GERMAN COLONIAL CLAIMSAND BRITAIN

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22337, 26 February 1938, Page 16

GERMAN COLONIAL CLAIMS—AND BRITAIN

Public Opinion in Both Countries Surveyed

During the last year I have devoted much time to addressing audiences throughout Britain regarding British and German relations in general, and in particular regarding Germany's colonial claims. I have invited questions and I have provoked discussions. I have attended working men's clubs, Conservative and Libera.l summer schools, undergraduate debating societies, Women's Institutes, League of Nations' rallies, Workers' Educational Association meetings, Chatham House study groups, mass meetings in my own division, gatherings at Bonar Law College, and informal discussions with senior officers of'the fighting services. Through all the diversity of thought and feeling, through all the gradations of knowledge and ignorance, cutting across all sectional divisions of class and party dogma, there runs a tenuous thread of unanimity. This general common factor is a profound dread of war; a recognition that Germany constitutes the centre of the whole international problem; and a desire to reach some agreement with Germany which shall be both comprehensive and lasting. In spite of a general dislike and suspicion of the present Nazi system, a substantial majority of the men and women are inspired by feelings of real friendship for the German people and by a belief that these feelings are reciprocated; they believe that the German demand for colonies is sincere and not unjustified; and they are convinced that the British Government should be able, by some colonial concessions, to satisfy German grievances and ambitions and to attain to some agreement which would guarantee peace at least for a generation. Friendship for Germany Is that opinion sufficiently profound and sufficiently enlightened to prove either lasting or effective? I admit that subconscious anxiety is the main motive and the main element in this pro-German feeling. But it is not the only motive or the sole element. There is a perfectly sincere feeling of friendship for Germany which Is wholly unconnected with any anxiety-complex. There exists a strong (although mistaken) belief in racial and temperamental affinity with the Teutonic peoples. And there exists something which is more than a hope and almost a conviction, that Germany and England, if united, could preserve the peace of the world.

I consider these elements in the majority opinion are neither transitory nor superficial. Yet they are founded, in my opinion, upon two assumptions which, if not actually incorrect, are at least highly questionable. The first is that it would be easy for Britain to hand over to Germany her former colonies; the second is that such transference would at once fill Germany with warm-hearted gratitude and render the German people blissfully and durably content. I question each of these assumptions. In the first place, it would not be at all easy to return the colonies. They, do not, either legally or practically, belong to Britain. From the legal point of view it is a muchvexed question in whom sovereignty or ownership is actually vested. Are we trustees only, and if so, on whose behalf? Do these colonies "belong" to us or to the League of Nations, or to the principal Allied and Associated Powers, or to the natives themselves? Objections Predicted Were we to transfer these colonies by a stroke of the pen to Germany we should certainly receive protests from our co-trustees. The League of Nations would object on the ground that such transference violated the mandatory system. The United States would object on the ground that it prejudiced the principle of the open door. France would object on the ground that it enabled Germany to raise black armies, and on the ground that any cession of mandated territory in Togoland would compromise her own position in the Cameroons. The native populations would object on the ground that it sacrificed their independence and their free development. These protests would be seriously pressed and profoundly felt. The majority of the former German colonies "belong," not to Britain, but to the Dominions and to Britain's former allies. It is difficult to believe that France would surrender her portions of the Cameroons or Togoland, that Belgium would surrender Ruanda-Urundi, or even that Japan would surrender the Marshall Islands. Even more incredible is the supposition that the Union of South Africa would restore South-West Africa, that New Zealand would abandon Western Samoa, or that Australia would sacrifice Nauru and New Guinea.

[By HAROLD NICOLSON, M.P.]

Even admitting that we could at once surrender those former German colonies which belong to us, there remains the fact that whereas Togoland and the Cameroons (at least Britain's share of them) do not amount to very much, the retrocession of Tanganyika Territory would in the opinion of many experts constitute a most dangerous sacrifice. Not only would it entail the reversal of a native policy which ia being pursued with success, but the abandonment of this area to Germany would constitute a grave strategical disadvantage. It would interrupt the Cape to Cairo route which, with the development of air lines, has become a very serious consideration. It would provide Germany with a base upon the Indian Ocean. And it would sandwich Kenya Colony between an Italian Abyssinia on the north and a German Tanganyika on the south.

Are Surrenders Worth While?

It might well be contended thart such surrenders are worth a comprehensive and final agreement with Germany, and this brings me to the second assumption in regard to which I consider British public opinion to be both optimistic an 4 incoi-rect. The ordinary Englishman to-day is not an Imperialist the thought that the flag flies ovee Uganda leaves him cold. He imagines vaguely, hopefully, that His Majesty's Government In the United Kingdom "possess" sufficient booty to glut even the most insatiable appetites. He believes that modern Germany is suffering from a lack of raw materials, a lack of food and a lack of outlets for her surplus population*. He likes to think that these requirements could be met by some facile concessions, and that from that moment onwards the Wilhelmstrasse would be wreathed in perpetual smiles. 11 one assures him that neither the economic, nor the nutrition, nor the population problems of Germany could be solved by any such transference of mandates, he becomes incredulous and a trifle cross. He has no conception whatsoever of the magnitude of the problem which he desires to see solved.

The British public have a superficial understanding of the German character and but little knowledge of German history. They assume that because their German friends assure them that there will never be peace in Europe until the colonial question is settled that this question is in fact a solvent of all future tension. They forget that we were told the same tale about the Corridor, about the Rhineland, about the Saar. Nor do they rightly estimate the extreme difficulty of inducing Germany to tell us what she really wants. "Germans Want Power" What the Germans really want is power. They desire the colonies not in order to repair their weaknesses, but in order to demonstrate their strength. Were the colonies desired as ends in themselves, then assuredly some agreement could be arrived at. I do not myself believe that Herr Hitler's major objective is the return of the former German colonies. I believe that what he still desires is to extend the might of Germany to the south-east and to strike in the direction of Odessa or the Aegean. To execute that policy he must obtain the necessary protection in the rear, which means that he must eliminate the danger of French intervention and that in its turn entails some agreement with England. What can Hitler offer? He possesses nothing whatsoever which England can possibly desire. All he can offer is not to rob her of her possessions. And in order to enhance the value of that offer he has organised this colonial agitation. 11 Britain gives way to it he obtains some colonies. If she refuses then he can ask a heavy price for the abandonment of his demands. That price would be "disinterestedness in South-Eastern Europe. It would be a heavy price to pay. It should be possible to take the German colonial claims at their face value. It should be possible, without repudiating any responsibilities or endangering any vital communications of Empire, to accord to Gee? many those economic opportunities of which she claims to be deprived. It should be possible even to give her a place in the sun. .But let us insist that any such concessions can be made only a* part of a general settlement. Let us be prepared to pay at our own expense a heavy price for peace. But let us not pay that price at the expense of other and weaker countries only to find that the sole result is an increase of Germany's resources without any decrease in her dissatisfaction. I foresee that Germany will not render our task an easy one; she will bristle with touchiness and ineptitudes. 'We must accept that. And let us try to induce Germany to tell us, to tell the world, and, above all, to tell her own people, what she really wants.