PROSPECTS OF THE WAR.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15773, 14 December 1916, Page 4

PROSPECTS OF THE WAR.

TO THE EDITOR OF ''THK PRESS," Sir, —-At this critical time, whtm the position! for some weeks past, has looked so black for tho Allies, and when the Central Powers, on the crest of a wave of success, are tempting us with peace proposals, the important factor of attrition, so much spoken of in the earlier stages of the war, should not be overlooked. Xo more able articles on the war have appeared in any journal than those entitled "Strategic Moves of the War.' - contributed weekly to tho "Scientific American'' by its "Military Expert These articles, moreover, po;>s<*-: *ho great advantage of a neutral «>k. in the issues of October 23tu .1 -November 4th of the "Scientific American'' —after things had begun to go badly in Roumania —this clever Vriter reiterates his strong conviction that, failing the intervention of the Almighty in some unexpected way, the process of attrition must result in certain victory for the Allies, and that, from now onwards, it must begin to tell heavily and rapidly. He says it takes about 8.000,000 men on each side to securely hold the existing fronts. At the beginning of the war, the / potential strength of tho Central Powers was. about l(i,OOU,QOO- men lit for fighting: and the potential] fighting .strength of the Allies was shout J8,000.000 men. The permanent louses on each side are about 1 per cent, per month of the forces at ! the front: that is, 48 per cent, per j year, or about 100 per cent, from the j beginning of the war to the present time. Tho Central Powers have been able to fully man their lines until now. so that attrition has not yet been obviously in evidence: bub the numbers of fit men .on the side of the Central Powers being now reduced to little more thr.n 8.000,000. the stage has been reached when attrition will speedily become a vital factor. A year hence the Central Powers will be 4*o or 50' per cent, short of' the -forces necessary to man the present fines; two years hence, at the past rate of wastage, their armies will be nearly annihilated. On the other hand, the Allies can keep their present, lines up to full strength for more than two years longer. The wastage will bo more rapid henceforth, owing to the vast increase in munitions. Front now onwards, the Central Powers are faced with the svdoption of one of two equally awkward alternatives. They must either attempt to hold their present lines, or they must contract tneni. To attempt to hold them involves early disaster: to contract them means further attrition, with the disproportion of numbers constantly increasing against them. In either case, the result must be a complete victory for the Allies within a year, or two years at the longest. To mv mind, there is only one flaw in this argument. It takes no account of the submarines. It seems to mc that it is a question of the relative speed of attrition on" land or at sea. Can the Allies exhaust their enemies' forces on land before the enemies' submarines liave so far (iastroy'ed tho world's chipping that the Allies can thomsclves no longer carry on the war? If the shipping can hold "out, then, humanly speaking, the issue of the war does not appear to be doubtful. What view upon the matter the Allies' experts take will be seen from the answer which their Governments give to the pence proposals.—Yours, etc.. * S. S. BLACKBFPNE.