Europe's Two Wars

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 22909, 4 January 1940, Page 6

Europe's Two Wars

t The British and the Italian ambassadors have left Moscow, according to their governments to taike their ordinary leave. But although the British Government has been at some pains to explain that Sir William Seeds "is known to * "bein need.of a holiday" and that his return ** ii&s xxo political significance/' 1 official Quarters in Moscow have been less discreet and express the opinion that in view of the present state of relations between Great Britain and Russia the Ambassador's holiday "may be prolonged "indefinitely." Signor Rosso's return to Rome is commonly interpreted as a sequel to the recall of the Soviet Ambassador in Rome after ■widespread demonstrations in Italy in favour of Finland; and it is significant that the organ of the Italian Foreign Office has chosen this moment to declare that Signor Mussolini has never deviated a hair*s Breadth from his policy of resisting Bolshevism. It may also be significant that the Italian wireless has given currency to startling reports of Russian troop concentrations in the Middle East and that the German wireless has begun to speak menac'ingly of British and French assistance to Finland. There is a strong temptation to conclude hfrom these events that the conflict in Finland imay transform the present limited war to a 'European war on an even larger scale than 'that of 1914. Russia and Germany, clearly, are ifceing driven closer together and may ultimately transform their non-aggression pact into lan active military alliance; and if this happens >it seems certain that Italy will go over to the 'Bide of the Allies. But although this may f ultimately be the course that events may take, 'it is still too soon to assume that the development is inevitable. In the first place, Germany jis relying heavily upon economic assistance jfrom Russia to offset the effects of the Allied 'blockade. Should Russia become involved in a war on several fronts, her capacity to supply Germany with' essential raw materials would be ■eriously diminished. The truth seems to be \ that if' the German Government thinks of the | war primarily as an economic struggle, its infterests will best be served by discouraging \ Russia from further adventures and by ehcOur- ; aging the Balkan States and Italy to maintain their neutrality. In the second place it is as Well to remember that, although the pact be-

tween Germany and Russia may have been a severe shock to Italy, trie Italian Government has twice since the outbreak of war reaffirmed its loyalty to Germany. Moreover, the general tone of the Italian press and wireless cannot by any stretch of imagination be called favourable to the Allies.