A LAND TRANSACTION.

Press, Volume LXVI, Issue 13743, 26 May 1910, Page 8

A LAND TRANSACTION.

CLAIM BY AN AGENT.

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT.

Judgment was given by Mr Justico Sim yesterday in the case of Charles Arthur Lees v. Matthew Stoddart Brown, a claim for accounts arising out of a land transaction.

His Honour said that in September, I'JOG, the defendant agreed to purchase from a Miss Wakefield certain land at Sumner for £1500. Miss Wakefield was living in London at the. time, and the purchase was arranged ami completed through tbe defendant's London agents. The defendant paid the prico out of bis own moneys, and the land was trans- ! ferred to him. Part of tbe land was j afterwards subdivided and sold through j tho agency of the plaintiff's firm. The : transaction had resulteel in a profit | which it was expected would amount . to about £2500 when all the land had I been sold. The plaintiff alleged that! the purchase was made by the defend- | ant on behalf of himself and the plain- j tiff in pursuance of a contract by which they agreed to enter into partnership lor* tho purpose of purchasing the land ! and subdividing and reselling it. The elefendant denieel that any such agreement w.is ever made. The conflict of evidence did not arise from any mistake or misunderstanding between the parties, and it was certain that there had been false swearing on one aide or the other. In the circumstances, the onus was on the plaintiff of making out very clearly tho agreement alleged to have been made. The strongest point in favour of nlaintiff's claim was that in his letter of August 30th, 1907. to the defendant, he spoke of an agreement by which a sum owing by him for costs was to be deducted from his share of the profits of the Wakefield purchase, and that no letter, was ever sent to the plaintiff in reply to this The defendant, however," said that when he saw tbe plaintiff after the receipt of this letter, ho denied the existence of any such agreement, and never at any time admitted that the plaintiff was interested in the purchase. This was elenied by the plaintiff, who swore than the defendant admitted, the existence of the partnership. There was thus a conflict of evidence as to what took place between tho parties iv connection with this letter, and it was not clear what weight could bo given to the letter in determining tho point in issue. When a similar claim was made by the plaintiff in his letter of June oth, 1909. it was repudiated in a letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff on June 7th, 1909. Ho had been unablo to find in the circumstances anything that made it clear that the story tolel by tho plaintiff must bo true. On the contrary, there were circumstances that tended to support the elefendant's version of the matter. The plaintiff in his evidence swore that the introduction of the property to the defendant anel the making of the agreement for a partnership took place about the beginning of June, PJOS. If that evidence were true, the plaintiff w<suld of course desire that the" defendant should acquire tho property as cheaply as possible on behalf of the proposed* partnership. But the plaintiff's letter of-Aug-ust Ist, 1905. to Miss Wakefield appeared to be inconsistent with the evidence of any such desire on his part. Tho nlaintiff on that date did not know in what position the negotiations with Miss Wakefield stood, and it seemed certain that if Miss Wakefield had received and read that letter before she agreed to sell to the defendant, she would not have sold at anything like the price she accepted. It was difficult to believe that any business man would have written such a letter at a time when ho knew that efforts were being made to purchase the land on his behalf, and the letter supported, therefore, the view that the plaintiff was not directly interested in the negotiations for the purchase of the laud. Tho correspondence between the defendant and the.' plaintiff's firm of. C. A. Lees and Co. in connection with the sale of the property scorned inconsistent with the idea that tho plaintiff was realiv one of the owners of the proporty "about which the parties were writing. The plaintiff said that it was considered dc. sirablo he should not appear in any way as part owner of the" property, and that, he explained, was the reason for the correspondence being conducted as it was. That might account for his not being put forward to the public as one of the owners, but it haidly explained why the fiction that the defendant was sole owner of the property and alone entitled to give instructions in connection with the sale thereof should have been so strictly maintained throughout the correspondence. The plaintiff swore that the introduction of the property to the defendant and the making of the agreement for a partnership both took place about the beginning of June, 1905. In his original statement of claim he alleged that he introduced the property to tho defen- [ dant's notice in or about tho month of October, 1905, and that the agreement for a partnership was made about the month of December, 1905. He thus made the introduction and the agreement for a partnership two separate transactions with an interval of about two months between them. Tho dates thus fixed for both events were subsequent to the date of the nurchaso of the property by the defendant. It was only after getting discovery of the documents in possession of the defendant that tho plaintiff filed an amended statement of claim giving the version now put forward. A mistake as to a date was one that might easily bo made, but it wns significant that the plaintiff now made the two events one transaction, when according to his original recollection of the matters they were soparated by a period of two months. That difference, rather suggested that the plaintiff coidd not have any clear recollection of what actually did take place in 1905. He must hole!, therefore, that the plaintiff had failed to prove the alleged agreement for a partnership. He thought that tho Statute of Frauds was an answer also to the plaintiff's claim. Judgment would bo for the defendant, with costs according to scale as on a claim for £750, with disbursements and witnesses expenses to be fixed by the Registrar. The sum of £S 8s would be allowed for second counsel.