JUTLAND.

Press, Volume LX, Issue 18149, 12 August 1924, Page 9

JUTLAND.

BRITISH TACTICS. ADMIRALS IN DEFENCE. "AS NELSON WOULD HAVE SAID." (BT CABLB-THRSS AHB H.I. ASSOCIATION (Received August 11th, 7.5 p.m.) LONDON, August 11. Admiral Mark Kerr writes to the "I>ailv Express," sayine "The situation before Jutland may be described thus: A party of armed shepherds protecting their masters sheep had driven a wild lynx, which dosired to worry the flock, into a dark cave. The lynx hoped they would send their dogs into the cave, where, owing to superior sight, he could kill them piecemeal. The shepherds rightly reasoned that tho lynx could not pass them towards the flock without being attacked at great disadvantage in the open by the dogs, so they stayed outside, with the result that the flocks were undisturbed and the lynx starved into surrender. _ "Ab Nelson would have said: why fight at an immense disadvantage for no adequate object f"

LORD JELLICOE'S REPLY. YON SCHEER ANSWERED. (ntzss AsaociATioir ration**-) WELLINGTON, August 11. Lord Jellieoe's reply to Admiral von Scheer, as published in this morning s newspapers, is incomplete. The London "Evening Standard, telegraphing to Lord Jellieoe, attributed to Admiral von Scheer tho following statements;— (1) That the Germans were able to tnrn owing to the hesitating fashion in which the British came into action, and the manner in which they turned from the enemy's torpedo offensive. (2) That the British could have eneased the Germans next morning, I when the British, at the tune they were sighted by a German Zeppebn, •were in a position to interpose between the Germans and their base. (3) That the British deployment to port during the battle was a vital mistake, and that Bad they deployed to starboard the Germans turn would have been impossible, Lord Jellieoe finds it difficult to believe that Admiral von Scheer, knowing the facts, could express such views; but, as they were widely reported in the English Press, Lord Jellieoe acceded to the request of the "Evening Standard," and telegraphed to the following effect:—

(1) There was mo hesitation • commencing the action. > The difficulty of remaining ui action was due to persistent retreating movements which were invisible* from the centre of the British line, being covered by smokescreens. , The disappearance of the O<*rmaHS from view was taken as* doe to the thick- ■ ening mist. , ■ The British turn from, the torpedo offensive could not facilitate the German turn, as the latter occurred five minutes before the British turn. (2) The British were 40 miles from the Germans when the Zeppelin was sighted, and the Germans were then entering a swept channel in the mine-field* „ (3) Th«i deployment ia well discussed in Sir Juliali Corbett'a History of Naval Operations, Volume HL, and Brassey/aNaval and Shipping Annual, 1924. The deployment to starboard would have facilitated the German retreat. The deployment to port gave the British the advantage of the light, crossed the German "T," and placed the British between the Germans and Heligoland. ;