DISARMAMENT.

Press, Volume LXIII, Issue 18970, 7 April 1927, Page 9

DISARMAMENT.

COMPLEXITIES REVEALED. SLOW PROGRESS AT GENEVA. IAMI-Stf!*"™" 68 "SOCIiTIOK-CGriaiOHT.) (Received April 6th, 10 p.m.) GENEVA, April 6. The complexity and the difficulties of the disarmament problem were revealed when the Preparatory Commission began a discussion on naval armaments. Lord Cecil, opening the debate, contested the French viewpoint, as expressed in their draft plan, that if armies are numerically limited, so must naval personnel be limited. He said the British Government's view was, that the proper way to limit the strength of a fleet was to limit the number, size, and power of the ships. This Britain was prepared to do drastically and very completely, but she saw no necessity for limiting effectives, which would occur automatically with the decrease of tonnage. The French proposal would complicate the convention and render ratification less likely. He added that navies could not l>e made more formidable by increasing the manpower beyond actual needs. Lord Cecil finally sprang a s/irprise by saying that he was not prepared to discuss the point further, as he had telegraphed to his Government for fresh instructions.

M. Boncour rather sarcastically re-1 marked that this was the second time the discussion had been suspended I owing to Lord Cecil's necessity for tret- I ting instructions. He proceeded to argue that naval, military, ant] aerial i strength and coast defence and expeditionary forces were inevitably bound up, and if a single category were j ignored, wholesale deception would be possible by camouflaging the nature ot certain forces. He recalled the part played in war-time by sailors who were not merely employed as crews, but as landing parties. I The American and Japanese delegates supported Lord Cecil's viewpoint, j and the Germans and Swedes approved j of M. Boncour's. Pending the receipt of instructions regarding the limiting of effectives Lord Cecil proceeded to discuss the limitation of material. He emphasised that the whole existence of the British j Empire depended on the security of its j communications. A cessation of seaborne commerce would mean Britain s j starvation, and therefore the question | was of vital importance to tho British delegates, whose programme envisaged an agreement which would (1) foresta 1 naval competition; (2) secure the fullest publicity so that every ti&tion «ioud be aware of the naval strength of its neighbours; (3) strengthen the psychology of security by eliminating the surprise element." Lord Cecil contended that limitation of the number of ships was more important than limitation of tonnage, numbers being the essential element in the strength of a fleet. (The French proposal is limitation of the total gross tonnage.) , . Lord Cecil added that Britain was convinced that the only effective measure was fixing tho number ot ships in each category. Mr Sato favoured limitation by categories, and he opposed fixing the size of the ships in each category. M Boncour said France favoured limitation by gross tonnara because she wished to retain the right of disposal of smaller classes of ships according to her special needs. The Swedish representative suggest. Ed (1) the limitation of total tonnage gill nations; (2) the eategonea limitation of tonnage by the Great KVrsT<3) the advance publication of all naval programmes. >. . This, appeared to evoke a spirit or compromise, and the Commission adSed on M. Boncour's promise to submit the new proposal.