GENERAL JOFFRE

Press, Volume L, Issue 15158, 23 December 1914, Page 8

GENERAL JOFFRE

STUDY OF THE SCIENTIFIC SOLDIER.

(From the Bordeaux Correspondent' of '•The Times.") Someone- declared that Joffre is of the school of Napoleon. It is a generalisation no more accurate than other generalisations. Nothing could be further from the wars of Napoleon than the great battles on the Marne, on tho Aisne, and now in tdie north. In themeeJves they do not present anything like tho tactical interest of t'hoso examples of military skill of a hundred years ago. And the aeroplane is responsible. It sees everything from its elevai«cd vantage point; from it nothing is hidden. It looks behind the screen of cavalry masking the enemy's froirt; it sees troops on the march or being carried in trains; it notes the number of army corps, tho proportion of tho different arms, and all the details of a vasts machine. Thus the art of war has beon robbed of that element of surprise which afforded Napoleon dramatic opportunity for the display of his genius. His object was to discover the weak epot in the enemy's lines., and, having discovered it, l>3 hurl upon it all tho forces at his command. His success depended upon tho speed and sureness with which the great blow could be struck. A premature revelation -would have spoiled all. But a. coup of the sort is no longer possible, for a. manoeuvre on iiio one side is met instantly by a manoeuvre on the other. War now consists in a scries.of parallel movements; its art has changed. It would bo scarcely an exaggeration U> say that it does not exist. The two armies turn about each other like boxers iy the preliminary phases of a. fight. They pivot clumsily *.K> catch each other at a. disadvantage, and that i« practically all the art of it.

The rest is a ding-dong battle of resistance, of marching and countermarching. Anything less like Napoleon's way of making war it would be difficult to imagine. It is like playing bridge with your opponent looking over your shoulder. He knows when you are finessing, and when you are T>lnying for an opening. In those conditions, how is it possible to gain a brilliant victory by great crushing blows, having calculated tho "psychological moment"? This is as far from present realities as Napoleon's canter on his wlu'to horse? along the line on tho eve of battlo on a visit to the outposts. You could not imacino Joffre cantering from Dunkirk to Belfort before breakfast at the moment of beginning tho battlo which lasts weeks and not merely a single day.

Tims all t>ho conditions of rrarfare have changed, and with them the mentality and methods of commanders. .TofFi\. is rarely seen on horseback ; but he lias much the figure of the Corsican —short and stout, nnd giving the impression of power. He spends a part of each day in a long, low. rapid motorcar visiting tho lines. It is impossible to visit all tho points—much must be left to tlio corps commander after the general plan is settled ; this robs a generalissimo of personal contact; with his troops; he is more or lens unknown to them, nnd J off re probahlv has to show papers to his sentries. He wears out two chauffeurs a day in hie rush from point t<) point.

But beyond that Joffra must hold tho wires iji this tremendous system. You have to imagine him passing long hours in nn unpretentious room with a. receiver to his ear. His assistant genernls herd over mnns r.nd examine attentively the lie of tho country; but .TofTre has no need of th<"it: rivers." mountains, valleys :iro enjrraved deeply in his brain. His chief characteristic is calmness. Ho is as calm in war as in nearo. And that quality has hrod eonlidenco. ITo has coTifidoi'Co in himsolf, and has given confidence to others. HLs staff never for n moment doubts his capacity to win, and that conviction has percolated through to tho masses of the troops. It has made him popular, tliou.zh ho has done, nothing to engonuoi fhat;«on ihe contrary, he eschew:; popularity. Ho lives apart from Press ''reclame"; ho does not seek it. and he dislikes it. To those who attack him and to those who defend him he shows an equal indifference. Junior officers sometimes take up the cudgels for him in a newspaper—for Joffre has made enemies like, most strong ~inen —but he disregards their good offices just as he disregards criticism. None can say that ho owes his promotion to having defended Joffre. Military merit is the only quality recognised by the generalissimo.

But if he appears to take no notice of attacks, particularly in the popular press, he is none the less very open to ideas, and listens attentively when a likely plan is presented to him. He knows how to combine the beet in his own and other people's projects. He is modest as he is unassuming. His readiness to accept suggestion has fostered the belief that ho is an adapter and organiser rather than strategist. He is both. Hie campaigns show the soldier as well as the engineer and, organiser. But his great maxim is that in war nothing can be improvised. Every detail must bo thought out; that marks his superiority over other modern commanders. A long .preparation has gone to each success. Ho succeeds because he takes the> infinite trouble necessary to secure it. Hi.s achievement k the formation of the General Staff. Ho has brought together the best military brains in France and co-ordinated and controlled their efforts. He has exorcised politics, that bane of the French army. It is the more to his credit, for his own political opinions are opposed to those of his chief eoadjutore. A Republican and Freemason, he is surrounded by men who are Catholics and disposed to cavil at the present Constitution; but it makes no difference to his- appreciation of them. His chief confidence is given to Generals Pau and do Castelnau, neither of whom belongs to his school of politics; and when ho arrived at power—on Pau's recommendation to the "War Council—he soon showed that politics meant nothing to him ; his advent as Commander-in-Chief was followed by the departure of the "Parliamentary soldiers," who should never have l>een drawn from their natural obscurity. The- result of his firmness and singleness of purpose is that he commands the greatest fighting machine in the world, from which every other consideration than that of efficiency has been obliterated. When it was necessary to break the careers of five generals who had shown weakness in manoeuvres, he did nofc hesitate. His own career has been one of great rapidity. He was Bachelor of Science afc 16. and entered the Polytechnique (the French "Woolwich) at 1". Then came the war of IS7O, in which he distinguislyxi hinihel f as second lieutenant, and then wrvk on fortificHtiens. He managed those of Paris so well that MacMahon made him captain at 22. He became such an expert in constructing defences in various parts of the world that he feared to be doing that and nothing tleo for the rest of his life. "1 want to command troops." he said, and the chance came in Cochin China and the Sudan, where he avenged the maesacre of the Bonpier column and planted the Tricolour on Timbuctoo the mysterious.