BRITISH ARTILLERY SMASHES NAZI FRONT

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23803, 24 November 1942, Page 4

BRITISH ARTILLERY SMASHES NAZI FRONT

ROMMEL OUTWITTED

[By WILLIAM MUNDAY. "Sydney Morn ing Herald" Correspondent with % Army.]

Reasons for the Axis debacle in the Egypt-Libya campaign can now be summed up. . . Undoubtedly, organisation, supply, and leadership played a major part in the campaign, but one of the main immediate factors, it is considered, was the refusal of Field-Marshal Rommel to believe that he had been outflanked by the Bth Army. , . When British armoured cars pierced the Italian Trieste division and began to move south upon El Daba, General Ritter von Thoma, Commander of the Afrika Korps, hurried with the news to Rommel, I was told. Rommel refused to believe it, but what Rommel did not know was that the whole Trieste division had given in. Even when air reconnaissance confirmed von Thoma’s report, Rommel insisted that it was impossible. Maybe the first reason for the Bth Army’s triumph was the realisation by the United Nations of the importance of the Middle East in the war against Hitlerism. Rommel, puffing at the door of Alexandria, had brought about this awakening. Churchill Acted Mr Churchill had come to the desert to see things for himself, and the sequel was just what might have been expected when the Prime Minister, with his energy and perspicacity, got down on to the job. It' meant more guns, more men, more tanks, plenty of them, and quickly. For the first time since the battles began to see-saw in North Africa, the Bth Army had as much as the enemy, perhaps a little more. For the first time we were a jump ahead of the Nazis, and able to act more quickly than they thought was possible. That was the solid basis for our success. It was here that Mr Churchill handed over to the new leaders he had chosen. It is hard, at this stage, to judge the part played by General Alexander and General Montgomery in the subsequent developments. I am able to write of them with more knowledge, perhaps, than any other war correspondent, for I was with General Alexander in Burma, and I have talked with General Montgomery on several occasions. My own view is that their part was paramount. Both had the bitterness of Dunkirk in their hearts, and, added to this, General Alexander had galling days of retreat in Burma to fire his determination now to see things going the other way. “There have been too many withdrawals, too many failures. I’ll have no more failure," General Montgomery told me, soon after his arrival in the desert. There was something almost Napoleonic in the manner and confidence of this slight British general that made us feel, even then, that he would do what he said he would do. He, at the outset, consciously instilled that feeling into every man in the Bth Army, It meant spending five days of each week among them, but in eight weeks he had succeeded in making them feel as confident as he did in ultimate victory, • and when he called upon them to “Knock Rommel for a sixer from Africa,” it was shown that his efforts in this direction had been well worth while. That was what might be described as General Montgomery’s “spiritual” contribution to success. Did Not Fear Losses The new leaders brought something else, too —a readiness to hit hard, regardless of losses, as long as the end was achieved. Rommel had docketed General Montgomery as “ruthless,” and the -Bth Army commander made it evident from the beginning that when he struck it would be an all-in effort. I remembered, too, when the British guns roared the opening of the new desert offensive, at 10 p,m. on October 23; a remark I had heard General Alexander make in Burma when we were talking of the way to victory. “You don’t count losses when you win a battle: you count what you have gained,” he had said. Where other generals, had feinted, warily withdrawn, and cut their losses, General Alexander and General Montgomery hit hard. But undoubtedly a most important factor in our desert victory was the concentration of all our forces into one irresistible striking force. We had stolen, and improved upon, Nazi blitzkrieg methods. At last the Bth Army had all the guns it needed—and they spoke with one voice. On the night our push began, for instance, 400 big guns paved the

way for the Australians and v.. landers, in one small part northern sector alone. 1 to When the tanks moved info w they went together. And ovJkT l bombers and fighters went in to hurl the concentrated hell o fj®l bombs and bullets amid an eneiiJi ing assailed already with a flenJU? and intensity they had never i?* before. In this perfectly co-ordinated «_ the man with the rifle and lai? came surprisingly to the cleared a way for the tank^lv to How Tactics Worked It is possible now to get a clear picture of the Allied cnni?® ders’ tactics. It looks simple on kS! An enormous number of gim. the enemy and his guns. The Air® blasted more of the enemy’s bJ:* his supply lines. The infantry wlp and cleared up what was left n ll there was a hectic job of clearinsi*^ 8 fields, and the tanks, free of the of being clay-pigeons for tank gunners, rumbled through t, ploit the role in which they are JS fearsome—at large amid unprotwS infantry. The first attack had been a assault, but out in the open com!. beyond the bottle-necked front, the tanks carried out a ger»2 outflanking sweeps on the retrain* enemy. Rommel’s exposed southern flankw*. what General Montgomery had Cf aiming at, and evidence of the ata? tage taken of it by the British taji was the swarms of thousands of iS ners rounded up like rabbits. w Speed, too, continued to be the m. Army’s watchword. When small pockiS of enemy troops chose to fight, tJ detachments dealt with them whileS main columns of the Bth Army fI O ,S on, giving Rommel no pause. Air Supremacy With bigger and better guns. theStk Army had more and better tantrc mans, with 75-millimetre gun; ’ their first appearance in the This superiority om land was to an overwhelming superiority in air. This air supremacy, apart fim preventing the enemy from spying on our movements, kept us fuliyV quainted with his, and our ceasda bombing and strafing raids, cS with the battering he got from our artillery, undermined German'' ed Italian morale, so that it was badly cracked when assaults by our inlantn and tanks completed the job and broke it altogether. German prisoners who had been in France, Poland, and Russia told me that the bombing and shelling to which they had been subjected in the desert were far worse than* any they had experienced before. The Bth Army also enjoyed the advantage of surprise. It was evident now that Rommel neither expected our attack so soon nor expected it'to come in the northern sector. Even when It began, he misjudged our frontal assault near the coast as being - mete diversionary and waited for-them offensive to begin in the south. Hot he made a mistake from which then was no recovery. Once his front-window display near Alexandria was engulfed, it was found that Rommel had practically, nothing left. - Three years of war were beginning to tell on the Nazi war machine. Since the summer, when he had pushed into Egypt, Rommel had not been <it«in« forced to anything like therttarW had. In desperate attempts ionnre his Mark 3 . and Mark 4 tanksnylty addition of protective armour, and the stepping-up of their 75 and.Bo millimetre guns—by the lengthening ef the barrel to secure greater mimic veto; ity—their speed and manoeuvnbHitj had been sacrificed. Axis Short 6t dll Little had been done to make good the Axis infantry losses. TW'studnrd of the troops had slipped dragtiaßy. Among the Italians, a high percents; of sickness had weakened tne alreai poor fighting material. One more significant fact emerged. As the Axis forces retreated they left behind no petrol and no oiL But they did leave behind vehicles which they might have got away if they had had fuel. It seemed that at last the shortage i oil fuel was going to throw its weight in the scales against :the Nazis. Here, in the desert, was the first polntertha the Axis was on the slide. The tradition of success for them had ended. (World Copyright Reserved)

