CM BEFORE STORM FOR AMIES OF AXIS

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 91, 17 April 1943, Page 5

CM BEFORE STORM FOR AMIES OF AXIS

ALLIES PREPARING

Warfare In Difficult Hilly Terrain

N.Z. Press Association—Copyright Rec. 1 p.m. LONDON, April 16. The Tunisian campaign has reached a less spectacular stage. Von Arnim's and Rommel's forces are firmly holding prepared defensive positions generally based on ravines, gullies and hills, but this is merely the calm before the storm for the Axis. Morocco radio reports that the Eighth Army is again massing for a new large-scale attack. Vichy radio says General Anderson is bringing up considerable infantry reinforcements. Rome radio states that powerful enemy reinforcements of ships and war material continue to pour into North- African ports. "Our valiant soldiers are fighting the most powerful army in the world," the announcer declared. Allied aircraft, based on North Africa, ■ the Middle East and Malta, are battering the Axis shipping bases, shipping, aerodromes, road, rail and supply routes in Sardinia, Sicily and Tunis. Summary of Land Situation The land situation can be summarised as follows:—In the northThe First Army has made -an important territorial gain with the capture of Jebelang Peak, which is over 2000 ft high and is 80 miles northwest of Medjez el Bab. Artillery covers the road from Medjez el Bab to Tunis and also somewhat neutralises the German-held Longstop Hill, south-west of Jebelang, from which the German artillery is able to fire on the Medjez el Bab-Tunis and the Medjez el Bab-Teburba roads.

In the centre the French are engaged in incessant fighting in the region of Djebel Sefsouf, which is an

important hill 25 miles south of Jebelang. The French captured Jebel Sefsouf two days ago, but deep ravines and gorges strongly held by the Axis are holding up progress to Pont du Fahs, which is the French objective. Pont du Fahs is one of the key defences.

Eighth Army's Position In the south the Eighth Army tanks, armoured cars and mobile infantry mopped up German pockets on the plain before Enfidaville. The army now faces a line of rugged mountain ridges. Their task is similar to that of the First Army. There is no room for wide flanking movements. Tanks are almost handicapped out of the race so that operations in the immediate future are likely to be confined to close infantry work, supported by artillery and aircraft.

Spurred by the realisation of the peak's great tactical importance, the Germans again attacked and retook the height. Tired British infantry in the evening made a desperate effort, cleared out the Germans and gained fresh ground east of the peak. Tanks and motorised forces could not be employed in this rugged terrain. The battle was a grim fight between the infantry for every vantage point. Pack mules were the only feasible form of transport. The two British brigades brought up all their supplies by mule train. Part of American Troops The United States Secretary of War, Mr. H. L. Stimson, in his weekly war review, said the American troops played an important part in the major victory in Tunisia. He explained that the Americans did not drive through to the coast to intercept Rommel's forces because they were under strict orders not to advance beyond a certain designated line in the hills.

In the master plan the major task was assigned to the Eighth Army, while the Americans in' Central Tunisia, the French forces in Ousseltia Valley, and the British First Army in the north were allotted holding operations. LieutenantGeneral G. S. Patton's thrusts forced Rommel to divert so much armour to protect his flank that the breaking of the Mareth Line by the Eighth Army was greatly facilitated.'

Mr. Stimson estimated the strength of the Axis armies in Tunisia at 175,000 to 200,000 men. He said: "There is no indication that the enemy plans a major evacuation of this force. The Axis occupies a naturally strong position, with indications that siege fortifications are defending key points. The enemy has two good harbours and a number of airfields.

"It is possible, however, that the enemy might attempt to extricate the bulk of his troops over a period of several weeks. On the other hand, the Axis leaders may have determined to delay the general offensive against Germany by holding Tunisia as long as possible and inflicting heavy losses on the Allies, even if it should mean losing most of the Axis forces in North Africa, where the Allies numerically are stronger and possess clear mastery of the air."