EVERY PRIVATE A MARSHAL’S BATOL

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23318, 2 May 1941, Page 8

EVERY PRIVATE A MARSHAL’S BATOL

HITLER’S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY -

IBy JOSEPH C. HABSCH.J [Published by Arrangement with the ''Christian Science Monitor.^ Mr Harsch, Berlin correspondent of the “Christian tor,” has returned to the United States. In a series of gives his. uncensored views of the setup in Germanv. In the folios ■ Ihg article, which has been summarised, he gives a frank v d«i||j tion of the German Army, emphasising that its long line ofti| cesses must be attributed to its equaiitarian spirit made it the mosV*unorthodox military weapon torgsd. ftocep armies of the French Hevolution. • '*£. ' \

BOSTON, March 8. One of the most skilful Jobe of propaganda put-over-on the outside,world., in the days before the German Army crashed into Prance was' the allusion that the ReichSweKr Was much weaker than it was. , * v Wishful thinking and complacency played into the, hands , of, Dr, Joseph , Goebbels’ Propaganda Department.. Im fact, there was almost nothing it had to do, except keep quiet and let the people in France, Britain, and the United States feed upon what they wanted to hear. The unwillingness to believe the facts extended high ufl. Before the war began, an Unusually brilliant military attache at, the British Embassy in Berlin was fwed-by his Ambassador to leave his post be-, cause he reported the factual .truth about the-German armed forces to his War Ministry In London. An equally brilliant attache at the- American E®* bassy was branded as-a pro»Naii in Washington and nearly, was forced out of the United States Army because he did tha same thing; No one wanted to believe the truth. ■' . ; ' In those days, people believed exactly what was most In the-interest of the German High Command to have them believe. They:believed chanical equipment of’ the , German Army was inferior, and would break down Under war- service; that, there was a lack of trained non-commis-sioned -officers; that the .officers corps was opposed to the Nasi regime, .and never would fight for it; that toe scripts :■ would turn on the Nazis , if weapons were put into their .nanus, that the individual Gorman soldier lacked Initiative; that German strategy still employed the mass v attack*. 1 with callous disregard for sacrifice. Concepts. Dear to Old Soldiers They paid a the Mtj. isfactioh they derived HefS, Greater alertness might not nave saved Holland and Belgium, but to probably would have saved the Chin nel ports and. France. .Comfortable wishful thinking was toe best ally Getmah militarism had during tne first year of the Wat. . Fortunately for the defenders of democracy, most of this complacency toas been liquidated by events. But a new danger has replaced it in the thinking Of those forging new military defences against. Hitler ism. This is a tendency to ignore the material sources .of the German Army and to-try some mechanical explanation , tor ite successes which could be reproduced easily and without much, change , to traditional military concepts so dear to the hearts of old soldiers. ■ . There still is a falladous and dangerous tendency to, find-the_.explan-tion of German victories secret, weapons.” cunning • espion*ge, _ <mu “fifth column” work alone. While rtus true that the German Army *;Success Owed touch to espionage, ip subversive activity behind the ppPQSmtfflmM to the confusion and internal disagreement developed ,bv_ Prhpsganda and ’‘flfthi columns,^" this is only-part of tne story. ; Some Le»»oos Intercepted ~ For anyone sincerely;■.lbtereSted'im forging an adequate military defence against Germany’s armeA forces there is still a great deal to be learned from the German of the technical innovationatoave been fidUMg” ported. The United States;. General Staff knows, , that technically the strengtliof ;the from a balance of different ( weapon* and types of equipment, rather than on preponderance, of. any one weapon such as tanks:'‘from a highly Warned, resourceful officer coirps Which has performed, phenomenal feats in planning the supply of enormous armies in motion; from equipment 1 which: often is inferior but always adequate in quantity and simple to maintain and operate. ... ; But if American defence is to take the fullest, possible advantage from Germany military progress much more must be known and appreciated about the military weapon which is poised to.-day tor Herr Hitler’s announced attempt to peek final Neal victory m 194 L It must be realised first of all that it is a-, new. kind of army as different from the Kaiser’s army of 1914 as the army of the French Revolution differed from its Bourbon predecessor.' . Democratic Army Probably the greatest single element of strength in this new German Army—and this is hard to believe but a fact attested to by. those: who have seen that army at close range—is the, spirit of equalltarianism, upon which its personal relationships are: founded. It comes remarkably close to being a democratic army, using the word democratic in the sense of fellowship and mutual respect between officers and men. True, there is some Prussianism left, particularly in the High Command where the older officers date from the Kaiser’s army. The clicking of heels and toe “Ja Wohl” are as mechanical as ever. But the distinction between the officers and enlisted men has been reduced-to what Is probably a military minimum. The Russians tried to go farther and have had to abandon the experiment, reverting to a greater distinction than exists in the German Army. One thing about this new German Army is sq simple that it has gone almost unnoticed in the outside world, Yet |t is of extreme and revealing importance. In the German Army of today a private soldier salutes another private soldier—and he does so with the samAmeticulous' care with which he salutes an officer. In other words the distinction between the officer’s and privates’ uniform has been reduced to a new minimum. With the change in the meaning of the salute much of the old distinction, between officer and private has disappeared. Privates dine at the Action or any of the best Berlin restaurants—provided they have toe money—with no inhibitions whatever. I have seen officers and enlisted men dining together in such places on many occasions with complete ease of relationship. The old “brass, hat” tradition has been eliminated right and left. On Campaigns, officers eat. the same rations as men. Of extreme importance ---officers actually lead their men where the danger is greatest Generals commanding whole army corps, frequently advance with the front line. During the campaign in Poland one commanding general was. the, first man across the river. ; Fat' Old Frenchmen Official instructions tor officers place major emphasis on taking detailed and Sympathetic interest in the welfare of the meh.< They .are , instructed to keep themflfelves informed about the personal problems of the men. These instructions include giving a man leave if he has any personal difficulties at home, sending greetings to the family, and inquiring sympathetically about his home life on his return. The greatest care is taken tor the safety and welfare of men In action. Herr Hitler was not boasting idly when be said that having been a private soldier himself he planned this war with the greatest care lor the lives of the men in the ranks. No position ever is taken by manpower if it can be taken mechanically, ; One of the most striking Contrasts this war has produced is that between the men commanding the German Army and. those who commanded the French Army. The German Army ex!iects of its officers a :degree of darng, quick thinking, initiative, and, physical activity which are character-

