The War in Spain

Press, Volume LXXII, Issue 21865, 19 August 1936, Page 10

The War in Spain

After a month of . fighting, the result of the Spanish civil war is as much in doubt as ever. The Government still controls the high inland plateau round Madrid; it has established control of the whole of the north coast, with the exception of the mountainous territory inland of San Sebastian and Irun, near the French border; it has recaptured part of the island of Majorca, dangerous as a possible base for air and sea attacks; it has made some progress southwards in the direction of Cordova and Granada; and in Catalonia its position can be regarded as secure. To the north of the Guadarrama mountains the rebels hold an extensive belt of country from Segovia to Burgos, Segovia is important as the base for any attack on Madrid through the Guadarrama passes; and according to the latest news it is menaced by Government troops. At Burgos a provisional rebel government is now functioning. In the south the rebels hold most of the coast between Malaga and the Portuguese border, and the territory between this coast and the Guadiana river, on which both Badajoz and Merida, now in rebel hands, are situated. The outcome of the campaign' seems to depend on whether the advance on Madrid from the south progresses fast enough to save the X’ebels in the north from a decisive defeat. Strategically, it must be admitted, the Government is badly placed. The capture of Badajoz, a heavily fortified town, is a serious blow, since it opens a line of advance to Madrid. Moreover, Madrid is unfortified and virtually unfortifiable; the chances are that the mere threat of an attack would throw the populace into a panic and leave the Government with no option but to surrender. But the greatest advantage possessed by the rebels is their control of the seas between Algeciras and the Moroccan coast, which enables them to transport troops from the Moroccan garrisons.

In the meantime, two general conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the war is a war between an army and a people. If the rebels win it will be a victory, not of Christianity over paganism (unless Moors are the defenders of Christianity) or of European civilisation over communism (unless fascism and European civilisation are synonymous terms) but of. discipline and high explosives over popular enthusiasm and rifles. The second conclusion is thgt, but for outside assistance, the rebels would now be defeated. It is worth remembering that a greater part of the navy and the air force remained loyal to the Government. Yet within a week of the outbreak of the rebellion the rebels were in possession of a force of bombing aeroplanes and a sufficient supply of bombs to deprive the Government naval forces of their initial command of the straits. There is good reason to suppose, moreover, that the rebels have received from Italy and Germany not merely aeroplanes and bombs but pilots as well. In the circumstances the efforts of the French and British Governments to secure a general, non-intervention agreement appear farcical. Intervention, even if not

directly ■ countenanced by governments, is already taking place on a grand scale. The attitude of the Italian and German Governments to the proposed agreement is what might be expected; they accept it in principle and raise sufficient objections over points of detail to prevent any decisive action. There is much truth in the contention of the “News- “ Chronicle” that the refusal of both the British and French Governments to assist the Spanish Government amounts in practice to the application of sanctions against the loyalists. The present position is that fascist Europe is freely supplying the rebels with munitions, while the Anglo-French policy of non-interven-tion has thrown the Spanish Government back on its own resources.