IN MESOPOTAMIA.

Press, Volume LIII, Issue 15939, 28 June 1917, Page 7

IN MESOPOTAMIA.

OPERATIONS REVIEWED report of royal commission. HISTORIC WAR DOCUMENT. (By Cubic—Press Association—Copyright.) (Australian and N.Z. Cablo Association.) (Reutcr's Telegrams.) (Received June 27th, 11.10 p.m.) LONDON, June 27. The report of the Mesopotnmian Commission, constituting another historic war document, has been issued in a Blue Book of IS3 pages. It deals comprehensively with tho operations through the various stages of tho advance to Bagdad and tli© incidental happenings. It examines at length questions which have given rise to public criticism. The main report-, embodying tho findings, conclusions, and recommendations, has been signed by all tho Commissioners except Commander J. C. Wedgwood, M.P.. -who presented a disscntiont report. The Commissioners find that the expedition was a justifiable military enterprise, but the division of responsibility bctweon the India Office and the Indian Government proved unworkable. The scopo of tho expedition's objective was never sufficiently defined in advance. Tho report criticises tho failures of the, Commajidor-in-Chief or representatives to periodically visit Mesopotamia during tho advance on Bagdad in October, 1915. It was an offensive movement based on political and military miscalculations, attempted with tired and iusulfrciont forces with inadequate preparation, and resulted in the Kut disaster. The "weightiest share of tho responsibility for tho untoward advanco lies with Sir John Nixon, whoso confident optimism was the main causo of the decision. Others responsible, in order of sequence, arc tho Viceroy, Lord Hardingc, tho Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Boauchamp Duff, the Military Secretary to tho India Office, General Sir E. G. Barrow, Mr Austen Chamberlain, and tho War Committee of tho Cabinet. Tho Commission points out that tho last two wero responsible as political heads who could not secure eompleto immunity through adopting expert subordinates' wrong advice. The general armament and equipment were quite insufficient to meet the needs of the expedition, and the wholo system of commissariat was badlv organised during fh o period of the Indian Government's responsibility. Though there was no general breakdown at Simla, the authorities bestowed meagre attention and illiberal treatment on the expedition's wants during 191-1 and 1915.

The supply of reinforcements was insufficient in connexion with tho advanco on Bagdad and the Kut relief operations. Tho Indian military authorities did not sufficiently realise from the first tho paramount importance of river and railway transport in Mesopotamia. Their responsibility is grave. Sir John Nixon was responsible for recommending the 1915 advances with insufficient transport and equipmet. The transport shortage, beginning in 1916, rendered tho Kut relief operations fatal. Dealing with the question of medical provision, tho Commissioners declare that this was insufficient from the beginning, and ultimately resulted in » lamenta.ble breakdown after the battles in 1915 and 1916, and most lamentable and severe suffering. The Commission, in apportioning the blame of tho Indian Government for inefficiency in the management of the Mesopotamian campaign, recognises their anxieties in other quarters. Tho Commissioners declare that notwithstanding a period of reverses tho success of the campaign as a wholo has been remarkable. They assert that in tho many parts of the world in which the Allies arc engaged no more substantial results or more solid victories have been achieved than in Mesopotamia. In conclusion, tho Commission seriously censures tho Indian Government for its lack of knowledge and foresight as shown in the inadequacy of tho preparations and the lack of readiness to recognise ana remedy deficiencies.