WITH RETIREMENT OUR LIBYAN GAINS REMAIN

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23300, 9 April 1941, Page 6

WITH RETIREMENT OUR LIBYAN GAINS REMAIN

RECAPTURE OF BENGHAZI

[By the Military Correspondent of the "Sydney Morning Herald."]

SYDNEY, April 2. While the reoccupation of Benghazi undoubtedly possesses a considerable propagandist value to the enemy, it is more important to assess its immediate military significance The westernmost point of Britisn occupation was El Agheila (Besher), at the southern extremity of the Guji of Sirte. Admittedly an outpost this was recaptured by the enemy on March 24. Shortly afterwards, it became apparent that considerable aggregations of motorised vehicles had been mustered along the coastal road, ana these were, in part at least, manned by Germans. Last Wednesday, these units occupied Agedabia (near Zuetina), just inland from the point where the coasts turns north; and they soon pressed on td Benghazi itself. It is important to get this occupation into a proper military proportion. Admittedly the strength of the latesi Italo-German thrust is something or a surprise, for it was not believed possible that an attack of this magnitude could be organised so quickly. With the worst of the summer season lying immediately ahead and with tne difficulties imposed by the heat on fighting, it was expected that the next few months would ' witness give-and-take skirmishes on the eastern fringe of the 300 miles of desert country between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Nature of the Thrust

Now that the enemy has derived some profit from his surprise attack, the question arises whether the thrust is part of a general counter-attack and whether it jeopardises the gains made by General Wavell in his recent Libyan campaign. From a local tactical point of view, there is much to commend General Wavell’s decision to choose his own battlefield and not to interpret the military worth of a town in terms of its civilian importance. Once it became obvious that a largescale thrust was developing, Wavell had to consider when, where, and how

he would. fight. The slightest glance at a physical map shows that the Gyre--naican plateau or escarpment is the dominating factor, and that any retarding stand would have to be made on the heights. As the earlier Italian experience showed in the first week of February, the environs of Benghazi are totally unsuitable for a stand against mechanised attack. From a military point of view, Benghazi was an outlying post, not a vital point on the general defensive system. It would be essential for a large-scale attack on Tripolitania by land, sea, and air, but, in view, of the general military position in the eastern Mediter-. •raneap, that has not been practicable. When Benghazi was taken by the British on February 6, it was believed- that its harbour might prove valuable; but actually, as a Cairo communique states, it has never' beep used as a port since the British took it over. The smaller ports of Bardia, Tobruk, and Derna have all been used, but the facilities and anchorages at Benghazi were severely damaged in the fighting before its occupation; its roadstead was open; and it had no natural protection against the German dive-bomb-

Written before it was announced that British troops were in Greec*, ' thC article considers-the implications of the recapture of Benghazi, , by Axis forces. I-

ers, attacks by which have been re*' ported from time to time. If it hatproven such a white elephant to the British, in spite of their undoubted command of the sea, it cannot be of much use to the enemy, for they will be subject to naval as trial attack. ,'}J British Objectives As against this, it cannot be denied that the Axis forces, especially if dom-> inated by Germans, might be able U»‘ establish advanced air bases at Benghazi. If this were so, they would bein a position to use fighter aeroplanes! in any future Cyrenaican operation* and this would certainly prove trouble-! some.' It would really mean a fighter-' base 500 miles east of any major, aerodrome at present available to the Germans. On the other hand, the problem of communications would remain,'. The enemy are now operating on tremendously long lines. They have ho important seaborne communication!and they rely on a single coastal rosul which is particularly vulnerable to sir attack on the long desert stretches between Tripoli and Benghazi. For thejjj, as for the British, Benghazi is at prejk ent an outpost. ,;■> Viewing the Benghazi operation ft its wider setting, General Wavell’j problem was to dispose his forces ft order to safeguard his original gain* It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the Cyrenaican campaign was not fought for the possession of Cyrenaica, admittedly useful though that ft The main aim was to remove th| threat to Egypt and the Canal and to' prevent any Italian interference -ft Britain’s wider plans in the eastern Mediterranean. The reoccupation « Benghazi by the enemy does not fti new that threat; and, however far. they bite into the outer fringe of the zone of occupation, they cannot constitute a menace to Egypt until they have bases and supplies in the who]* of Cyrenaica, and we know how lonj it took the Italians to build those up, even under favourable peace-time conditions. . ;; Keeping Egypt Safe We know now that Cyrenaica wa| taken by forces absurdly small in pro*’ portion to the numbers of the defenders, and we know also that the forcn of occupation have been exceedingly light. Small as was the original army of conquest it has been still further reduced-, by the requirements of the East African campaign and by procautionary rearrangements needed ft meet other threats that may develop in the eastern Mediterranean. In the face of a strong thrust toward' Ben* ghazi Wavell’s problem was thus; to preserve his mobility and to concen- .. trate his troops on the vital points in ■ Cyrenaica. He is too astute a cam-, paigner to make them fight at any minor outpost, and he is far too mindful of Graziani’s mistake to reinforce needless outposts and see his forces isolated in so many small groups, Hft , job is not. to seek conquest as such, but to keep Egypt and the canal safe; . and it is quite conceivable that he could go back very much farther ft Cyrenaica without endangering these, Further withdrawals may even add ft the total strength of his defensive position. After all, as American military com* mentators have recently been point- . ing out (before Benghazi fell), the British may retire as far as Bardia without any insuperable military loss and without jeopardising the results for which the, campaign was originally fought. Militarily Bardia is thermal ' key to Egypt, especially if all works of military value between Bardia 4n3 Benghazi should have been wrecked. While the reoccupation of Benghasi.ft no sense implies such a ment, these facts must be streslftjKy order , to show how much more C.T be ceded to the enemy without Ifflfiii* vital military advantages. Such j cop-! siderations place the loss of Benghazi; in its proper place, especially atythfa particular moment, when the ftw of events elsewhere allows the;ftnk sideration of only defensive tactiesda eastern Libya.