HOW MUCH HAS UNRRA DONE?-VERY LITTLE

Auckland Star, Volume LXXVI, Issue 38, 14 February 1945, Page 4

HOW MUCH HAS UNRRA DONE?-VERY LITTLE

LONDON, Feb. 7.. TITHILE millions of Europeans are ** dying of starvation and going short of clothes, shelter, medicine and other necessities of life, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, whose function it is to relief this misery, has so far managed to achieve very little of its great humanitarian aims. It seems clear that its efforts are being hamstrung by military and political influence. ■ UNRRA, nominally, was empowered to spend £600,000,060 on humanitarian work in Europe and Asia. But it is doubtful whether the amount of food UNRRA has distributed in Europe to date is valued at even £12,000,000. Meanwhile, UNRRA has accumulated stocks of food and medicine at Cairo and other centres, and is increasing its generously paid staff in Washington, London and other world capitals, where more than 2000 employees are mainly kicking their heels. Since the United Nations agreed to subscribe 1 per cent of their national incomes, plus annual administrative charges, UNRRA's activities have been obscured by a curious haze of reticence. Relief "Very Small" Questioned by the Melbourne Herald representative, UNRRA's London bureau said that it was unable to estimate what relief had been distributed in Europe "because such figures were available only at the Washington headquarters." It admitted that it was "very small," but said that "some supplies are now en route for Poland and Czecho.lovakia by air." The critics do not blame those who conceived UNRRA or those who are trying to make the agency function in face of what they claim is hamstringing by Allied military and political groups. They say that UNRRA has been sacrificed in the game of power politics and spheres of influence and it is doubtful whether the damage can ever be repaired. If these enarges are true it is, of course, bad in the immediate humanitarian sense. It is even worse in so much as a serious blow has been struck at prospects of future international co-operation. UNRRA is the first big new altruistic experiment of World War 11. It is a symbol of the new humanitarianism placed above national frontier or party politics. To-day, as far as Europe is concerned, it appears that UNRRA has been either manoeuvred into oblivion or has become the discredited instrument of narrow governmental intrigue. UNRRA, which embarked on the aim of distributing 46,000,000 tons of foodstuffs and medical supplies among 500,000,000 Europeans and Asiatics, has not yet helped more than a handful of people in Europe. Unless its powers are radically revised it seems unlikely to do much better in war-ravaged Asia. , Much Planning The principles of UNRRA were auspiciously born in August, 1940, when Mr. Churchill said in a statement: "There will always be held up before .the eyes of the people of Europe, including the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that

Special to the Auckland Star—By DOUGLAS WILKIE

>the shattering of Nazi power will bring them immediate food, freedom and peace." Thirteen months later the InterAllied Committee on Post-war Requirements was established by the "Big Three," from which emerged UNRRA. The 8.8.C.'s foreign service quoted articles attributing to UNRRA plans for feeding 150,000,000 people. Meanwhile, various Allied technical committees had worked out the minimum food and other relief requirements of war-ravaged Europe in an atmosphere of concord. They submitted estimates on the assumption that the minimum relief needed would be identical with the relief supplied. Six months later they by the British Government that this assumption was illusionary and that their only job was to establish ways of meeting needs if supplies were available. Deprived of Main Job But faith was not yet shattered, because when President Roosevelt opened the first UNRRA meeting in November, 1943, he said: "We mean business in this war in the political and humanitarian sense, just as we surely mean business in the military sense." Simultaneously, howerer, President Roosevelt vested the military authorities with responsibility for relief in liberated areas, thus depriving UNRRA of the main part of its job. The United States Army arrived at an estimate of minimum requirements which was only a fraction of what the UNRRA experts worked out. The British authorities, wholly dependent upon American supplies, concurred in these estimates, thus dissociating themselves from the "inter-Allied body they had helped to create. All this was done behind a thick screen of convenient security hush-hush. Ladk of Authority UNRRA was further handicapped by lack of authority to allocate civilian requirements. Exclusively British and American institutions such as the Combined Production, Raw Materials, Resources and Shipping Boards have the last word concerning the allotment of any commodity which UNRRA may wish to include in relief." When the UNRRA DirectorGeneral, Herbert Lehmann, accepted office he promised to be the servant of 44 Governments. To-day his real position is that of agent of the AngloAmerican Military Command and the Anglo-American combined boards. In such circumstances most European countries have beert, reluctant to apply to UNRRA for help. Exiled Governments found that if anything was to be gained it could best be gained by bringing political pressure on the combined boards. France and Belgium found their colonies a valuable asset in this game of power' politics, while the Norwegian Government found it necessary to remind its British allies that Norwegian seamen were bringing food, fuel and other supplies to Britain while their own countrymen were being deprived of the barest necessities. Last month, when Lord Huntingdon asked the British Government why some countries which urgently needed relief seemed reluctant to apply to UNRRA he was told that it was because "the Governments of

these countries feel that they can handle the problem quite adequately themselves." The critics say that this answer conveniently skirted the fact that these countries had originally shown the greatest desire to participate in international co-ordination of their post-war relief plans until UNRRA's limitation were exposed. Graver Charge UNRRA is now facing a graver charge by its critics —that relief and rehabilitation supplies are being used for a political weapon contrary to all previous resolutions and promises. This, doubtless, is untrue in so far as UNRRA itself and its highprincipled administrators are concerned. But in so far as military and political authorities have usurped UNRRA's functions UNRRA has lacked the chance to put its own resolutions to the test. There is a very thin dividing line between the deliberate use of food as a political weapon and its automatically becoming a political influence. When the Pierlot Government in Belgium was on the point of collapse late last year, Supreme Allied Headquarters rushed extra food allocations to Belgium. During last autumn Mr. Churchill pressed for an increase in the Italian bread ration at a time when Italian votes in, the American Presidential election had to be considered. After the election the ration was again reduced. Mr. Eden and Greece When the British Foreign Secretary (Mr. Eden) went to Greece before the political crisis he guaranteed generous food supplies, but when the storm broke UNRRA was ordered to withdraw, against its own wishes, and food distribution was left in the hands of General Scobie's forces. All this may have been merely fortuitous in its political effects. But read as part of the UNRRA debacle as a whole it provides easy propaganda for cynics ready to discover sinister motives in Allied "relief and rehabilitation." It appears that the damage can be repaired at this late stage only by determined intervention by inter-nationally-minded people.