THE MONETARY VALUE OF LIFE

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22343, 5 March 1938, Page 16

THE MONETARY VALUE OF LIFE

The death of either party to a contract does not in general put an end to the right to sue-for damages for breach of -that contract. On the other hand, until a year or so ago, the general rule in Tort was that the personal representatives of a deceased person could not sue or be sued in respect of a wrong committed against or by the deceased during his lifetime. Consequently, if a person negligently injured another he would be liable to pay damages; but if either party died before judgment could be obtained, the right to recover damages ceased. There were certain exceptions, but the general effect of the rule was that it was cheaper (as well as, in some cases, more humane) for the negligent party to kill his victim outright. The Law Reform Act, 1936, substantially abolishes the rule and most actions by or against a person may upon his death be brought by or against his personal representatives. Relatives' Pecuniary Loss Another aspect of the question appears in the rule that the death of a person is not a cause of action. Hence a person, having an interest in the continuance of the life of another, could not recover damages from a wrongdoer who caused the other's death. An important exception to this rule is found in the Death by Accidents Compensation Act, under which certain relatives financially dependent upon the deceased can recover limited compensation for the financial loss they suffer through his death. Profit from Death The Law Reform Act goes much further. It enables the personal representatives of a person wrongfully killed to recover damages to an unlimited extent in respect of causes of action which would have been available to the injured person if he had not died. Hence it is that creditors, legatees, or next of kin—even next of kin unknown to the deceased—may be financially benefited by the pain, injuries, and loss of expectation of life of one wrongfully killed. It is true that such person would, under the former law, have benefited similarly in the rare event of the deceased living just long enough to obtain a judgment. Nevertheless, the object of the o'd law was to grant compensation to the injured person himself for his loss; and the windfall for others was both occasional and incidental. The newer humanitarianism, however, is remarkable for the fact that its sole or primary purpose is to allow a profit to be made out of another's death. Measure of Damages The act provides that damages by way of punishment to - the wrorig"doer shall not be recoverable; but, in respect of the causes of action which do survive, no satisfactory way of measuring damages is indicated by the act. In the English case of Rose v. Ford, which ultimately went to the House of Lords, the personal representative of a deceased girl claimed damages (a) in respect of pain and suffering, (b) for loss of a leg, and (c) for loss of expectation of life. The facts in this case were that a girl sustained a compound fracture of her leg on August 4. On August 6 her leg was amputated, and on August 8 she died, having been unconscious nearly ail the four days. It was held that damages for pain and suffering must be limited to the four days; and as the girl was unconscious most of the time, nominal damages only, amounting to £2O, were allowed. Residuary legatees will no doubt observe from this decision that they have a financial interest in seeing that the injured person in his dying hours is restored to the maximum of consciousness and pain and suffering. The trial Judge allowed £SOO for the loss of the limb; but the Court of Appeal considered that, as the deceased had lived as a one-legged girl only two days, the damages should be only £2. The House of Lords confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal but on a different ground, stating that the sum awarded in respect of shortened expectation of life was assessed on the basis of a normal two-legged life and damages should not be awarded twice over. Loss of Expectation of Life The most interesting of the three heads of damages was the claim in respect of loss of expectation of life. If a person is injured and the injury will shorten his life, he can sue for damages for loss of expectation of life. Under the Law Reform Act, actions open to the injured during his life pass to his representative; and the House of Lords authoritatively decided that the personal representative can sue for damages in respect of the deceased's loss of expectation of life. It is expected that substantial claims for damages will in future he brought under this heading, except perhaps where life before the accident was not worth living, but the injuries received would have made existence still more unbearable. Is Life a Boon? In order to establish that substantial damages should be granted, it seems that it will be necessary for the jury to take the view that life, for the deceased, would have been worth living. If the jury takes such a view, it is faced with the problem of assessing life in terms of money. How difficult a problem this is may be gathered from the summing up of his Honour Mr Justice Northcroft in the first case of the kind in Christchurch. You are taking part in an historical incident in the law. the placing of a milestone in the progression of the law. It may be that the law will be. thought to have advanced too far; but with that consideration neither you nor I are concerned at this moment. We aro not involved in the making of this. I am only concerned to construe it and you to apply it. After referring to the change in law his Honour proceeded:— This being the law. it becomes your dutv to consider an award in this case which involves the loss of expectaiion of life of a small child, little more than a baby aged only three years seven months. It would not be relevant and I think it would be misleading or at

;—♦ A New Demand on Juries (SFSCIAXiXiY WBITTEH JOB TKB PRBSS.) [By "BARRISTER."]

