French Leadership In North Africa

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23799, 19 November 1942, Page 4

French Leadership In North Africa

Mr Roosevelt’s assurance that the arrangement by which Admiral Darlan has become head of a French North African Government is only temporary will be welcomed throughout Britain and the United States. The controversy over Admiral Darlan’s position has been peculiarly unfortunate at a time when there seemed to be an opportunity to unite Frenchmen throughout the world under one leadership. It is already clear that Admiral Darlan’s elevation has puzzled and distressed the British and American people as much as it has the Fighting France movement. Newspaper comment in the two countries has been overwhelmingly and outspokenly adverse. British official and semi-official comment, though more restrained, shows that Lieu-tenant-General Eisenhower’s decision was made without the consent or approval of the British Government. Mr Attlee’s reply to questions in the House of Commons amounted to a plea to members to reserve judgment until the situation had been straightened out. In its European services the British Broadcasting Corporation has referred to Admiral Darlan’s association with the policy of “ collabora- “ tion ” and has given full publicity to the attitude of the British press. There is, of course, no disposition to quarrel with Lieutenant-General Eisenhower’s decision to negotiate with Admiral Darlan, who was in command of the French Navy and also of French armed forces in North Africa. Those negotiations were justified by their outcome — swift cessation of French resistance and an almost immediate restoration of civil government in the occupied territories. But although it may have been necessary to negotiate with Admiral Darlan, it was not necessary to confer upon him a title and authority for which his political record unfits him. This is not the pass final judgment on his actions since the fall.

of France and the establishment of the Vichy Government; nor are the British people likely to forget that under his personal leadership part of the French Navy fought bravely at Dunkirk and saved the lives of many thousands of British soldiers. For the present it is sufficient to say that his whole career shows him to be a man of great political agility and no political principles. Even since his arrival in North Africa he has shown these qualities. In his first proclamation after the conclusion of the armistice, he claimed to be acting on behalf of the Vichy Government, and ended with the words: “ Long live Petain! “Long live France!” But when it appears that his association with Vichy is a source of weakness, he hastens to break with Vichy, It is not safe to have a man with so little fixity of purpose in authority over a territory so important to the Allied cause. And as long as he remains in this position the attempt to unify Frenchmen under one leadership can make little headway. There is another aspect of the situation which is equally serious. As the “ Manchester Guardian " points out, ever since the establishment of the Fighting French movement, the Foreign Office in London and the State Department in Washington have differed in their methods of handling the diplomatic problems created by the breakdown of France’s political unity; and there is at least a suspicion that Lieutenant-General Eisenhower’s recognition of Admiral Darlan as head of the French North African Government is one result of this difference. It is too much to hope that a nation which has for two years been divided and demoralised by a conflict of loyalties will immediately recover its unity merely because the Vichy Government has ceased to have a claim on its allegiance. But it should not be too much to hope that, the British and United States Governments will see the folly of further bewildering the French people by speaking to them with two voices.