NOTES ON THE WAR.

Press, Volume LVII, Issue 10635, 20 April 1900, Page 5

NOTES ON THE WAR.

fIJT AN EX-MfcMBER OF THI INTBLLIOBKCB Bkakch, South As-bica.) Fran the α-iticisms of Lord Roberts oo the conduct of .Generate Bullet and Warren m the campaign, and particularly in the case of the attack and abandonment of Spionkop, we learn that in the opinion of the Ciunmander-in-Chief in South Africa that neither of these generals have done their duty. In stating .that he approved of the wide flanking movement to the west that General Boiler planned, Lord Roberts has only confirmed the principle of all the lessons taught m every text-book on methods of modern warfare. Ail military men in all countries, in theory, if not in practice, agree that it is folly, if nothing worse, to throw away the lives of soldiers by attacking an enemy in front when the attack can be made from the flank or rear. But while be approves of General Buller's evident intention to make a wide flank movement, having for its object the turning of the enemy's position on Spionkop, Tabunyama Ridge, and Acton Homes, he (Lord Roberts) condemns General Buller for allowing General Warren, his subordinate, to attack Spionkop and thus change the plans of hie superior officer. It seems to us that there i* very little use of having the best plans tha* even a Voo Moltke could arrange, if i a subordinate officer (regardless of his rank) | is allowed to alter the «cheme in any way to suit his own ideas as to what part of the project shall be carried into effect. If it is true that General Buller allowed General Warren to direct a frontal attack on Spionkop (the admitted key lo the Boer position) when his own plan was to move further to the flank, and attack the enemy from the west, or north-west, after turning their position, and gaining the right rear of the Boer enti enchraents at Acton Homes, then General Buller deserves to be severely censured.

The admission made by General Butter when he reported the retreat from Spionkor>, that tha position \ra* too extensive to bold, seemed to us to be a very lame excuse, for if he did not know the extent of the place, surely he had the means to reconnoitre the hills, and it wag his duty to see that this wa* done, and that properly, before he allowed General Warren or any" other officer to lead or order an advance against the enemy holding the pJaoe. Surely, General Bulkr had the means, as he had at hi* command some of the best Nwtal scouts that couJd be obtained, besides his cavalry and Natal mounted troops, and the best balloon section of the Royal Engineers, besides natives who knew the couatrr thoroughly. Consequently, we are of opinion that General Buller was guilty of the very offenoe against the rules of modern warfare that he w> severeJy criticised his subordinates for committing before the attack on Colenso, which began and ended bo dittfttroiulr to the troop* engaged. Our

readers will remember how General P.ulle; laid the blame of that disaster on Col one Long, and stated that, perhaps, British oilioers would, in time, learn the value of scouting. We took exception to the criticism i'.t the time, for it was not Colont , ! Long's duty to scout the country in advance of his guns. As a soldier and an artillerymen he hud every reason to suppose that General Buller had full information in his possession of the enemy's strength and position in front, before he gave the order for a general advance of the troops. Perhaps now that the criticisms of Lord Roberts have ehown that General Buller took things to<> easy, and allowed his subordinates in command to do as they pleased, we may at last hear that although Colonel was very unfortunate, he bravely fought his guns in the position that ho wns leJ into by the failure of someone higher in authority to do their whole duty.

The report further charges tumoral Warren with incapacity and practically with laziness, or \vor.M>, in not being personally present at tho front at a time, ami place, when so much wass at stake. It seems curious that after the fall of (lentnil Woodgato there was no other general otlicer nivseril u> conduct the operations that were taking place for the possession of such an position us Si>ioii Kop is said to have mid that tlie command fell on an utiicer with the local rank of Licttlvnant-Coloucl. Surely if Spion. Kop was the key to the enemy's position the whole responsibility of commanding the troops forming the attacking column should not have fallen on Colonel Thorneycroft when the gallant Woodgato could no longer lead the attack. Then; is much more than appears on the surface in th« blttmo that Lord .Roberts attaches to General Wam-n fur failing to personally be present and sve for himself whether the position no dearly bought should he so soon surrendered. Lord Roberta's view of the situation is supported by the report o( General Buller. who states that in his opinion Spion Kop was tenable if lienerul Warren had properly supported the troops which gained the sunim.it of the Kop. Under certain conditions any otlieer, if left to his own devices, may make tho mistake of attacking a position that he may tind too strong to earn', but, when any officer orders an attack on a"n important post and his troops succeed in gaining possession of it, ho should not leave the question of its retention, or abandonment, to be decided by an officer of such subordinate rank as thai held by Colonel Thorneycroft. We consider General Warren's proper place, after Spion Kop was taken, was on the captured ground, so that he could personally determine whether the position wa.s worth the sueriliee of life necessary to hold it, and whether the guns of the supporting batteries could bo placed in a position to silence the enemy's fire tlu*. was raking the ground. In attaching a part of the blame for the evacuation of Spion Kop to Colonel Thorneycroft, Lord Roberts softens his strictures against the gallant Colonel by paying a tribute to his bravery. We are sure, 'however, that the words of censure that accompany the praise bestowed will be taken heed of by many other otticers, and that in future no -officer of junior rank will take upon himself the responsibility of ordering a retreat when he has i> superior within reach of communication Where Thorneycroft erred was in failing to ask for instructions from General before he gave the order, to retire. And under r.o circumstances ought he to have taken upon 'himself the responsibility of quitting such a position as Spkra Kop without positive instructions to do so. or unless he was driven from it by overwhelming numbers of the enemy. The intimation received from Berlin that the Boer Peace CoE?"f ■ : nner would be wasting time by going to the German capital, shows plainly that however much the German people may wish for Boer supremacy in South Africa, Germau statesmen are not going to help French designs by assisting the enemies of Great Britain. The departure of the Roya! Dublin Fusiliers from South Africa for Ireland, owing to their great losses during the war in Natal, is sure to be followed by tie return of the Royal Irish Fusiliers avid the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers irova Uae .same colony, and it is probable that tlie Gordons and the Black Watch Highland regiments will also be seat h«me as soon as other troops can be despatched to South Africa to replace them. There are a number of other regiments which have, lost 'heavily, but ths five we have mentioned are by far the greatest sufferers, although the Royal Irish Rifles is not very far ibehiud in tlie 'nu.mbers they have lost "from various causes. Unfortunately some of the Natal regiments were almost, if mot quite, as unfortunate as t"he regiments we have mentioned. The publication a.t this tune of Lord Roberta's strictures on Generals Buller and Warren is considered to be tlie prelude of their return to 'England. Under the circumstances the Generals named could iiot with am' independence of spirit coniinu* to serve under Lord Roberts.