THE GREAT WAR.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVI, Issue 130, 4 June 1935, Page 9

THE GREAT WAR.

SECRET ALLIANCES.

THE PRIME CULPRITS

PROF. RUTHERFORD'S VIEW

Causes leading up to the Great War were discussed by Professor J. Rutherford, who holds the chair of history at the Auckland University College, in a paper presented to the Royal Society of New Zealand Science Congress in Dunedin. Briefly, the professors opinion may be summarised in a few words. He said: "It ie impossible in the narrow limits of this paper to investigate the question of war guilt fully, or even in its broad outline." He would be content if he had shown that there was at least room for questioning the view that Germany and Austria were the eole authors of the war, and that the Powers of the Entente and the Alliance alike must share the responsibility in various degrees. "My own view is tiiat a more correct assessment of war guilt would convict Ruesia, Servia and Austria as the prime culprits in that order with France, Germany and England guilty of complicity before the deed. The only European nation that can plead innocence in the matter is Belgium."

Britain's Moral Obligation. The speaker went into considerable detail in bringing before Ins audience documentary evidence, lhe German White Book of August 3, 1914, was concerned to dofend Germany's peace efforts in July of that year and ascribe their failure to Russian mobilisation whllo negotiations were proceeding. Part of the German contention had been substantiated, but the White Book was discreetly eilont on Germany's commitments to Austria. The British White Paper and Blue Book of the same month were more complete and candid, but in omphaaieing the invasion of Belgium as the sole cauee of Britain's entry, hart done less than justice to the obligations the nation hart contracted to give military aid to Franca in the ovent of war. "Our moral obligation in this respect," ho said, "was i complete."

The Russian Orange Book strewed Russia's peace efforts, concealed the fact of mobilisation, and carefully avoided reference to Russia's aim in the Dardaiiolloa and her understandings with France, The Servian Blue Book (November, 1014) was merely a collection of allegations of Austrian oppression, nnd gave no hint of the active Servian propagandn sponsored by tho Ministry in Bosnia anil Herzegovina, The French Yellow Book of Dopombor consisted mainly of recrimination against Prussian militarism. The Austrian Red Book of February, lflir>, suppressed all thu important secret Berlin correspondence and did nothing to reveal tho real temper of the Cabinet in July, 1014.

"The war strain aggravated national animosity," the professor added, "and preordained it that the victorious allies should bo blind in their condemnation of Germany's other assneintee. Tho Commission of Responsibility of tho Authors of the War n(firmed* that tho war was premeditated and planned by Germany and hor associates, nnd on this basis tho peace treaties were erected," 111-founded Charge. The opening up of the official archives of Russia, Germany, Austria and England in post-war years, ho said, plus the flood of memoir mnterial of politicians nnd others involved in the i"ent In question, provided mnterial fij- the exhaustive revision of an ill-founded charge. The fundamental cause of the war lay in the growth of the system of the secret allianeoß after 1871, growth which was undoubtedly fostered by Bismarck in the interests of the German Empire. But Germany's interest was peace. After INOO the Franco-Russian entente and military alliance produced the division of Europe into two diplomatic "blocs," but oven then the development was natural, and, on the whole, pacificatory.

The clangers of the system, however, became Increasingly apparent after about 1900, Rnglaifd'e emergence from isolation and her entente with France and Russia upset the European balance

and encouraged. German fears of "encirclement" and inferiority. Acute Anglo-German rivalry due to Germany's desire to build a navy, and England's determination to maintain a two-to-one superiority, produced a dangerous tension. French advances in Morocco produced German protests. The effect was to consolidate the Anglo-French pact. Britain's entry into the war depended legally upon Parliament, but morally the English Cabinet was pledged in advance. The clash of Austrian and Russian and Servian ambitions in the Balkans provided the ultimate crisis which led to catastrophe, and in the affairs of the Near East, Germany played, in a sense, a secondary role as the ally of Austria.