilds •the-world, , »