England as a Military Power.

Bruce Herald, Volume XI, Issue 1017, 11 June 1878, Page 3

England as a Military Power.

"» " Sir (Gtarnet Wolsely contributes an article udder this title to the March number of the. 'Nineteenth Century. We give hiß concluding observations': — "At no previous period of our history have we • ever been bo strong in a military sens'eTas at present? r 1n '1854 we were very weak in 'field artillery ; the military force in these islands was under 70,000 men, and there was no reserve whatever beyond some pensioners, who were too old for 4eld service. Were war declared to-morrow about 400,000 drilled men would fall into line if Required',' supported by 372 field guns, manned" 1 and' horsed; by the Eoyal Artillery I .' That number would roughly be made up aB follows :— Standing Army at 'home, 99,000 men ';' Army , and Militia Reserve, 40,000 men ; Militia, 85,000 men ; Efficient Volunteers 180,000 men ; Second-class Army Reserve, 10,000 men ; total, 414,000 men. In this'calculation I have put the figures very low, and have left out altogether the 10,000 Yeo- > ma'nry who would be available for honte service. 1* have likewise not taken into consideration the number of regular troops that would be available for "war when {he Mediterranean garrisons were furnished by Militia. It will thus be seen that we, could afc once take the field with two fully equipped army corps of more than 30,000 soldiers each, leaving a similar force of regular troops at home, as a 7 reserve. When I now compare the military strength of England with' what it was in 1854, lam as amazed at the conditions of military weakness and helplessness which we were in when we began the "Russian war of that year; as I am at the ignorance of those who are now to be heard croaking over our supposed want of strength, and our alleged consequent inability "to«. fight. Unlike most other nations, if we declare war we need have no apprehension of invasion ,- this confers upon us the great ad. vantage of being able to choose oiir own time for beginning active hostilities, . and as our army would necessarily have to be conveyed by sea to the theatre of war, we are always able to select the line of operations considered best and most suitable- to the force we act with. In fact, the initiative would rest with us, and I need not tell the student of history how invaluable it is to the commander, who knows how to take advantage of it. But if we are to secure this national advantage of the initiative, we must act with unity of purpose."