The Press THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1940. M. Daladier's Speech

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 22909, 4 January 1940, Page 6

The Press THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1940. M. Daladier's Speech

The chorus of approval which has greeted M. Daladier's cautious remarks about the planning of a new Europe, made in the course of an address to the French Senate, is a sign of the widespread interest in the question of war aims and will, it must be hoped, embolden Allied statesmen to discuss these aims with more frankness and precision. M. Daladier, while confessing his distrust of " grand " theoretical conceptions" and affirming France's unwillingness to lay down her arms without "material guarantees against a return "of events such as those from which we are "suffering," was nevertheless convinced that it would be necessary, in order to organise a lasting peace, to " increase international co- " operation and perhaps to envisage federal "ties among the various States of Europe." Great Britain and France, M. Daladier pointed out, have under the stress of war already developed such complete military and economic co-operation that it is possible to talk of thenassociation as a union. This union, he. said, is "open to all," meaning presumably that it is the potential nucleus of a European federal union. Commenting on the speech, "The "Times" says: "The Europe of 1939 is gone "for ever and few will regret it." If this is true, and it is impossible to doubt that it is true, then there are good reasons why the Allied Governments should, without unnecessary delay, say boldly and formally what M. Daladier has said cautiously and informally. For, in the first place, it is already obvious that the claims of submerged nationalities now supporting the Allied cause may, at the end of the war, create a difficult and embarrassing problem. Already Polish and Czech leaders have indicated that they expect the victorious •Allies to confer " freedom" on their peoples and that by " freedom" they mean full sovereignty and political independence. It is therefore desirable, if the reproach of broken pledges is to be avoided, that the Allied Governments should now say firmly that any idea of recreating a Europe which is a patchwork of small sovereign nation States has been aban- . dohed. In the new Europe, freedom for nationalities must mean freedom to speak their own languages and to develop their own cultural life; it must not mean freedom to erect barriers against the natural flow of trade, to oppress other nationalities, to maintain what armed forces they please, and to act politically as if there were no higher law than the will of the State. In the second place, it should not be assumed that no progress towards the federalisation of Europe is possible until the ■war has been brought to a decisive conclusion. Most of,the small neutral States are now becoming aware that, in this war, evei. the strictest impartiality towards the belligerents cannot save them from destruction. Sooner or later, they -will be, compelled to choose between the Allies and Germany; and it is thus possible that before the end of the war the union between Great" Britain and France will have been enlarged by the addition of Belgium. Holland, Sweden, and Norway. As far as the Allies are * concerned, it is desirable that the neutrals should make "their choice as soon as possible; and it would therefore be a sound strategic, move to announce now the terms on ■which neutrals can associate themselves in a • -union with Great Britain and Finance. Finally, it is worth emphasising once again that the more rapidly the Allies move towards a clarification of their war aims, the more rapidly the war will move towards a decisive finish. iPresident Wilson's 14 points shortened the Great llWar by at least six months; some similar j formulation of war aims by the Allied Governments would do much to prevent this war from becoming a war of inanition.