THE ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE.

Auckland Star, Volume LI, Issue 196, 17 August 1920, Page 5

THE ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE.

REFORMING CONSTITUTION. MR STATHAM'S BILL. ] (Special to "Star.") WELLINGTON, Monday. I When a bill is read a first time in Parl'ament it has not necessarily been even drafted- The "reading" is one of the convenient fictions which have fastened themselves on to legislative procedure to the comfort and advantage of ail concerned. This was the case with Mr. Statham's Elective Executive Bill, which was read a first time :n the House on Friday. The measure has not yet b«?»Ti printed, nor its details, it WOuM seem, very closely considered; but it will have to make its appearance in the House in due form on September 1, which ie the day selected for its second reading. The Prime Minister having argued when the member for Dunedin" Central brought down his proposal as an amendment to the Address-!n-Reply that it should be embodied in a private member's bill, he had no alternative to pro-1 m.sing "a fair run" to the acceptance of hia suggestion, and this no doubt it wilL receive. WHAT IT MEANS. It is understood that Mr. Statham and the members who are collaborating with him in bh'e matter will frame their proposals on the lines of the bills introduced by the late Sir William Steward some years ago. These provided for the election of the members of the Ministry by a ballot of the House .and the allotment of the variou- portfolios between themselves. Mr. Massey h'mself was at one time an ardent supporter of this scheme, holding that it was the only means of restraining the undue dominance of the Prime Minister, but after the death of Mr. Seddon he renounced his former profession of faith and gave his vote and influence to the maintenance of the existing system. Sir Joseph Ward also supported Sir William Steward's bills, but in late years has not _.g-d their principle on his own behat. j FORMER OBJECTIONS. j An obvious object'on to Sir William Steward's proposals was that they inevitably would lead to the election of the members of the Ministry by the dominant party in the House, and not by the House as a whole. The leader of the dominant party in the House, who would 'have established himself in h'-sj position at the preceding election, would nominate his Ministers to the caucus and the caucus would confirm their appointment under the provisions of the Elective Executive legislation. It is conceivable, of course, that the dominant! pa. _y mignt contain a sufficient ntimoe. of members of "independent" tendencies to upset the choice of their leader by coalescing with the Opposition, but in this case it would be open to the leader to res'gn and to throw upon the malcontents the responsibility of disorganising and possibly defeating the party they had been returned to support. ITS ADVANTAGES. On the other hand, it was argued by Sir William Steward and his fr'ends that the election of the Executive by the House would lead to the selection of the best men available, would check the arrogance of a self-willed leader, would make each Minister responsible for the administration of his own Departments, ana i.ou,d enable the liouse to get rid of an unsatisfactory member of the Cabinet without dismissing the whole of hiscolleagues. All these advantages, how-' ever, would depend upon the Prime M'nister being prepared to abrogate the, privileges and authority he enjoys underj the present Constitution and to settle! down as a member of a team in which ! ho would have no more effective voice! than the least of his colleagues. It I would be an act of self-abnegation that would not come easy to the average I party leader. " j