RUSSIA AND THE SECOND FRONT

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 200, 24 August 1943, Page 2

RUSSIA AND THE SECOND FRONT

JF happenings which normally would be regarded as unmistakable in meaning can be passed over as possessing no significance, then perhaps all is well in the relationship of Britain and the United States with the Soviet Union. If it is of no consequence that the Soviet is not represented at the Quebec conference and that (according to Moscow) its representative was not invited; if the replacement of M. Litvinov by a junior diplomat as Ambassador at Washington is a routine happening—then appearances are perversely misleading. But despite the extreme reticence, amounting to pretence, by which- the whole subject has been surrounded, it is unfortunately hard to avoid the conclusion that Anglo-American-Soviet relationships are bad and growing worse. The veil of pretence has been drawn aside to some extent in a London message published in this issue, declaring that there is a growing realisation that the position is not as good as it might be, despite /'official bland optimism." Russian opinion, as expressed by the army newspaper, is revealed as more than cool towards the Allied nations. The Red Star's slighting reference to the Sicilian battle, its declaration that the opportunity created by the Red Army offensive has not been utilised, and its assertion that the Russians are suspicious of British and American intentions and policy, are significant and disturbing.

_ This is the time, obviously, when consultations among the three major Allies should be frequent and free, the time when good relations established by Ambassadors should be fruitful of results. Yet this is the time chosen by the Kremlin to recall M. Litvinov from Washington and to retain M. Maisky in Moscow. Litvinov's value to the Kremlin lay in his long experience of the Western Powers and his good standing in the United States and Britain. In 1939, when the Kremlin decided that it had nothing in particular to hope for from the democratic Powers, Litvinov was suddenly replaced and relegated to obscurity, where he remained until, Germany having invaded Russia, and the Kremlin desiring hastily to refurbish its relationships with the democracies, he became useful again. His recall and apparent relegation now cannot be thought of as unimportant. On the contrary, considered with other happenings, it must be regarded as an indication of the Soviet's extreme dissatisfaction with the course of events. What has happened? After the British-American victory in Tunisia had rounded off the North Africa campaign, Marshal Stalin expressed lively satisfaction with the achievement and the prospect. His references to the Allies had never been so cordial; his expectations and confidence of Allied action were high.

Since then his Allies have struck Germany tremendously hard from the air, and he has launched a summer offensive, which has gone well. They have conquered Sicily; Italy has "cracked," and soon must get out of the war, or be knocked out. In these circumstances it might be expected that the three major Allies would be co-operating more closely than ever before; and to millions of people it is a deep disappointment that this is not happening. They had better be told why. The last time it was pretended that, despite appearances, BritishSoviet relationships were normal, the pretence was brutally shattered by the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. There is a hint in to-day's message that a conference in which Russia will be represented may be held as a sequel to Quebec. Such a conference cannot be held too soon, and in the light of recent developments it should be very strongly urged. We" may hear the old story that any signs of division among the Allies will be eagerly seized upon by the Germans for propaganda purposes. Better that than turning a-blind eye to a course of events which, unless promptly checked, may lead to very serious consequences.