WEAKNESSES SHOWN BY MOCK INVASION

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23477, 4 November 1941, Page 6

WEAKNESSES SHOWN BY MOCK INVASION

N in the "New York Post.”]

[By WILLIAM H. STONEM.

BRITAIN’S DEFENCES

With the ‘‘German Army” in England,

October 8. , „ , .. If it were not for the Royal Air Force and the Home Guard, an invading German army equipped with panzer divisions and several divisions of infantry could roam England, spreading havoc for at least one week, and at the end of that time could still exist as a fighting" unit. It would be able to do so because the British army itself is still slow on the pick-up and incapable of massing armoured units, pushing them on and guiding their activities once they are beyond the range of ordinary motorcycle dispatch riders. If the manoeuvres mean anything—and it is not certain they do—that is the lesson provided by the grand antiinvasion exercise staged across the countryside norfh and west of London during the last six’ days.

The “Battle” Plans

In this grandiose bit of military stageplay, involving hundreds of thousands of men and thousands of mechanical vehicles, it was the job of the invading “German force” to strike westward across East Anglia, to draw off and annihilate the troops defending the London area, and then to stab the force defending the south coast of England while further German forces tried to land there. It was the purpose of the defending armies to stop this drive in a head-on collision and at the same time to get around into the Germans’ rear, cutting them off from the east coast of England and severing their communications. To prevent confusion the Home Guard was excluded from the games. Both sides were handicapped in that civilian life remained normal in the area of the exercises, telephones and railways could not be disrupted, and tanks were not allowed to leave the roads. . Defenders Move Slowly

What happened during the six days of battling was that the invading force crossed East Anglia and Bedfordshire, actually threatened Oxford and then lost most of its armoured units in a clash with a British panzer division. It also lost an infantry division to, the Canadians who had managed to surround, it, but then before the British forces were able to follow through or move in from behind, the invaders had extricated most of their infantry and the remnants of their tanks and retired to a defensive position where conceivably they might have received reinforcements from the continent. Although the course the Germans took seemed to invite encirclement and

disaster, the British forces moved too slowly and blindly, as a result of an inadequate communications system, to capitalise on the situation. Here, in a playful way, we saw exactly the same thing we saw in Flanders (May, 1940), when for days on end we did not know where anybody was or what he was doing.

A Lot to Learn Granted full use of the Home Guard and the Royal Air Force, the net result would undoubtedly have been different; the Germans have not attempted invasion, because they have not been able to cripple the Royal Air Force, and it is everybody’s opinion that the Royal Air Force would probably defeat an invasion attempt. So these manoeuvres do not mean that an invasion would be successful. What they do mean is that the British still have a lot to learn about lightning war and how to combat it. However, there were several things of which the British, could be proud. Their armoured divisions made an posing display, and they moved Iwi greased lightning when they were W- -v lowed to do so by their commanders and the umpire. If their communications had been as rapid, they might have done much better. Infantrymen and gunners, who were • confronted by armoured attacks, showed great skill in preparing ambushes and destroying enemy tanks by means made famous in the Spanish and Finnish wars. If tanks, instead of following obediently along the roads, had been able to rove the countryside, the story, of course, might have been different.

Correspondents “Captured” With all the difficulties, this was oh® . of the fastest-moving manoeuvres ever held, and it was a lesson to any prospective war correspondent. Time and again, our party was behind the, enemy lines before we knew it, and on three occasions we were either exterminated or captured. When either of the two sides was on the advance, the countryside was full of enemy pickets, which, as a result of the lessons learned in the Russian war, did not surrender just because they were theoretically surrounded. , . , These manoeuvres were designed primarily to give general officers of the British Army an opportunity to handle larger bodies of men than they had ever had under their command before, and to experiment in the use ' of mechanical vehicles en masse. At night they were more tired and Wiser men and so were the newspapermen who followed in their train.