MOST DISPUTED CAMPAIGN

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 66, Issue 248, 1 August 1946, Page 5

MOST DISPUTED CAMPAIGN

INVASION OF SOUTH OF FRANCE REPORT OF OPERATION RELEASED (N.Z. Press Association —Copyright.) LONDON, July 30. Varying judgments among British and American Chiefs-of-Staff of the value of an invasion of the South of France in August, 1944, made the campaign one of the most disputed of the war. according to Field-Marshal Lord Maitland Wilson, formerly Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean. whose report to the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff was publish-

ed to-day. Field-Marshal Maitland Wilson at one time wanted the whole operation cancelled, because he thought it unwise to divert forces from the more important Italian campaign and because he could not be assured that he would get the necessary men and material. It was General Eisenhower’s insistence which finally decided the matter.

Only 11 days before the landings Field-Marshal Maitland Wilson was asked by the British Cliiefs-of-Staff to examine with the greatest secrecy if he could divert all resources to tjie ports of Britanny. The American Chiefs-af-Staff could not agree to this diversion. They were convinced that landings in the South of France would be successful, after which a Rhone Valley advance would be rapid. It was not until March 10 that the combined Chiefs-of-Staff decided that the assault should proceed as planned. _The landings were made on August, 15. -

Field-Marshal Wilson, in . February and March, 1944, proposed that the projected operation be cancelled, because the odds were against the allotment of sufficient forces. Fie told the British Chiefs-of-Staff that the' South of France plan implied a strategy aimed at defeating Germany in the first half of 1945 at the cost of an opportunity to defeat her before the end of 1944. Although the British earlier supported this, the Combined Chiefs’ decision was that the invasion would be made. General Eisenhower wanted a minimum of three divisions for the assault. The Combined Chiefs proposed two. General Eisenhower opposed any measure which would make the operation impracticable through lack of resources.

Field-Marshal Wilson says that General Giraud, French Commander-in-Chief, jibbed when told that the commander would have to be an American general, though the troops were seven-eighths French. General de Gaulle similarly was concerned over French prestige. “When, on April 4, General Giraud ceased to he French Commander-in-QLief I shed no tears,” Field-Marshal Wilson added. “His influence to us was primarily as a figurehead,, as a stabilising influence on the French Army. Even General Juin, Chief-of-Staff to General Giraud, thought General Giraud’s retirement did not adversely' affect the morale of the French forces.”