HOW BRITAIN HELD THE MEDITERRANEAN

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23804, 25 November 1942, Page 2

HOW BRITAIN HELD THE MEDITERRANEAN

WAR STRATEGY

The foundation for the events in North Africa by which the world s imagination is now gripped was lain by Britain as early as 1940. Britain in 1940 not merely made the decision to continue fighting alone, but actually laid down the great simple strategic plan of victory. This strategic plan was to put a ring of encirclement round Hitler and hold that ring until the United Nations had time to combine and gather their forces The nng of encirclement laid down by Britain stretches from north of Norway, via Iceland, to Gibraltar, Malta Egypt, and Iran, The determination to hold this ring was in fact offensive slrategy, since Mr Churchill saw clcaily that if the ring could be held until the United Nations had time to gather their forces, an offensive could be launched from the Mediterranean area right at the heart of the Axis The two places where Hitler tried haidest to break out of this strategic ring with which Britain had encircled him were; 1. The Mediterranean. 2. By land via Russia. Against Heavy Odds Let us take first the sea operations in the Mediterranean in 1940-42. In June, 1940, when Italy entered the war, she had in the Mediterranean six_ battleships, seven eight-inch gun cruisers, 14 six-inch gun cruisers, 131 destroyers and torpedo boats, and 104 submarines. On May 20, 1942, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, who commanded the British Fleet in the Mediterranean m 1940-41 and now commands the AngloAmerican naval operations in the Mediterranean, revealed: ‘‘ln June, 1940 Britain had in the Mediterranean little more than a token force. When Italy entered the war our fleet consisted of a few cruisers and destroyers and nothing else ” In joint AngloFrench strategy, holding the Mediterranean was mainly the task of the French fleet. Thus, when France collapsed, complete sea control in the Mediterranean by the Axis seemed assured. A.t the same time, in air power over the Mediterranean the Axis numerical and qualitative superiority was overwhelming. Here are the figures: Front-line Italian air force available for the one purpose of smashing the British ring round the Axis in the Mediterranean was between 2000 and 2500 aircraft. Against this Britain had all told in Egypt 168 machines and four machines m Malta. Further,, even these figures of the gigantic' Axis superiority do not tell the whole story, since qualitatively the Axis aeroplanes were also superior. Of the 168 British machines in Egypt, 40 were Gladiators, and the four machines in Malta were Gladiators. The Gladiator is a comparatively old-fashioned biplane, outclassed in speed by at least three types of Italian fighters. The Gladiator’s maximum speed is 250 miles an hour; the Fiat C.R. 42 does 272 miles an hour, the Fiat G. 50 does 299 miles, an hour, and the Macchi monoplane does 313.9 miles an hour The British Blenheim bombers in the Middle East were outclassed in speed and range by the Italian Breda. Even this does not tell the whole story, since In order to defeat Churchill’s strategic plan and break up Britain’s ring through the Mediterranean, all the Axis had to do was to establish complete control over the Mediterranean narrows south of Sicily —what Mussolini called before the war “the quadrilateral of fire.” Apart from battered Malta, the nearest British sea and air bases to these narrows were Gibraltar, 900 miles to the west, and Egypt, 900 miles to the east. The Axis, on the other hand, had (apart from the exits) overwhelming air and sea superiority and the further enormous advantage of dozens of first rate air bases in Sicily and Sardinia, giving complete fighter as well as bomber cover over the narrows. The Ring Holds All these ponderables of the war were overwhelmingly in favour of the Axis breaking the British ring. That they failed' to do so during the two years 1940-42 is probably the most magnificent achievement in the history of the -British people. When France collapsed Britain made a last-minute attempt to send air reinforcements to the Mediterranean, but this resulted in the safe arrival of only three Blenheim bombers and six Hurricanes. When the battle started, a small number—at most two or threebattleships were rushed to the Mediterranean at the last moment. Events in the Mediterranean after Italy’s entry into the war can be divided into two phases. The first was from May, 1940, to the spring of 1941. During this phase Britain brought Italy to the verge of complete defeat on land, sea, and in the air. Of Italy’s total front line air force, more than 1100 aeroplanes, almost 50 per cent, were destroyed by Britain’s utterly outnumbered Mediterranean air force. At the same time, Italy’s effective fleet was cut in half. The second phase opened in the spring of 1941, with enormous German reinforcements to save Italy. At least 500 German aeroplanes were concentrated in Sicily in the spring of 1941. This number was later increased to 700 for the great attack on Malta in the winter of 1941-42. At the same time, German armies and at least 400 front-line German aeroplanes were sent tb Africa to attempt to succeed where the Italians had failed. This phase lasted from the spring of 1942 to the autumn of 1942, and

