The Press THURSDAY, AUGUST 13, 1942. Has Russia a Plan?

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23715, 13 August 1942, Page 4

The Press THURSDAY, AUGUST 13, 1942. Has Russia a Plan?

The pace of thd German advance into the Caucasus, which has now achieved results of major importance, and the apparent absence of any effective Russian resistance north of the mountains, is the most puzzling feature of the Russian campaign. Is the Russian withdrawal merely the result of weakness, or is it deliberate? Last week the military writer of “ The Times ” said that if Marshal Timoshenko was still waiting with any prospect of dealing an effective counter-blow he was indulging in one of the most extraordinary gambles in military history. That counter-blow was being withheld until a highly critical moment. Yesterday a 8.8.C. commentator, discussing the German claim to have taken Pyatigorsk, said this represented an advance of 120 miles in three days, and added; “There is something queer about “this,” These two statements are the outcome of the general hope that the Russians would be able to make an early stand in defence of the Caucasus, such as they have made at Voronezh and in the Don bend opposite Stalingrad. When the German advance was overwhelming the industrial areas of the Don basin, the explanation offered by military writers for British newspapers, including “The Times,” was that the open terrain offered no good defensive positions until the Don was reached. Along the southern reaches of the river, it was claimed, the Russians had probably prepared a strong defensive line. But the Germans swept over the lower Don after only brief delays. Then it was suggested that the Russian plan was to make a stand at the Kuban river, 140 miles south of Rostov. But the Germans have forced the Kuban, and claim the capture not only of the river towns of Krasnodar, Krapotkin, and Armavir, but of Maikop, the oil-producing centre in the foothills more than 50 miles beyond the river. The Russians do not admit the fall of Maikop, but say they have destroyed its oil wells, and report fighting in the general vicinity. The sweeping German success in the whole of this north-west Caucasus area has been achieved at a speed—the Germans estimate the rate of their advance at 17 miles a day—which could not have been possible in face of any strong resistance. Recent reports have described Cossacks and men with bayonets facing the German tanks, and there has been a significant absence of newjs about any Russian armoured forces in action in this area. Apparently the Russian forces here have been inferior in armament, but the contention that their withdrawal has been orderly is supported by the absence of any German claims to have taken large numbers of prisoners. If it is an orderly withdrawal, this supports the argument that it is taking place in accordance with a pre-arranged plan. If that plan is for a withdrawal to the mountains along the whole line from the Black Sea to the Caspian before a stand is made, the Russians are apparently willing to make tremendous sacrifices of resources and territory before underr taking a counter-stroke. The Russian forces which have been defending the Sea of Azov sector are pow. driven back to an area near the Black Sea about the mouth of the Kuban and Novorossiisk, and are likely to have to retreat along the narrow Black Sea coastal strip towards Tuapse, with only an uncompleted railway serving their transport needs from Batum and Poti. The loss of Novorossiisk would force the Russian Black Sea fleet to withdraw to these more southerly and inferior ports, leaving the road open for German reinforcement into the Caucasus from the Crimea. To the south-east, yielding more territory would involve German occupation of the oilfields of Grosnyi, 120 miles on from Pyatigorsk, and Makhatch Kala, on the Caspian. Thereafter, provided they could hold the narrow coastal strips, and the three military roads across the mountains, the Russians would be in a fairly strong defensive position. Such a plan, of drawing the Germans into “the Caucasus sack,” can benefit the Russians only if they aie able to close it further north. The long exposed German flank is vulnerable. A salient driven down to the Sea of Azov from the Voronezh area, or westwards from Stalingrad, would achieve the desired effect. For success, the Russians cannot allow their position opposite Stalingrad to deteriorate, and it is good news that the German thrust towards the Volga north-east from Kotelnikov is being held up. Even more hopeful for their possible ultimate results are the continued Russian local successes in the Voronezh area. If the Russians have a plan for a grand counter-offensive, it is likely to begin with a general renewal of activity on the whole front north from Voronezh, and to be followed by a thrust in full strength from one or more vital points. Suggestions of Russian offensive action further north, particularly in the Rzhev area, opposite Moscow, have lately been coming from German sources. It is perhaps significant that Russian reports lately have not mentioned Rzhev. But whether the Russians have a plan or not, is has become increasingly evident in the last few days that German penetration in the south is now so deep that only a master-stroke can retrieve the situation.