The Press MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1943. North Africa

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23848, 18 January 1943, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1943. North Africa

Although all long-range considerations are still to be summed up heavily in favour of the United Nations in North Africa, and the weight of some of them is already telling, the immediate difficulties are obviously much greater than appeared a month ago. It seems possible, also, that they are in some respects greater than were expected when the operations were planned. The rapid advance of General Anderson’s Army was an audacious enterprise, the full success of which would have left only the last chapter of Axis defeat in Africa to Ije written. It is not to be counted a failure, however, because it missed the slenderest of chances of a triumph. It unquestionably aided General Montgomery by compelling the Axis to concentrate on the reinforcement of Tunisia; and it established the Allied positions, threatening Tunis and Bizerte, much more advantageously than shortsighted caution could have done. But General Nehring was able to throw back the venturesome right wing for two main reasons. It had little or no air support; and its road and rail communications ' were weak. While the Germans, round Bizerte and Tunis, had at least six good airfields in operation, within easy distance of the front, General Anderson had none; or, more accurately, all he had were remote from the front, he found' them in an almost unusable state of disrepair, and the landing operation had been so planned that he could not rapidly develop their use. It is officially explained that, because French North Africa was expected td resist, the ships had been loaded so that troop equipment could be unloaded first; Royal Air Force supplies and equipment came off last. It is not easy to suppose, however, that this explanation is complete. It accounts for a delay—and a delay of grave importance—but it does not obviously account for more than that; and it seems that there is more to be accounted for. It is .difficult to believe that the requirements of air strength and air supply were fully measured and met, or that the state of the airfields and the roads and railways was foreseen and provided for, when it has taken so long to begin to redress this initial disadvantage in the air. It has only very recently become possible to give fighter support to the bombers attacking Axis ports. In air supply as in other factors, of course, the enemy is aided by (i) a long lead in the development of air transport and (ii) proximity, by air and sea, to his main bases. Still, the course of events and official comment on the ..“slow, tough struggle ahead" both suggest doubts, which official references to the off-loading schedule, the bad railway, and the bogged roads do not wholly dispel, whether the Ist Army’s difficulties are all due to Incalculable and unavoidable circumstances. “Toolittle “and too late” no doubt belongs to the sorry past. “ Barely enough “ and too slowly ” would reach back to it.

In his march on Tripoli, General Montgomery-has also had to face increasing difficulties as his supply line has lengthened and the bases for his aircraft have again and again had to be moved up. Hundreds of miles from Benghazi, his nearest port, he has been at a standstill rather because these problems must be solved and cannot be solved quickly than because he is waiting for Rommel to play the next move. Here again, want of air transport, it may be hazarded, enters considerably into the time factor, together with the enemy’s still unbroken power to make Mediterranean transport difficult and costly: an important factor, because the short crossings, sea and air, build up Axis strength in North Africa day by day. While it must now be supposed that the thrust to cut Rommel’s coastal road link with Tunisia was either prematurely reported or has been checked, two developments offer real encouragement. Bombers from General Montgomery’s advanced airfields have begun to share with Ist Army bombers the task of pounding the Tunisian ports. In the air, at least, the pincers have begun to close. Second, the significance of General Leclerc’s advance from Lake Chad is considerable. From Murzuk to Brach, his progress was rapid; and, with the help of the Italian roadmakers, his advance may now be considered a long-range threat to Misda and Gharian. As such, it is a threat to Rommel’s rear, if he should decide to hold his ground and fight it out at Misurata; it is also a threat to the two best airfields commanding Tripoli. These possibilities, however, though real, are offset by the fact that General Leclerc’s force is neither large nor heavily equipped. It is important, in spite of that, because it is working towards a strategic pressure point of great advantage.