least confusing were I to tell you what amounts were awarded in Flint v. Lovell, which was the case of an elderly man in good circumstances, or in Rose v. Ford, the case of a young woman. The amounts awarded in those cases were assessed in respect oi the r.umstances of those particular persons '"I and were made somewhat easier than is your task here, because at least some degree of stability had been reached and the future course of events was more easily postulated than is the case in respect of a young child. At this stage I suggest also that you ignore altogether the amount claimed for the plaintiff —that can afford no guide at all as to what is appropriate in the judgment of your 12 jurymen—the amount claimed only represents the opinion of the claimant or perhaps of his advisers. Your task is to consider as much of the circumstances of this child as has been proved by the evidence, and to assess what you con-. sider appropriate in those circumstances. I realise that this is difficult, but it must be done as well as is possible. . We have not omnipotence to know what we ourselves may expect of life, still less to know what may reasonably have been exDected for the life of the child concerned here. It is my duty to warn you no guidance may be obtained by considering what is an appropriate amount for the punishment of the defendant These damages are for compensation, not by way of fine; and if punishment is to be imposed, that is done by the Court in its criminal jurisdiction. Furthermore, I must warn you to avoid any attempt to compensate for the grief of the child's parents, still less for any future loss of comfort, or even support, from the child after he had grown up. These items are not sued for, the action being based upon a consideration of what is the loss to the child himself for his deprivation of the expectation of his life. Life is not necessarily either pleas- . ant or profitable, and the contingencies militating against enjoyment of future life by a young child are innumerable. The child might have died in his childhood. He might have suffered infantile paralysis or some other grave illness and have been doomed to a har- • assing lifetime. He might have proved mentally unstable or developed antisocial tendencies and lived an unhappy, hunted, and persecuted existence. Again, he might have been entirely worthy and yet suffered poverty and want. That is to say, he might have found that "Life is a waste of wearisome hours." On the other hand, he might have grown up to be healthy, happy, and prosperous, and lived surrounded by those he loved, going to his end at peace with the world, having lived a long and honoured life with all the comforts and joys this world can give. Had he known all the pleasures of life he might have % thought, "Life is a bumper filled by fate." You will observe that I omit philosoohical speculation as to what constitutes happiness in life—whether living an abundantly good life or living with an abundance of the goods of life. I do so because your nroblem is based upon a material philosophy, in that you are to assess the value of life in terms of money. In a material way I have endeavoured to outline the alternatives: but you will realise that life is rarely all sadness or all joy, and this child may well have had his share of good fortune and of bad fortune, according to the lot of most of mankind. The whole question is highly speculative, and it is one uoon which I cannot give you any lead even if I were oermitted and able to do so. lam only required, as indeed I am only allowed, to draw your attention to the factors for your consideration, leaving it to you in your own discretion to decide according to the evidence as far as it can help, and thereafter according to your knowledge and your experience of life. W. S. Gilbert, in one of his songs of common sense and whimsical philosophy, asks, "Is life a boon?" and then goes on to comment, "If so, it must befall That death, when'er he call, Must call too soon." Bv way of completeness the song at a later stage asks, "Is life a thorn?" and comments, "Then count it not a whit. Man is well done with it." It is for you to determine, as I believe a jury has never before been required to determine, the answer to Gilbert's question, "Is life a boon? You may decide it is not. and that itis so compounded of happiness and unhappiness that this child was "well done with it." No one except those unhappy few of suicidal disposition would willingly give up life. That clinging to life mayarise, not from the value of life itself, but because of an overwhelming instinct for the preservation of life. You must try as best you may to determine whether having regard to the uncertainties 'and the vicissitudes of life, it can be said that this child has lost anything at all in losing life. If you do decide that life in itself is of value and to be regarded because of value, you will then proceed to determine what, at the time of this happening, that life was worth in terms of money to this child of three and a half years on whose behalf this action has been brought. I sympathise with you and am comforted that, on this occasion, it is your duty and not mine. As I said before, this is, I think, the first time either here or in England that a jury has been set this formidable problemIt would be unseemly for me to cnu-. cise these changes in the law. I do but explain them, and having done so I pan only ask you to retire snd give I your best consideration to a difficulty which might well have confounded Solomon himself. Reform of Reform However difficult the matter of valuing life in terms of money may be, the question must in each case be solved; and executors will be required to parade and juries to value the pathetic hopes and fears and pleasures and pains of the dead, until the law is reconsidered and changed by the Legislature. The human corpse is not yet auctioned for the benefit of the estate. Life and its value should also be things very private and personal to the individual. Let these be decently interred with his bones.