By the end of the attack our gunners had fired nearly 8000 rounds per gun without rest during 10 days of battle. “Our infantry went forward with great dash, admirably supported by our engineers, machine-gunners, signalmen, and the whole divisional organisation, and captured all objectives despite heavy casualties. “Tanks of the 9th Armoured Brigade and the Divisional Cavalry broke through the enemy gun line. It was this attack, following so quickly on the first series of attacks, that finally made the breach through which the 10th Corps, comprising two armoured divisions and the mobile 2nd New Zealand Division, was passed on November 4, “The role of the armoured divisions was to seek out and destroy the panzer divisions, while the 2nd New Zealand Division and the British 4th Light Armoured Brigade, comprising tanks and armoured cars under our orders, were to move west, avoiding the armoured battle to the north and cut the enemy communications at Fuka 60 miles behind the enemy line. “It was a difficult manoeuvre, especially as the majority of our battalions had to embus from positions in the front line. Congestion and shelling at the gap and the armoured battle en route delayed progress, and when darkness came the brigades were still miles apart. Concentration by night in unknown enemy country 25 miles behind his line is a difficult operation, and it was not till two hours before dawn on November 5 that all units had concentrated, using as an assembly beacon a blazing ammunition lorry hit by enemy fire in a night skirmish. “Before dawn on November 5, our advance continued, the force moving in desert formation over the open desert with armoured cars and tanks ahead. At daylight we encountered a column of the latest type of German Mark 3 and 4 tanks, eight of which the 4th Light Armoured Brigade surprised and disposed of in as many minutes. “Fires and explosions from enemy dumps on the coast could be>seen during the day as we moved westwards, and reports of a precipitate retreat were received. Later in the day our tanks and artillery drove lift the rearguard covering the Fuka position. “On November 6 we were directed on Bagush, where, unfortunately, a heavy storm turned the desert into a morass, and all the wheeled transport not using the coastal road was bogged. The enemy made full use of the respite, but had to leave behind many guns ’and trucks caught in the mud. “On November 8 the weather improved, and we pushed on, passing within sight of our June battlefield at Minqar Qaim. The enemy at this stage had evacuated the Matruh fortress, and the divisiop and attached troops were directed on Sidi Barrani. Damage Done by ,R.A.F. Sidi Barrani was occupied on November 9, and on November 10 we advanced on the heavily defended escarprnent at Halfaya. The pursuit conturned along roads strewn with all manner of wreckage and abandoned vehicles—an eloquent tribute to the Royal Air Force, whose fighters and bombers had given the army magnificent support throughout the battle. ‘“Below the Halfaya escarpment our light armoured advance guard was held up by the enemy, covered by a minefield, but as we deployed to attack the enemy withdrew by dark. “On November 10 the sth Brigade

moved forward throlJgh the min. to the support of the 4tn Armoured Brigade. . ..* r pcses “Halfaya, last of the Axis for i fall last year, is a formidable a to fall last year, tensive position, a surwrwc -«r r hloi decided on, and just before dayiis „irf Asurpri^aW^ Armistice Day, 110 men_ of the J Battalion went’in with Bren bayonets. It was a completejjjg We had one killed and one wo and took 612 prisoners, some but mainly Italians of the division, whose motto is; ‘VahantF Unto Death.’ 11tf and "Solium fell automatically. Egypt was clear of the enemy"The enemy is still retreating,, we are now waiting to go forwa the final objective. . . ~ to its “Your division has again adaea . record by a series of battles ana tions which reflect the greatest - on the brigadiers, commanding cers, and junior commanders i u way they have trained and com® nsC , during battle. The courage and * ity of our fighting soldiers .r®mo.ujpthe highest order. The training.®^y, ment, and efficiency of the foie stood the test of a most exacting paign. and we look to the future w. confidence. . , Ml “I am sending this from Ov ..v.; truck." vMi