Problems For Men Planning Next Invasion

Auckland Star, Volume LXXVI, Issue 163, 12 July 1945, Page 4

Problems For Men Planning Next Invasion

By COLONEL TOLCHENOV Military commentator of Red star, official Soviet Army journal. The completion of war in Europe by the utter rout of Japan's ally Germany is bound to have its effect on the Pacific operations. The situation has changed to such an extent that even the hidebound bureaucratic optimism of Japanese propaganda is more and more punctuated by despondent reflections They understand in Tokyo that the defeat of Germany must worsen Japan's military situation. However, the course of operations in the Pacific shows that Japans military fortunes were failing long before Germany's capitulation. Having seized at the beginning of the war a huge territory rich in natural resources, Japan has proved unable not only to consolidate its power in the newly conquered regions, but even to safeguard its own possessions. The Philippines operation, which from the strategic point of view may be regarded as completed despite the few remaining Japanese pockets, is of great importance, as it provides the Allies with a large jumpmg-of: ground of about 110,000 square miles for future operations in the direction of Japan itself. The success of the U.S. troops in Iwo Jima and Okinawa completely decides the outcome in their favour. On The Way By a series of successful operations the Allies have established themselves on the approaches to Japan, which gives them the following important advantages: 1. Having captured naval and air bases near Japan, the Allies are now threatening the sea communications between Japanese islands and the Japanese-occupied South Sea territories, Formosa and the Central and South Chinese coast. In addition, aircraft based on the newly-established aerodromes will be able to disrupt to a certain extent the Japanese land communications over Chinese territory. All this shows that the Allies now have wide possibilities of blockading the Japanese islands and are already doing it on the most vital routes. 2. The transfer of the Allied Air Force to the Iwa Jima and Okinawa aerodromes will make possible a great increase in the bombing of Japan, since the new distances will allow the use of ordinary bombers in addition to the Super Fortresses and even fighter escort. 3. With the capture of the Philippines and the islands to the north of them, a landing on the Asiatic mainland or metropolitan Japan itself becomes feasible. Obviously, such an operation is not an easy one. i First of all, in the event of a landing on the Japanese islands, the Allied communications with the American Continent will be extended to some 5000 to 6000 miles. Great Distances Involved Ever since the launching of the Allied operations from the Australian base, one of the most important factors hindering operations has been the great distances involved. To overcome great distances is a complicated problem, but it was successfully tackled by the Allied Command by outflanking a number of ihe Japanese bases and strongpoints in combination with blows at the most important enemy objectives. With the development of operations these Allied jumps from island to island became longer and longer, and eventually brought them to the approaches to Japan. Such tactics were successful in dealing with islands defended by relatively weak enemy garrisons, involving operations of a limited scope and duration and not requiring prolonged building-up of forces. The operations in Japan itself will be of a different category. They will undoubtedly consist of great decisive battles, and transport of big reinforcements and much material to the battle zone will be a complicated job, difficult to solve.

Every tank, gun, and machinegun will have to be brought from the United States, Canada or Australia.

This leads us to assume that before undertaking invasion operations against Japan itself the Allied Command will concentrate the necessary forces and means somewhere near metropolitan Japan.

What territories in the Pacific will be able to play the same role as did Britain in the invasion by the Anglo-American forces of Western Europe? The Volcano and other islands are quite close to Japan, but they have only a limited area, and it is doubtful, therefore, if they will meet the requirements of the large landing forces. Philippines Big Enough The Philippines are big enough, but their distance from Japan—some 1200 miles—is a great disadvantage. In both instances, huge construction work would be required for deployment of invasion forces. In the opinion of a number of foreign commentators the vast territory of China, with relatively better facilities, is more suitable as an invasion base for Japan. When and preciselv what steps will be undertaken bv the Allied Command, the future will show. We should not forget, however, that the Allies have achieved important successes in their fight against Japan at the time when the greater part of the Anglo-American armed forces were in Europe and only relativelv small forces were in the Pacific theatre. AVe can expect, therefore, that the operations in the Pacific will develop with ever-increasing intensity as the Allies transfer ever greater forces there.