RUSSIAN AUXILIARY CRUISERS.

Press, Volume LXI, Issue 12027, 31 October 1904, Page 4

RUSSIAN AUXILIARY CRUISERS.

TESTING NEUTRAL RIGHTS. THE SEARCH FOR CONTRABAND. (From a Biarritz Correspondent of tlio "Standard.") Some carious and interesting data have gradually been collected concerning the experiments -which Russian .Diplomatist*, Consuls, and agents of the Intelligence Department have been making in neutral ■ countries of Southern Europe, with a view to testing both the disposition* <if the ■Government's and the n.xsistance that tho fleets and auxiliary cruisers of the Czar could secure by straining to the utmost the toleration extended to belligeron'e in neutral ports. The Spanish and Portuguese Governments, **> far, have clearly intimated that they are not willing to show any preference to either belligerent, ond that the customary usages of Inter- j national law will be strictly applied to Riwwan and Japan***. They have allowed it to be known that WUigerent ships will have to depart at tho end of twenty - fouv hours, unloss it is very clearly proved, to tho satisfaction of the local Spanish Naval authorities, that a longer delay is absolutely necessary for indispensable repairs to enable tho belligerent war vessel to venture out to sea again. In regard to assistance given to Russian war. yewele, the Spanish Government is determined to follow eimply the lines laid down in the ! Russian Government definition of contraband of war. Tho case of the auxiliary I cruiser Don plainly showed the necessity of seriously examining the pretexts invoked to prolong the stay of belligerents in Spanish ports. The commander of the Don argued that euch defect* had been discovered in his machinery, on the way from Libau to the coast of fcpain, that he might probably require five days to make them good. Suddenly, when not half that delay was over, urgent telegrams from Russia wore handed to the commander, which instantly decided htm to overlook the alleged defects in his engine* and he went off on hie cruise a«am In the fame week the fishing fleet off the tialician cowt several times «• Don cruising near the Chics group of Jβlets, and pushing even further couth to the Portuguijsc coast -without any apparent difficulty in her steaming. When tho Don n> in Vjgo Bay much ado was made in the local papers and in the Madrid Prcssabout her having.entered that Spanish port to watch an Lnglifih steamer which had been obliged to take refuge- in TSigo after suffering come damage alio in her machinery, which it had not been possible to repair with the aid or Spanish local firms. The Spanish renters surmised that the English steamer Carried bdow Ker apparent cargo, bound for Constantinople, much contraband in the shape of guns, ammunition, and coal, though the captain and owners of the vessel stoutly denied the insinuation. Anyhow, the Kirkwall remained in Vigp Bay come days after the departure of the Don, which had'other matters to attend to in virtue of its original Libau instructions and of the urgent messages by wire that oblioed Captain Korsakoff to start. It has been observed that the officers and some of the petty officers of the Don, the Ourel, the Texel, and other Russian vessels that have put into Spanish and Portuguese porta since tho beginning of the war in the Far East, spoke Spanish and Portuguese fluently, and seemed to make a display of strong sympathies for the people and sovereigns of those countries. It has been ascertained that the Russian auxiliary cruisers—almost all, by the by, were formerly. German liners—are carrying out on the ocean coasts of the Peninsula and further south, near the mouth of the Mediterranean in Spanish and, Morocco waters, as well as in the Canary Islands and Madoira group, not only «. chase after alleged war contraband, but also a series of experiments to discover the possibilities of coaling, victualling, getting water and other supplies in neutral ports, in the first place, and, in the pecond place, in convenient, less-frequented territorial waters of Spanish and Portuguese possessions. Russia expects to execute the first part of this programme more or lets openly in neutral ports through the connivance, hesitation, -or friendly dispositions of neutrals not sufficiently powerful, like the United fotates or England, to enforce international precedents against the two belligmnts. The second part of the programme has been already put into practice, according to Spanish private and official advices, in the waters of the Canary Islands by Russian cruiccre, which met in isolated roadsteads—or. to use the proper expression, "convenient and less frequented territorial waters of a neutral"—colliers which are said to have come direct from Wales and Antwerp, and to have awaited, according to arrangement, the arrival of the men-of-war to which they transferred "war contraband," as coal is styled by Russian Proclamation. Should the Russian Baltic Fleet ever go to tho Far Kust, these preliminary trials show how its coalinp and victualling will be carried out in distant countries, where the coalers sent ahead and the provirion-ladon ships from neutral porta can find more easily the "le*s frequented and less watched" harbours, bays, or roadsteads for their purpose. It is not 'at all surprising that Russian Navnl officers jocosely make no secret that their Navy, their cruisers, and "their Naval Commissariat Department" are training and practising what they may be called upon come day to perform on a larger scale, and after all, other Naval Powers might have tf« do in future contingencies if unprovided with baees, properly equipped beforehand, and properly distributed over likely fields of naval operation*. Russian officers admit Ijjiat their country has to a certain extent been caught napping, and insufficiently prepared for the present struggle; but. they have a remarkably strong conviction that the lessons of adversity will not be lost ou their people and their rulens. These Russian naval officers have impressed Spaniards with the belief that Russia looks upon the inarch of events by no means despairingly as ye*, and they affect an almost Oriental fatalism in tjieir way of raying that if not immediately, or in this war, Russia, woner or later, must prevail over all resistance. Not the least interesting feature of Russian proceedings is tho work of her Naval Intelligence Department, which seta in movement* the search, for -war contraband and the preparations for her fleets and cruisers. A very network of Roaian