[By a London Correspondent.}

gives way to the present third il the United Nations’ offensive Thus Britain, at all times num« , ly inferior, both on the sea and j?!? air. held her strategic ring throuAa Mediterranean, and destroyed T Italy’s power which tried to br«v? and later a large part of J power. The Naval Struggle In the naval struggle for thr-iy-terranean, the first action bria on July 9, 1940. The UalJ itS to draw the British Fleet close to the Italian coast ■ order to destroy it by sea ami.? power. H.M.S. Warspite damage £ Italian flagship at 26,000 yards* chased the Italian fleet to within’*? of the Calabrian coast. Heavy bomt?? attacks made on the British [k|T the greater part of the Italian metS politan air forces were completely n. successful, although the Warspiteju, had 500 bombs round her. We had n fighters at sea to intercept these » tacks. For months after this the Italia, fleet avoided cruising into the mm Mediterranean. w

The next great action was at T« ranto. Since the Italians would n „ come out, Britain went in. OntheiiiS of November 19-20, 1940, three iffi battleships were heavily damaged tm actually partly submerged, after an at tack by the Fleet Air Arm. Two end sers and two fleet auxiliaries were afe badly damaged. The effective HaSa battleship strength was halved fo many months. But between the battles at Calabrii and Taranto memorable. fleet action occurred. In the first place, again in again convoys were passed duringthii pei'iod right through the entire Wh of the Mediterranean, including ft, narrows, in spite of the enormous Atii superiority in the air from land-tow aircraft along the whole length of th< narrows. On July 19,1940, the cruise Sydney' engaged two Italian cruisen each more powerful and faster ttoi herself, yet she sank the Bartdonw Colleoni and put the other to flight The cruiser Ajax on October 12, mi in action single-handed against an Jtal ian heavy cruiser and seven destroyers sank three destroyers and put thecrui ser to flight, After Taranto the Italia fleet was reduced almost to impotent and the locking of the British ring through the Mediterranean m an accomplished fact. Germany to the Rescue The Germans saw in the springs 1941 that Italy was nearly out oi tin war, so they ran reinforcements to fli the gap. There was a gret|t divenloi of German air forces and. later i considerable [Aversion of-German law forces in an attempt to break the Bri tish strategic ring in the Mediterranean More than 400 long-range dive bombers, fighters, and reconnalssanc German first-line craft were based oi Sicily in the spring of 1941. In iplti of this, large British convoys continue! to pass right through the Mediter ranean, and also British convoys t( Greece with whole divisions of men But heavy losses were sustained, Firs was the attack on the Illdstrious oi January 10,1941. In all 10 attackawithii 24 hours were made, on this aircraft carrier at sea and in Malta. In the kc ond attack 40 German dive-bomber concentrated on the Illustrious alow Several heavy bombs hit her. fires (or and aft put the -ship’s steering out o action and gave her a heavy list. (Yetft Illustrious; steered by her engines,ce tinued to beat off all subseqtjtoy; tacks with her ack-ack, made pprtlfw was saved. ’ ’’ Next, on March 27, 1941, the Itsliai fleet, emboldened by the German si forces in the Mediterranean,’ again pi out to sea with the purpose of cutbni the British convoy routes, to Greece This was the battle of Matapsn, in Which the forces engaged were: Italian three battleships, 11 cruisers; British, three battleships, one. aircraft-carrier, four cruisers. The result was: to Italian heavy cruisers sunk, ’an Italiai light cruiser sunk, two Italian (k stroyers. sunk, and a new battleship o the Vittorio class damaged. There WJ no damage or casualties in any Brills ship, although part of the action tool place at night at point-blank range. After the entry of Japan into the wai in December, 1941, British forces in ftj Mediterranean were gravely depleted yet still the strategic ring was held With 700 aircraft in Sicily, Hitler it tempted the complete destruction o! Malta and the final breaking of' thj British strategic barrier. But the BritiM Mediterranean fleet, hopelessly outnumbered, and indeed with now Iltt* more than light craft, kept MalUj® plied, and destroyed over one-third (« all Axis shipping attempting to read Afric3» Here we see in brief the picture d those naval actions from June, 1940, u( to the opening of the Anglo-American offensive in North Africa in November, 1942, which kept tight that strategic ring which Mr Churchill laid downm 1940 round Hitler, and which mad* everything else possible. '. The notable feature of British- naval and air achievements in-the Medp ranean in this war is the ElizabeW quality of courage and daring displayed throughout. It is the ElUabeto capacity for attacking because oMin utterly outnumbered that distinguished the whole two years and answers W 1 ter than any words Hitler’s and Mm#* lini's pre-war statements about W' tish decadence.” i. —*= gag