istics of youth. Seniorit£lSKMHHH handicaps to advanceiriexft assets. The result is 35 years of age have marshal's rank and armies. Physical youth 'WHB daring and «mandpitton'ftMi»Hß r tion and caution mark: the>ftl|B» Of'this army. By officers with disabilities, burdened often marked by the worn tmßßtim' the best characteristics OtfjijHßiiV strikingly numerous in timwgusm prison tamps behind the GerfltfjHlßjfS during the 1940 campaign; Another thing worth no&Mttlflnl tion can hive an, army Uk* 7 TOlwifl man without miking flees In civilian life ictr it live in Germany, as X In hi hiIMIIB ing since the beginnint you begin to' think of the tornggHran only thing in Germany-. of 'NflBHssV quality. It has all the on its back, all the good leawraHn its feet, all the best metaJ^nßHl

weapons, all the btlt food%liHßWll Everything else in CK|»W|H| shoddy and second rate. ■ - •-^^BH This concentration of nteUwmgmfi i army even extends 1 baokvOver nearly a year <3fermahy at war I am struck<l|gHH fact that the most interesting,\th««H| intelligent, the most honest, m ; ABj§H all respects the most desirable Mj§a| met were la the trmy—taking^wm The great.tragedy of (fermitfilMpJ in'this fact that its best peoplfeMM the orders and do the. technical'-jSPJi deliberately closing ihelr minds'fWPj implications <rf what they are 4HH Indicative of this is the, case' '«■ German lahdowner who had liveflH Poland before the war,. As a GeiHl he looked -forward* ta >; the arrival of the after ihe had lived for a mvHI under the new regime he cameapsß|H lin to join the army aaying; tXiilMl ashamed .of my country /toJ|lf|Bß| it so I am going into the armswwgl hope of dying for it." - \ Any idea that the Army is PffffHff to do anything about Nazism discarded at once. There arejgiHH Officers in its ranks who diapJtfilMi the regime. But every timeJjjggyMj been a conflict between them*jPq||Jll party authority they have glyjiiWi even when there was a sound JBflglHj reason for the Army positioa^*b'||§l It never has been to their for example, to have the <3**M¥.lH S.S. take over control of;-. countries from the Army. instance the Army got along rwatipiig well with the conquered every instance the arrival."&)JM Gestapo and S.S. has mark*d:|M||jgS ginning of friction, ation, and mounting hatred; mans. This has increased 6npffigsajjj the Army'* police problem' dangeted its security. But w jWffil invariably has surrendered. Enthusiasm Wanes Having said so much AwM strength and power of the '9*398 Army, this much can be adds* JnvJH out arousing false hopes: -,JH The initial sense of adventure sm«M| the ranks which gave it its elajifflraj the .campaigns in Poland and" fTWHB largely has disappeared. Classes sill mm to the colours before these euftm Mil went with a sense of relief .maPJPJI ticipation. For the individual Wfjl|| it meant relief ' from respWupHHl political uncertainty, boredom, "■'JBB civil drudgery. It also meant jjgM radeship in the field and a chajafjHjfi scene. For boys from farms, :< °£| l Jra and, factories who never had beeffigMm side their home communities campaigns were exciting larks affijPjll up by easy military victory. ■ r^Bßi That phase seems to be tPPrai|lS| ing its conclusion. The novelty Wm worn of! and the end is not in fciPPjg This winter I met soldiers, hom|«| leave who expressed for the flrst'Jjsfpji a preference tor staying at hgHJB Heretofore they always were eagfejj|Hl get back to their units. It is QBffiH a straw in the wind and can effect on discipline or morale dunjHß the coming campaign season. .&£SH is worth noting as something yMfSI might become significant, a year of Wffl|[ from now. t'^HJ