agenta has bern spread otct th© cotmUrios in which Japan is suspected of getting guiu«, email arms, ammunition, coal, anil other items <>numcrat«d in the Muscovite li«t of so-called war contraband. Those agaite more especially \ratch the porta, and forward to their oentree in Eussaa. and abroad the information collected. Soms tim«, to gain time, they wmply telegraph to the ports of call of their crui>er& and to the Diplomatic and Consular Agents the grounds that «xist for interfering with the foreign vowels. Their funreiUwiee is most active over British and American vessels, and generally over all steamers bound for the China seoe>, and even for neutral porta in tho Far East. Thiuc Naval Intelligence detectives liave, Uw Bussiaiw contend, already dono some Twy useful irork in tracing contraband-laden v«sel-«, these being up to th© present, thry ray, chiefly English. Much had been, expected from the Black Sea auxiliary cruif»T9, Smolensk and Petersburg, ajiH from those that were, tn have followed in their wake, whose ports of call for inetruction*, , and sotuc for coaling and victualling, were mostly French and TurkieU, besides Egyptian, Portuguese, and Fnrcicl) on the enastn of Africa, Mozambique, India, and further East. Coalers ha.i been likewise sent ahead of the Black Sea contraband chasers, whose carwr was hrought to a close by international protests and premire. No secret whatever if" mad<\ by Russian naval officers and agents, of the advantnges that were to be derived from the action of the auxiliaries of the Imperial Navy in'supprotfsrng war contraband, acting as scouts for the. European fleet of Russia if it some day made, for t<be For East, and as coalers and carriers of Avar material. las*, but- not le<i#t, they aro held to be a powerful means of deterring the nations which sympathy? with Japan from indirectly assisting the enemy of Russia, as soon as it is jiecn that the interference, by the auxiliary cniiwra, with neutral shipping is rapidh damaging English and American carrying trades to tlm Eaft, and highly benefitin? French, German, and other Continental flags. All the auxiliaries, thirty-two in number, wem to lv, so far. large, swift, roomy «*i?amors: t-lie majority purchaJ»?d from Oorman,' French, and American lines. They have » respectable armament of gun.«, mo'tly quick-firers, and some mach'uw irutw Tlieir crews va.ry Ix-tween 400 and 450, with 25 to 30 officers, a complement that allows them easily to provide prize crewa.