NAVAL DEFENCE.

Auckland Star, Volume XXVII, Issue 19, 23 January 1896, Page 8

NAVAL DEFENCE.

INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL , I BRIDGE. RECENT IMPORTANT EVENTS. EFFECTIVENESS OF BRITAIN'S WAR FLEE TS—LAND DEFENCES. An interview with Admiral Bridge aboard B.M a. Orlando, Norfolk Bay, was obtained by the "Argus" correspondent in Tasmania. Admiral Bridge was connected with the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty. He declined to express any opinion on the political aspect of the present difficulty wibh Germany, bub waa delighted to see that Admiral Dole had been appointed to the command of the new flying squadron. This squadron, said Admiral Bridge, was one oi several capable of being mo?ed rapidly from poinb to poinb, and in fact was of a character such as had long been advocabed ,by many naval officers, himself included. Admiral Dale, who was an officer of bhe highesb ability, was in command of H.M.o. Diamond on tho Australian station when he (Admiral Bridge) commanded H.M.e. ffispiegle. (■•* When asked what was tho extent of the naval force immediately available at the Capo, the Admiral replied thab 11 vessels jwere thero, and tho same number on tha ' Australian station. Concerning tha opinion thab Russia was desirous of obtaining foothold in the south-east of Africa, Admiral Bridge expressed the conviction thab either Dutch or Portuguese territory would be useless to Russia. "The possession of fortified stations adds little bo the naval power of any country," he remarked, " unless accompanied by a corresponding addition to a movable naval force. Turkey has tho moßb powerfully fortified coasts in tho world, and yeb hor naval power may bo regarded as" nob far irora insignificant, bub if she doubled bhe strength of hor coast defences, her naval power would b<} unaffected. Some people think powerful uiaterial the most important characteristic of war efficiency, tho Dardanelles for example, but tho history of war defence leads to a different opinion. In roaliby no strength of fortification would defend any country from naval attack unless ib has a sufficient military force to combat an assailant wherever appearing. Ib cannot be too often repeated to people in various parts of bho British Empire thab, although considerable additions have been made to tho British Mavy in rocent year«, thore still exists ample reason for maintaining an efficient military service ashc-re" Miaundcratanding on thia point ia deplorable." Tho British navy Admiral Bridge conDid erod strong enough to hopelessly ruin any enemies' attempt at conqueab. and bo give reasonable protection to our vasb ocean trade. Still it would nob be strong enough to guanmtee evory port in tbe British empirn against attacks which might be of sufficient magnitudo to cause intense damage and misery. To give reasonable security against such attacks every place Bhould be provided with sufficient trained soldiers, to beat off an enemy. Our navy was strong onouf'h to prevent any large hostile expedition slipping through its finger*, but nob to furnish an absolute barrier to all raids within, say, 24 hours; but a few hundred men, well armed and trained, would make a raider think many times b-afore attempting an attack. Still, the British navy wan so strong that we need not four anybody but ourselves. Its force tit present numbered over 95,000 available officers and men without counting the res«rves, and this was considerably moro than tho aggreyato warfooting of two of bho mosb powerful navies in the world. The position in the Mediterranean ab tho present timo was thab Russia had one small vessel thero, her other vessels being aa far off bhe Wesb Mediterranean, as those mon-of-war on the British coast. Franco had seven first-class and one second-class battleship and two cruiser", all of modern typo those, and 10 smaller vessels, but hor icservo waa nob manned with full crews excepb at manoeuvres.' The Bribish had 10 firsb-class battleships, all of modern type, one firat-class cruiser, three second-class and three thirdclass and twenty torpedo vessels, besides eight small vessels of the Karrakatba type in the Mediterranean. In addibion, the Channel squadron luually wintered at Gibraltar.

Referring to tho disposition of the Australian uquadron, Admiral Bridge said that ib was commonly believed that the ships would be well employed in the defence of particular localities, but thia was opposed to all well understood naval strategy, nnd completely refuted nearly every page of British naval liißtory, " There !R only one position in war time," his Excellency continued, " fo»----tho British man of-war to occupy, and that is in closo proximity to the enemy's ships. Tho Australian squadron could not be considered a social institution to steam from port to port, bub had incomparably higher functions to perform. In past history badly managed naval combinations had invariably been duo to interference by shore-going people sufficiently influential to be effective in the wrong direction. Tho fleet remains ab Norfolk Bay until about January 23rJ, and will then rendezvous at Hobarb.