FRANCO-RUSS PACT

Auckland Star, Volume LXXVI, Issue 39, 15 February 1945, Page 8

FRANCO-RUSS PACT

POLAND'S FRONTIERS

POWER BALANCE IN NEW COAT

By PERTINAX WASHINGTON. The measure, of Franco-Russian co-operation arranged in Moscow by Premier Stalin and General De Gaulle goes beyond what the letter of the treaty, signed by Foreign Ministers YyacheslaSf Molotoff and Georges Bidault on December 10, would suggest. To make sure that no divergence ever would arise between Soviet Russia and France and interfere with their joint efforts directed against the German danger of to-day and any possible German menace of to-morrow —the specific object of the treaty—the negotiators took care to reach agreement on a number of issues which, at the present moment, are being debated among the great Powers. With others, the following ' may be mentioned. The problem of Poland's frontiers was discussed at great length. Long ago, in relation to it, General De Gaulle was credited with a personal opinion which was not to the liking of the Polish Government in London. For no other reason that Government did all it could in the spring and summer of 1942 to persuade General Giraud to take command of the French Forces in North Africa. In the view of the French Government, Poland, if confirmed in the possession of territories inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and White Russians, could never be relied upon to fulfil its part in a plan intended to curb the Germanic world. Poland's attention would unavoidably be turned eastward and not westward. Rhineland and Ruhr The French Government wishes a strong and democratic Poland to arise. And it is in agreement with Prime Minister Churchill that the western and eastern frontiers assigned to Poland in the Russian proposals to former Premier Mikolajczyk are best calculated to serve the common purpose. Besides, it did not meet with any contradiction in Moscow when it insisted that the Polish people must be left free to choose their Government. As seen by the French, the Rhineland and the Ruhr, in the west, are the equivalent of the Polish problem. The Moscow and Paris Governments hold the view that Germany's power cannot be drastically curtailed and controlled unless the military springboard called the Rhineland and the arsenal called the Ruhr be taken away from Germany's sovereignty.

This is a difficult undertaking, but one which ought not to exceed the collective exertions of England, France, Holland and Belgium. The setting up in the Rhineland of a permanent military machine, to which France would probably bring a major contribution, and the organisation of an international regime in the Ruhr may prove to be an adequate solution. In the near future the French Government can be expected to negotiate with the British on these subjects. It is in the Rhineland and in the Ruhr that the FrancoBritish Alliance of to-morrow will have its foundation. Meanwhile, as a preliminary, all the disputes still outstanding between London and Paris are to be disposed of. A good beginning has already been made in Syria. General Louis Spears, whose quarrellings with General de Gaulle, General Catroux and others, had unfavourable repercussions last year on rf Mr. Churchill's attitude towards the committee of Algiers, was recalled from Beirut a short while ago and replaced by a career diplomat. Thus, a bitter personal element has ceased to operate in Syria as a dam to FrancoBritish relations. Security—And Interests Toward the system of world security worked out in Dumbarton Oaks, the Franco-Russian Treaty of December 10 is more reticent than the Anglo-Russian Alliance of May, 1942. The Anglo-Russian Alliance, in the terms of its article 4, will be merged in the general system of security whenever the contracting parties recognise by mutual agreement that the change does not impair their interests. The Franco-Russian compact is described as an instrument of execution within the framework of the system.

In practice, the difference does not, perhaps, amount to very much. But it makes it all the more necessary for the French and Russian signatories to harmonise their respective conceptions of the general system. On the one hand, the French Government has endorsed the Russian thesis concerning the veto which every great Power must be entitled to wield even when directly involved in a conflict with a secondary Power upon which the council has to pronounce. On the other hand, the 1< rench Government is known to be in favour of a more liberal represencouncil secondary Powers in the The French Government ha"? always m mind that one of the most fruitful rules of France's classical diplomacy was to qualify for the eadership of small nations.— land Star and N.A.N.A.