MODERN MORALITY.

Press, Volume LXVI, Issue 19941, 30 May 1930, Page 12

MODERN MORALITY.

DIVORCE AND PUBLIC OPINION

ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S ARGUMENT.

(kou otat OWJT COBSSSPOHDBHT.)

LONDON, April 24

Sir William Jowitt, K.C., the Attor-ney-General, has appeared as counsel in a divorce case—Apted v. Apted and Bliss—to argue a difficult point that the case has raised.

In the course of his argument .ho said he felt difficulty in suggesting exactly how to apply the canon which had been often referred to in the old days, and which must be present in the minds of everybody in these days—the general interests of morality. It was extraordinarily difficult to decide how best to serve the general interests of morality in this class of case.

Lord Merrivale, tho president, remarked that one very great difficulty at the present time arose from the fact that tho form of tho State had been totally altered. Publicity had been a little restricted in that Court upon the decision of the Legislature. There was, however, a keen attention to .the. current events of the day which brought home the kind of facts which were in question in those cases to the minds of tho people. The world had changed since Lord Penzance laid down canons of judicial conduct in 1859. Sir William Jowitt: It is amazing as one casts ono's mind back, to note how public opinion and outlook have chauged, even sinco I have been at the Bar in tho last twenty years.

Lord Merrivale: The war lias intervened.

Sir William: Yes. In tho last twenty years wo have lived over a span which is really more like forty years. Having dealt with a number of judgments, Sir William went on: "The conclusion of tho whole matter really comes to this: Thero are no rigid rules, no rigid compartments into which a case has to fall in order to justify the exercise of discretion. Each case must bo considered having regard to all tho relevant circumstances —the welfare of the persons concerned and the general interests of morality. Perhaps all one can say with regard td principles to-day is that there are two negative principles which would, except in exceptional circumstances, be followed. "First of all, if the petitioner's own adultery has conduced, to tho adultery of tho respondent, it is probable that discretion would not bo exercised. Second, if there has been a deliberate suppression of facts, the Court would be reluctant to exercise the discretion which evon then it would have.

"Apart from that I hope that the principle which your Lordship has laid down will be regarded as one of overriding importance —the position of the children of tho marriage, and the possibility that there might bo illegitimate children born if an unlawful union were allowed to continue. The consequence to children of being born otherwise than in wedlock is such a serious matter that the Court in all these ■ cases, in the interests of tho children, would strain-so as to make it possible that the union might be regularised.

"In addition to the children—who, I hope, will always be regarded as tho first matter-of importance—there is

the question of the position of the spouses themselves, and the possibility of them ever coming together again. "In the case before the Court the two Spouses parted in the sense of husband and wife in 1914, and there was the question of the probability and desirability of one of the spouses marrying a third party. There is the question of whether, in the interests of morality, irregular unions should continue." Referring to tho difficulties of the Bang's Prdetor in carrying out his duties, and in • knowing, what facts he was to enquire into, the AttorneyGeneral said that the position had become more difficult since the practice of hearing divorce cases at assizes in the provinces. Matters were sometimes left in so vague a state, so far as the King's Proctor was concerned, that his' task was rendered almost impossible..