MOLTKE'S STRANGE TALES.

Press, Volume LIX, Issue 17740, 17 April 1923, Page 5

MOLTKE'S STRANGE TALES.

HUNS' TREACHEROUS WAR

PLANS,

Some strange disclosures are made by the late General Helmuth. von Moltke, nephew of tho great Moltke and himself Chief of Staff in tho Prussian Army before tho -war and during the first weeks of it, 111 the collection of his papers, published by his widow under the titlo of " .Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumentc, 1577-1916" (Der Kommende Tag, Stuttgart). Moltke was removed from his post after the German defeat in the first Battle of the Marne, and he died in into of heart disease. He reveals what has always been suspected, thac the Germans at one time intended to violate the neutrality of Holland as well as that of Belgium and Luxemburg. '"The concentration worked nut by my predecessor was so arranged -that the German right had to pass by Ptorrmond and travcrso not only Belgiau but Dutch territory. My .predecessor, Count SchliefTen, was of opinion that Holland would content herself®with a protest and would otherwise allow the violatin of her frontier to proceed without hindrance." Liege Kehearsals. Moltke changed this plan, not because he regarded it as a wicked act to attack another neutral State, but because, as he explains at great length, ho thought the violation of Dutch neutrality would injure Germany. A fact which he reveals is the coldblooded character of his preparations to attack Liege, the Belgian fortress, in a country whoso neutrality the Kaiser just before the war had promised to respect:—

"I took caro to have the positions at Liege reconnoitred constantly, and all the roads tested by which columns of troops could advance towards tho interior of >tho town, keeping out of sight of the forts. There were five such roads. Officers to guide the columns using them were trained by actual practice on the spot at night, and their number regularly supplemented."

When the attempt to seize Liege at the very outset failed, the Ivaiser turned on Moltke with the words: "Your attack on Belgium has brought England on my shoulder.? as an enemy." And this entry of Great Britain into tho war (which Moltke professes always to have anticipated) was a serious matter, as he says: "The swift aid given by England was the chief reason why the attempt to crush France in tho first onrush failed." Ex-Kaiser Deceived. An account is given of an intervention of the ex-Kaiser on August Ist, tho date when tho mobilisation order was given. William 11. misinformed by Prince Lichnowsky, tho German Ambassador in London, was led to suppose that France would remain neutral. On this the Kaiser said to Moltke: "Now we can concentrate the whole army against Russia in the east." I answered his Majesty that this was impossible. The concentration of an army of mill/ons could not be improvised; it was the result of a ] year of arduous labour, and, once begun, could not be altered. If his Majesty insisted on directing the whole army to tho east, it would not be an organised force, but a

mob of armed men without supplies." Moltke declares that he wept tears of despair at certain orders which the Kaiser issued, but they wero shortly afterwards cancelled when the misunderstanding was cleared up.

There is evidence in his letter that he lost his Head at the Battle of the Marne. On the day when the German retreat began, he wrote to his wife, almost despairingly: "TJie war which began so hopefully has now taken a turn in the -opposite direction. I must bear what has happened and stand or fall with my country. How different it was when only a few weeks ago

we began the campaign so brilliantly, and now what bitter disappointment has come upon us. And how can we manage to pay for what lias been destroyed?" Apparently Moltke never imagined that the Allies would "be so simple as to allow Germany to evade payment for tho damage done.

The blame for the retreat of the Germans at tlio first Battle of tho Marne has been generally laid at Moltke's door, or lias been saddled on bis staff officer, Col. Hent.=ch, who has been made a scapegoat. But he says: "ITentsch on his return (from the front) denied );o had given the order to retreat. Ho reported that the orders for tho retreat of the Ist Army (Kluck) had been worked out at the hour of his arrival. That the Ist Army was not in a condition to operate independently is shown by the fact that it could not establish a liaison with the 2nd Army."