The Press TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 1942. Aid From America

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23589, 17 March 1942, Page 4

The Press TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 1942. Aid From America

For some weeks now Australians and New Zealanders have been alternately depressed and exhilarated by statements in American newspapers about the amount of military assistance they can expect from the United States in the coming battle for control of the central and south Pacific. Thus, the Washington correspondent of a New York newspaper recently reported a high official of the State Department as making this comment on an appeal by the Australian Prime Minister for increased aid: “ Whether Aus- “ tralia holds out or not depends en- “ tirely on Australians themselves. “ We are going to help all we can, “ but the main job is theirs on their “territory.” On the other hand, a correspondent of the “ New York “Times,” in a message which has been headlined in Australian and New Zealand newspapers, said: “United States forces sufficiently “strong to combat the Japanese in “ the south-west Pacific are now “pouring towards that region by “ convoys assembled and equipped “ since December 7. This aggregation of air and naval power, together with specially trained U.S. “ shock troops, is expected soon to “attempt to change the defensive “ role so far forced upon the J United Nations into an action that “will place the Japanese on the “defensive.” The Washington correspondent of the “ Christian “ Science Monitor ” takes the same optimistic view. “ It can now be “ stated authoritatively,” he says, “ that the flow of reinforcements to “the south-west Pacific exceeds “ anything the average layman im“agines and is going well beyond “ what even the most optimistic “ officials thought possible.” There are, unfortunately, many people in Australia and New Zealand who are ready to look anywhere but to their own exertions to save their countries from a Japanese occupation and who prefer to bplieve only the most rosy accounts of the help to be expected from the United States. If is therefore necessary to point out that neither in Washington nor in Canberra has any direct or indirect official encouragement been given to the view that United States reinforcements and war materials are arriving at this side of thfe Pacific on a scale which will shortly enable Japan to be forced back on the defensive. Every official statement made in Washington has deprecated expectations of an early offensive against Japan. Moreover, if the statements quoted above from the “ New York Times ” and the “ Christian Science Monitor ” are true, it would seem that the note of urgency in Mr Curtin’s broadcast appeal to the American people was unwarranted and that there was no need for the Australian Government to send Dr. Evatt on a special mission to Washington. It is, of course, unlikely that the United States Government will oblige the Japanese by making a detailed statement of the help Australia and New Zealand are likely to get from the United States in the next few months. But it is only necessary to look at the broad outlines of the situation to realise that those who expect to see a substantial American army on Australian soil in the near future are likely to be disappointed. Nine months after the outbreak of war, Great Britain had succeeded in moving 12 divisions across the Channel into France, although for at least a year before the war began the preparation of an expeditionary force had been under way. The United States has been in the war a little more than three months; her military preparations over the last year have not included the assembling of an expeditionary force for service in this part of the world; and she is expected to send forces a sea distance of between 6000 and 7000 miles. The shipping problem alone is a colossal one. It was estimated recently by a naval expert that it would take 630,000 tons of shipping to transport an army of 150,000 men from the Pacific coast of the United States to the Philippines; and it is safe to assume that the transport of a comparable force to Australia or New Zealand would take nearer 750,000 tons of shipping. Since the amount of Allied shipping in the Pacific was heavily reduced in the first two years of war, it is a reasonable assumption that, even if an American army were available for service in Australia, the shipping to take it there would not be available. Another aspect of the situation must be borne in mjpd. The primary responsibility of the United States in the Pacific is the maintenance of sea and ajr communications between North America and Australia and New Zealand. That is not merely a matter of naval patrols; it is also a matter of garrisoning dozens of strategic islands and of providing them with antiaircraft defences and in some cases with aerodromes and fighter aeroplanes. This task has been the main preoccupation of the War Department and the Navy Department in the last three months and has drawn heavily on their resources. In the circumstances, the most that Australia and New Zealand can expect of the United States in the next month or two is naval protection for their eastern sea approaches, an increasing flow of military equipment, a substantial addition to their strength in heavy bombers (which can still be flown across the Pacific), some fighter units, and possibly some specialist army units. The provision of land forces to meet a Japanese invasion must be the responsibility of the Pacific Dominions themselves. It is not a responsibility which should cause them great anxiety. Between them they can put in the field armies i numerically superior to those

which the Japanese have used for the conquest of Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. The future can be faced with some confidence provided Australians and New Zealanders do not fall into the mistake of sitting back on their haunches and wailing for others to deliver them from (heir peril.