Convoy Losses

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23718, 17 August 1942, Page 4

Convoy Losses

Getting a convoy to Malta last week cost the Navy at least an aircraftcarrier and a 9000-ton cruiser; the previous Malta convoy cost it one cruiser, four destroyers, and several merchantmen; and it is a reasonable inference- from the Admiralty’s statement at ’ the week-end that losses of this order must be expected every ( time a convoy is sent to Malta—that is, once every two or three' months. The prospect is a disturbing one, for British naval losses in all theatres of sea warfare, and particularly in the Mediterranean and on the northern convoiy route to Russia, have been at a rate which cannot be' borne indefinitely without seriously weakening British sea power. Moreover, sentiment apart, Malta is now more of a liability than an asset. Rommel’s victories in the Western Desert have not merely made the island more difficult to supply; they have also reduced its usefulness as a base for raiders operating against Axis communications in the Mediterranean. The loss by the Imperial forces of the greater part of the Cyrenaican and Egyptian coastline has meant that Axis supply lines have been shifted much further east. But although the cost of supplying Malta is now out of proportion to the island’s strategic value, it is inconceivable that Britain, unless she were in desperate straits, would abandon a population whose heroism under the greatest sustained air offensive of the war has been an inspiration to the British peoples. The position of Malta is, therefore, one more demonstration of the urgency of breaking the deadlock at El Alamein, where the bottleneck which blocked Rommel's advance is now making it desperately difficult for General Auchinleck to deploy the Bth Army for offensive action. That deadlock favours the Axis, if only because the longer it lasts the more difficult does it become for Britain to maintain her naval position in the Mediterranean.