CONSTITUTIONALISM.

Auckland Star, Volume LXIII, Issue 136, 10 June 1932, Page 6

CONSTITUTIONALISM.

I liavc a full realisation of the sort of criticism that may be levelled at me for daring to question a decision of the Privy Oouncil. Nevertheless, I express the view that the recent decision with reference to the abolition of the Upper House in New South Wales is constitutionally unsound in principle. The British conception of constitutionalism is that the power of the people is paramount. The power of Parliament is merely the foregoing power delegated, and it necessarily ranks second to the direct power of the people. When the Bavin Parliament legislated in this matter, it ordained that what it then did should not be undone by any succeeding Parliament of equal power with itself. In doing thw, it placed itself above its equals, which is illogical and absurd. It ordained that its Act should not be set aside by any power less than the highest, namely, that of l the people, speaking by mean/3 of a referendum. By taking this attitude, the Bavin Parliament placed itself on an equality with the ultimate constitutional power from which it had obtained its own inferior and delegated power. In short, it took up the position of being at once both equal and inferior to the ultimate power, which is impossible. The Privy Council has now virtually decided that the part is equal to the whole. Of course, the position would have been otherwise if the Bavin Government itself had been backed by a referendum or even a substantial majority mandate on this question at ttie elections. The exercise of duly delegated power is constitutional, but all usurpation of power is unconstitutional INTERESTED.